EHRENZWEIG AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS:
AN INQUIRY INTO THE "RULE OF VALIDATION"
BRAINERD CURRIE*

A historian of philosophy-or was it a philosopher of history?-has
been quoted to the effect that one of the most difficult of all intellectual
feats is to take a familiar set of data and re-evaluate it in the light of a
novel hypothesis. In his treatise Professor Albert Ehrenzweig has performed just such a feat: he has taken the familiar cases on the Statute of
Frauds in the conflict of laws, heretofore treated chiefly as establishing
that the distinction between substance and procedure is determinative,
and has reviewed them in the light of the hypothesis that there exists a
"Rule of Validation" such that "contracts have been quite generally upheld," irrespective of "ambiguous and irrelevant" choice-of-law rules,
"where they have satisfied either the formality requirements of the law of
the forum or those of another proper law." 1 You will not be surprisedthose of you, that is, who have read the treatise-to be informed that
Ehrenzweig found his hypothesis confirmed by the data. In this paper I
propose to review the same cases and consider the extent to which I think
they support the Ehrenzweig hypothesis.' I shall not attempt a feat similar
to Ehrenzweig's-that is, to re-evaluate the same familiar data in the light
of my own rather novel hypothesis, which is that the courts in deciding
problems of the Statute of Frauds in the conflict of laws do so (or should
do so) by reference to the policies and interests of the states involved,
upholding legitimate domestic interests even when they truly conflict with
those of another state, and certainly when there is no such conflict; but
that they do not often indulge in either unconstitutional discrimination or
* William R. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University.-Ed.
1 EHmENzWEG, A TREATiSE ON THE CoN erucT
o LAWS 473 (1962) ; see also id. at 353
thereinafter cited as EHRENZWEiG].
2 This symposium was conceived as a tribute to Ehrenzweig and his treatise. Except
that the sheer industry and diligence demanded by such an achievement are grounds for appreciation and congratulation, I know of no sincere way to honor a scholar except to subject his
scholarship to critical analysis. If for this occasion I have chosen a phase of his work that is
more vulnerable to criticism than others (I have already predicted that his hypothesis as to
the Statute of Frauds will not survive analysis: Currie, Book Review, 1964 DUXE L. J. 424,
429-31), I regret the generally negative impression that will inevitably result. I should like it
to be distinctly understood that there are many aspects of the treatise I find wholly admirable.
I should find it simply tiresome, however, and not very constructive, to write about those
things with which I am in full agreement.
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in short-sighted provincialism, nor do they often apply domestic law when
the forum state has no interest in the matter. I have no confidence that I
could demonstrate that these data vindicate this hypothesis. Consistently
with my usual experience in research in choice-of-law matters, I find the
cases rather in a mess, and in no mood to have order imposed upon them.
To me the cases seem to be determined by a large variety of considerations.
All too often the results seem dictated by devout and orthodox commitment
to the fundamentalist theology of territorialism and vested rights; sometimes they seem to reflect simple provincialism; sometimes the courts seem
to be manipulating traditional rules for choice of law in order to achieve
what appears to them to be the "just" result-which usually, though not
always, means upholding an informal contract. I dare not claim that these
cases demonstrate that, as a matter of living law, cases are decided on the
basis of the governmental interests involved, though many of these turn
out to be consistent with that analysis. The most I can offer by way of
competition with Ehrenzweig is that my hypothesis furnishes a better guide
than his for predicting the result that a court will reach in such a conflicts
case-though not the reasons the court will give. In addition, I may venture
to suggest that we should all be better off if my hypothesis had, indeed,
been the principle actually informing the decisions of the courts.'
Ehrenzweig begins with the advantage that his hypothesis is not
altogether novel but enjoys some support from Corbin,4 a respected and
sophisticated writer on contracts, and Lorenzen,5 a respected and sophisticated writer on conflict of laws. With becoming modesty, Corbin did not
offer his opinion as that of an expert on the conflict of laws;' indeed, like
other eminent jurists, including Cardozo,7 he confessed a degree of be3 On this occasion I find it desirable for several reasons to limit myself to the data-the
cases-on which Ehrenzweig bases his conclusion. I have found it necessary further to limit
the discussion to the cases cited in the treatise, omitting those cited only in Ehrenzweig, The
Statute of Frauds in the Conflict of Laws: The Basic Rule of Validation, 59 COLUM. L. REv.
874 (1959). At a later time, perhaps, I will examine both the cases cited in the article and
relevant cases not cited by Ehrenzweig at all. The treatise cites some 97 cases, the article 24
more. 2 CoR
ON CONTRACTS §§ 293, 294 (1950, Supp. 1964) [hereinafter cited as CoRBnN]
cites 32 cases not cited by Ehrenzweig; LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
ch. 11 (1947), cites 67 more; and HE=iAN, THE CONFLICT or LAWS AND TiE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS (1961) cites 78 more.
4 2 CORBIr, §§ 293-94.

5 Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws, 32 YALE L. J. 311 (1923),
LoRENzEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON TE CoNFLICT oF LAWS ch. 11 (1947).
62 CoRBIN, § 293 n. 57, citing RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934), and works by
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Cook, Goodrich, and Beale; he placed special faith in Professor Lorenzen's conclusions. Id. at
§ 294, n. 77 and related text.
7 CARDozo, TnE PARADoXEs oF LEGAL SCIENCE 67-68 (1928).
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wilderment concerning the esoterics of our specialty: . . . [T]here is conflict even in the rules applicable in making a choice among conflicting laws,
a conflict that is perhaps greater and more puzzling than that to which we
are accustomed in other matters."8 As I interpret his discussion of this subject, he took an Olympian view of the law of contracts, as he was entitled
to do, and believed that detached reason, oriented toward the practical
affairs of life, should be able to construct, at least within a fairly homogeneous society, a consistent and reasonably uniform law of contracts,
blemished by a minimum of aberrations resulting from ignorance, local
officiousness, and historical anomaly. Thus the law of contracts and its
handmaiden in certain situations, the law of conflict of laws, could facilitate
"movement, communication, or commercial transactions across State lines
or even across the boundaries of most nations."9 In the purely domestic
context the Statute of Frauds seemed to him at best an anachronism and a
poorly devised instrument of governmental policy. "Such gain in the prevention of fraud as is attained by the statute is attained at the expense of
permitting persons who have in fact made oral promises to break those
promises with impunity and to cause disappointment and loss to honest
men."o
This is a conclusion with which I heartily agree, and it is no wonder
that, as Corbin says, courts have in consequence been disposed "to interpret
the statute so narrowly as to exclude many promises from [the statute's]
operation on what may seem to be flimsy grounds."'- When this attitude is
transferred from the domestic to the interstate level, however, it leads
Corbin to embrace to some degree a philosophy of nullification with which
I cannot agree, although Ehrenzweig quotes him with enthusiasm: "If a
court is convinced that a contract has been made as alleged and that there
has been no fraud or perjury, it has no sympathy for a party whose only
excuse for repudiation is the lack of a statutory formality."' The Statute
of Frauds we have with us, whether we like it or not; and while courts may
construe it narrowly or even with hostility, sheer judicial nullification of
clear legislative intent is indefensible according to my conception of the
8 2 CoPaiu at 66.
9

d. at 65. See also id. at 66: ("achieving such a degree of nearness to uniformity as
[the court] may") ; id. at 73: "[In certain situations] our courts have nearly always enforced
the contract, just as sound moral and commercial policy requires"; id. at 74: ("[a statute of
the forum commanding local courts not to enforce a contract wherever made or to be performed, unless it complies with local requirements of formality] would be unreasonable and out
of harmony with our system of free interstate commerce.").

10 Id. at 3.
21 Ibid.
'2 Id. at 69, quoted in ERRENzwEiG at 470-71.
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judicial function; and, as I have said before, the deed is not justified merely
because it can be cloaked in the obfuscations of conflict-of-laws theory. 18
I once suggested that "In a conflict-of-laws case a court should have just
that degree of freedom to escape the compulsion of a disagreeable law that
it has in a purely domestic case, and no more."' 4 To avoid misunderstanding I should rephrase that suggestion somewhat, since in the conflict-oflaws situation the process of construction or interpretation may involve an
important factor never present in the domestic situation: the interest of
another state.' Thus in the conflicts case the court, while confining itself
to the method of statutory interpretation as distinguished from conventional choice-of-law theory, has a little more latitude to escape the compulsion of a disagreeable law than it has in the domestic case: recognition
of the interest of the foreign state is always a legitimate, and often an
admirable, approach to solution of the choice-of-law problem.' 0 But the
escape should be accomplished avowedly as a feat of construction or interpretation, so that it is plainly susceptible of legislative correction if that
should be thought desirable, rather than as one of deliberate nullification, or
of prestidigitation under the diverting influence of conflict-of-laws theory.
Lorenzen, in contrast, justifiably offered his opinion as that of a careful and critical student of the problems of conflict of laws; and while he
evinced no great affection for such formalities as those prescribed by the
Statute of Frauds, he stopped well short of advocating anything that could
be stigmatized as nullification in interstate cases.17 His principal concern
was to destroy the conventional notion that the problem of the Statute of
Frauds is essentially solved by classification of the statute as pertaining to
substance or to procedure-especially in so far as that notion was founded
on the sterile literalism of Leroux v. Brown.'" This he did with remarkable
persuasiveness, demonstrating that characterization of the forum's statute as procedural, with the consequence that any noncomplying contract is unenforceable notwithstanding its validity under the laws of one
or more interested foreign states, is largely devoid of any credible policy
basis, results in commercial inconvenience and injustice, and is out of
harmony with the laws of a number of states and foreign countries. His
13 Currie, Book Review, 1964 DuxE L. J., 424,431.
14 CURM, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 106 (1963)

[hereinafter cited

as Cum].
15 Id. at 93-94, 118, 279, 280, 368, 370, 422, 592, 604, 689, 717-18; Currie, The DisinterPROB. 754, 757, 762 (1963).

ested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEIE.

16 Cf. Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal.2d 588, 12 Cal.Rptr. 266, 360 P.2d 906 (1961).
17 LoRaNzFz, SELECTED ARTCLmES ON THE CoNmICT OF LAWS ch. 11 (1947) [hereinafter
cited as LORENZEN].
18 12 C.B. 801, 138 Eng.Rep. 1119 (C.P. 1852).
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thesis was that all statutes of frauds should be treated as substantive, not
procedural, so that the validity of any contract would be tested not by the
law of the forum merely as such but by the law of that state whose law
otherwise determined the validity-at least the formal validity--of the
contract. In the beginning he tended to assume that this was the law of the
place of contracting; 19 but when he arrived at the point of designating the
specific state whose law should appropriately supply the substantive rule
of decision he deliberately left the question open: "Whether [formalities]
should be deemed controlled by the law of the place of contracting, or by
the law of the place of performance, or, if the contract relates to land, by
the law of the situs, cannot be gone into here."2 His closest approach to a
position that would support Ehrenzweig's "Rule of Validation" was a
reference to an article on another subject in which he had suggested that
"a rule in the alternative" would "best meet the needs of interstate or
international business,"121 to which he added a suggestion that "the same
arguments would be applicable to the statute of frauds. 22
There is much to be said for a rule of alternative reference when there
has been substantial compliance with the essential policy expressed in the
law in question.23 Ordinarily, said Lorenzen, the allowable alternatives
should be the laws of states having a close connection with the transaction
at the time of its execution. "When, however, the mutual agreement of the
partiesis conceded, and the required mode of expressing that agreement is
alone in issue, as in the case of the statute of frauds, it might not be improper to enforce such foreign contract if it meets the requirements of the
lex Jori, though it is unenforceable under the lex loci or the law governing
the transaction in other respects."24 (Emphasis added.)
Observe that this qualified endorsement of a rule of alternative reference is a far cry from a plea for an indiscriminate "Rule of Validation."
The suggestion applies only where the mutual agreement of the parties is
conceded, and such concessions by no means occur routinely. Moreover,
Lorenzen hesitated to affirm with conviction the propriety of validation
by the law of the forum state when, apart from being the place of trial, it
has no significant relation to the parties, the subject matter, or the transaction. Substantially the same suggestion is repeated with somewhat more
conviction in the last of his three frequently quoted conclusions: "The
19 LOENzE N at 339.
20 Id.at 345-46.
21 Id. at 346, especially n. 76 and related text.
22
Ibid.
23 See CuRR3E at 186, discussing inter alia minor variations in the interest rates allowed
by laws regulating the small-loan business.
24

LoRENzEN at 346.
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peculiar nature of the statute of frauds makes it desirable, at least as a
matter of legislative policy, that contracts not enforceable under the law
of the state whose law determines the formalities of contracts in general
shall be enforced nevertheless if they meet the requirements of the statute
of the forum."2 5 Unless he meant that the Statute of Frauds is rather generally disliked and has been badly in need of at least repair for three centuries, I am not sure just what Lorenzen meant by his reference to its
"'peculiar nature"; and I call attention to the fact that again he qualified his
suggestion, this time by reference to legislative policy (to be distinguished
from judicial activism). Even so, I have serious reservations as to the
propriety and even constitutionality of validation according to the law of
the disinterested forum when this entails subversion of an actual protective
policy of the interested foreign state-as distinguished from equating
modes of proof that serve the same basic policy but differ in minor detail.
As for Lorenzen's two other conclusions, I am in substantial agreement with the first, which affirms that all statutes of frauds should be construed as substantive rather than procedural. Perhaps I go farther than he
did when I advocate that the substance-procedure dichotomy be discarded
altogether as worse than useless. I would, however, concede that a typical
statute of frauds may conceivably be given one or both of two interpretations: one, that it is for the protection of parties who are sued for nonperformance of alleged promises informally made (which roughly corresponds to the concept of the "substantive" statute); the other, that it is
a regulation of the administration of justice in the enacting state, designed
to relieve the courts from the embarrassment and frustration of attempting
to extract the truth from a welter of contradictory testimony without some
reasonable indicia of reliability, and to prevent their use as instruments of
extortion (which roughly corresponds to the concept of the "procedural"
statute). Of these two interpretations, however, the latter seems to me
implausible, and Lorenzen's examination of the treatment of the statute
in the purely domestic cases convincingly supports this view. I would stop
short, however, as I believe Lorenzen did, of denying to a court the prerogative of construing its Statute of Frauds as one designed to regulate the
administration of justice in the forum state. 20 Though many a court has
characterized its Statute of Frauds as "procedural," I can hardly imagine
any modern court's deliberately holding that it expresses a policy designed
to regulate the administration of justice in the courts; I would expect
reasonable men to agree today that the policy of the statute is designed
25

Id. at 351.

26

Cf., Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F.Supp. 333 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
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simply for the protection of defendants. Yet such is the colorable case that
can be made for the "housekeeping" characterization that I think it cannot
be stigmatized as utterly arbitrary and without foundation.
Lorenzen's second conclusion, that the Statute of Frauds "is not expressive of a public policy from the standpoint of the Conflict of Laws, so
as to preclude the enforcement of a foreign contract,"2 7 Ehrenzweig quotes
with relish;2" but plainly, Lorenzen is here speaking the idiom of conventional choice-of-law doctrine. According to that doctrine, once it has been
determined that an appropriate foreign law gives rise to a valid claim, the
forum will not decline to enforce it on grounds of "local public policy"
unless (to use Lorenzen's moderate statement of the formula) "[in]oral
considerations of a paramount character, sufficient to warrant a disregard
of private rights," are involved. 2 9 Within the framework of conventional
doctrine this is an impeccable statement, clearly supporting Lorenzen's
antipathy to the invocation of the forum's Statute of Frauds on grounds
of "local public policy" alone. If, however, forsaking the conventional system of choice-of-law rules, we seek our solution in construction or interpretation of the laws of the respective states, in an effort to determine the governmental policies expressed in them and the scope of each state's interest
in the application of its policy, we move policy from the status of a disfavored, last-ditch device for escaping some of the most disagreeable effects
of the system to a front-line instrument of analysis. In this light, Ehrenzweig can hardly find legitimate support in Lorenzen for his rather remarkable reference to "the demise of the anti-fraud policy in both domestic and
conflicts cases." 30 The Statute of Frauds in some form is, I believe, in force
in every state of the Union; 8 1 and some temerity is required to say that it
does not express an anti-fraud policy of some sort. 2
27

LoRpzEN at 351.

28

EmtNzwria at 472 n. l0.
Lo.ENz
at 351. For a more revealing formulation, see McGirl v. Brewer, 132 Ore.
at 445, 285 Pac. 208, 313 (1930), discussed in CuRRuE at 423; "The phrase 'public policy' is a
term which seems difficult of precise definition. Mr. Greenhood, in his work on public policy,
at page 46 thereof, has this to say about the expression: 'But when a contract is valid under the
public policy of the state where made, it will be enforced in another state, although the same
would by the statute laws of the latter state be void, unless its enforcement would exhibit to
the citizens of the state an example pernicious and detestable.'"
30 EHazENZiG at 472.
31 Cf. 2 CoRBIN at 66.
32 The strongest support for Ehrenzweig's thesis is perhaps to be found in HxmrAN, THE
CoIrucT op LAWS AND THE STATuTE OP FRAuDs (1961), which Ehrenzweig cites only once in
29

this narrow context (EHaENzwaso at 470-71 n. 1), and then only as generally supporting the
thesis. Heilman was a disciple of Corbin and, like Corbin, acknowledges his debt to Lorenzen
and Cook. Ehrenzweig's slight reliance on this book, coupled with the pressure of time and
space limitations, precludes a separate analysis here of Heilman's thesis.
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I begin with no such distinguished, though qualified, backing, though
I do not claim originality for my hypothesis and do expect to find most
of the cases at least consistent with it. I do begin with an abiding conviction
that the common-law tradition is fundamentally one of dedication to common sense; and that, while courts sometimes do rather silly thingschiefly under the influence of academic theorists-they will not lightly
nullify policies clearly expressed in legislation, nor often arrive at results
that are capriciously discriminatory, especially when the discrimination
is against local people.

THE ANCESTRAL CASE: LEROUX V. BROWN:
SUBSTANCE VERSUS PROCEDURE: LITERALISM
Clearly Ehrenzweig can derive no comfort from the "ill-famed" 3 but
mischievously influential decision in the leading English case of Leroux v.
Brown,34 and he claims none. 35 His treatment of it, however, is oddly at

variance with that of Lorenzen, on whom he so strongly relies. "Obviously,
[the English Statute of Frauds] originally demanded its application to both
domestic and foreign contracts in view of its policy which was directed
against perjury and fraud."3 6 I agree with Lorenzen that the anti-fraud
policy was probably designed for the protection of alleged promisors, not
of courts; accordingly, it never "demanded" application to actions in
English courts involving transactions abroad between people in whom
England had no interest. Ehrenzweig does deplore, as both Lorenzen and
I do, the perverse literalism of the Court of Common Pleas, and also that
court's emplacement of the notion that, on the basis of literalism or otherwise, the line of classification between substance and procedure is decisive.3 7 Yet he finds a peculiar kind of personal satisfaction in the decision:
had the court faithfully interpreted the anti-fraud policy of the statute (as
Ehrenzweig interprets it), the decision "would have foreclosed that express
recognition of the Rule of Validation [sic], which is now quickly becoming
necessary in view of the demise of the anti-fraud policy in both domestic
and conflicts cases."3 8 I am almost tempted to terminate my discussion at
this point. I have already remarked that Ehrenzweig has no warrant for
signing a death certificate for the anti-fraud policy; and his admission
33 EHRENZEIG at 472, quoting Rabe].

34 12 C.B. 801, 138 Eng. Rep. 1119 (C.P. 1852).
35 EHRENZWEIG, note 33, supra.
36 EHRNZwEiG at 471.

37 EmaNzw~ax at 471-72.
38 EHRENZWEiG at 472.
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(or assertion) that Leroux v. Brown was in its rationale (though not in result) a subversion of the original policy of the statute, without which the
"Rule of Validation" would be foreclosed, sounds like the death knell of
the "Rule of Validation" rather than of the anti-fraud policy. 9
Such is my own dislike of the crass literalism and the progeny of
Leroux v. Brown that I almost disdain to seek any support in it for my
thesis. It must be noted, however, that the decision not only effectuated
any judicial-administration policy that might be attributed to the Statute,
but also effectuated the unquestioned personal protective policy for the
benefit of an Englishman transacting business with another Englishman
residing in France. Resort to the continental theory of the time, according
to Ehrenzweig, might have validated the contract by reference to the law
of the place of contracting or of performance, or to the "intention of the
parties."40 That would have subverted any policy that could reasonably be
attributed to the Statute. So would a "Rule of Validation." The fact that
the decision may be said to have undermined a policy of France designed
to vindicate the reasonable expectations of its residents including British
subjects) does not disturb me. Any other result, to be acceptable to me,
must be the product of a Bernkrant type of operation: 41 the court might
have recognized the protective policy of the Statute, but, in deference to
the presumed contrary interest of France, might have declined to assert
30 Corbin also took a peculiar view of Leroux v. Brown. After saying that "in the interests
of justice and of commerce, the contrary should have been held," 2 CoRBnX at 67-68, and
characterizing the reasoning as "mere verbalism," he concluded that the reasoning is further
vitiated by "the more important fact that the true basis for decision is the prevailing business
mores and the commercial interests of Englishmen." Id. at 68. I assume he did not mean that
such was the true basis for this decision, for that would be nonsense, and Corbin did not, to
my knowledge, write nonsense. I assume he meant that such ought to have been the basis of
decision, and that it would have produced the contrary result. Still the comment is remarkable.
How did Corbin determine the prevailing business mores in England and/or France circa 1852?
And is not an Act of Parliament, however dated, a relevant consideration in determining the
commercial interests of Englishmen in the matter of judicial enforcement of alleged oral
promises?
40 EMHENZWEiG at 471. If the question is, as it usually (though not always) is in statuteof-frauds cases, whether any promise has been made at all, how can the "intention of the
parties" be a relevant consideration?
41 See Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal.2d 588, 12 Cal.Rptr. 266, 36 P.2d 906 (1961). As I
construe that case the court said in effect: Our Statute of Frauds expresses a policy for the protection of decedents' estates. We would be constitutionally justified in applying that policy to
deny this claim against the estate of a local domiciliary; but in the light of the sister state's
evident policy of vindicating the reasonable expectations of its people, in the circumstances of
this case we shall not attribute to our legislature an intention that the Statute be applied to
invalidate the contract. If we are wrong the legislature can correct us.
If, in the subsequent course of this discussion, I use some such expression as "to perform
a Bernkrant," this is the technique to which I shall be referring.
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for England an interest in the application of that policy in the circumstances of the case. That kind of operation would have been rather difficult
on those facts, however, and in any event the court said nothing remotely
resembling what I have just suggested it might have said. In short, everything about the case except the result is indefensible.4 2
II
THE "RULE OF VALIDATION"
A. Lip Service to Official Doctrine and the Quest for Just Results by
Resort to PrecariousDevices
"Pending... [express recognition of the 'Rule of Validation' [sic]],
courts, while paying lip service to official doctrine, have been compelled
to seek just results by such precarious devices as . .. , those to be listed
immediately below:
1. "[A]rbitrary (primary or secondary) characterizations....
The cases cited in the note following this statement will be individually considered, care being taken to note any qualification appended to the citation:
a. Global Commerce Corp. v. Clark-BabbittIndus., Inc.44 ("best
practicalresult").45 In this action by a Mexican corporation against a New
York corporation for breach of a contract to sell copra, the New York
Statute of Frauds being pleaded, the court did indeed hold the contract
valid and enforceable, but hardly by paying "lip service" to "official doctrine," unless Ehrenzweig means that such doctrine is embodied in modern
decisions of the New York courts and in the nascent restatement of the
4 I do not see that characterization, primary
Restatement.
or secondary,
has anything to do with the decision. Applying as he understood it the New
York mystique for choice of law in contract cases, Judge Learned Hand
found the validating Mexican law applicable because (1) the transaction
had its "center of gravity" in Mexico; (2) Mexico had the "most signifi42 As if to discredit the authority of Leroux v. Brown, Ehrenzweig cites at this point
(p. 471, n. 6) Reade v. Lamb, 6 Exch. 130, 155 Eng. Rep. 483 (1851), and Carrington v. Roots,
2 M.&W. 248, 150 Eng. Rep. 748 (Exch. 1837). These are not conflicts cases, but merely hold
that for certain purposes in the domestic context the difference between the language used in
§§ 4 and 17 of the Statute is not significant. That the difference should have no significance for
conflicts purposes I, of course, not only concede but stoutly maintain.
43 EmmNZWEXl at 472. All the cases under this subhead A are cited in id. at 472 nn. 11-16.
44 239 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1956).
45 The italics here and in similar instances indicate that the language, treated as part of
my caption, is taken from EHMENZWEIG.
46
lsTATSNT (SEcoaN), CoTI'rcT oF LAWS, § 332b (Tent. Draft No. 6 (1960)).
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cant contacts"; (3) Mexico was most intimately concerned with the outcome; and (4) application of Mexican law produced the "best practical
result." I do not begrudge Ehrenzweig any comfort he may find in the
decision. Because of its subordination of New York's apparent interest in
protecting New York enterprises it is inconsistent with my version of governmental-interest analysis, unless a Bernkrant operation47 can be justified.
I derive little comfort from the vague way in which the early-modern New
York cases groped toward something like governmental-interest analysis.
b. Renault v. L. N. Renault & Sons. 8 This case upholds an
informal contract in an interstate situation, but hardly by tricky characterization as a device to evade official doctrine. As I read the case there was
simply no conflict. The plaintiff, a resident of Pennsylvania, as widow and
executrix of a sometime president of the defendant New Jersey corporation,
sought to recover on a 27-year-old unsealed demand note issued by the
corporation to the decedent, its president at the time. It is clear that at one
time the claim was time-barred, so that the plaintiff's only reliance was
on a new promise, express or implied. Two statutes requiring a writing
were involved: the New Jersey statute of limitations required a writing
for a promise to pay a barred debt; and the New Jersey Statute of Frauds
required a writing for a contract not to be performed within a year. The
court assumed, without deciding, that New Jersey was the place of contracting and that therefore both that state's statute of limitations (! ) and
its Statute of Frauds were controlling. Even so, it reversed the lower court's
judgment for the defendant and remanded for a jury trial because (1) according to the plain terms of the New Jersey statute of limitations, the
requirement of a writing did not alter the effect of part payment as tolling
the staute, and the jury might find that certain payments that had been
made were in partial payment of the note; and (2) the New Jersey Statute
of Frauds, according to New Jersey authorities, applied only where neither
party was to perform within a year, and moreover did not apply, though
performance within a year was neither required nor rendered, if full performance might have been had within a year. This, of course, is familiar
doctrine. There is no suggestion that Pennsylvania law in any way presented an obstacle to the enforcement of the promise. There being no conflict, I cannot see how the case supports Ehrenzweig's strictures on the
methods employed by the courts to reach just results; nor can I comment
on its consistency with governmental-interest analysis.
49 ("A
c. Marie v. Garrison.
body of literature has grown up
47 See note 41, supra.
48 188 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1951).
49 13 Abb.N.Cas. 210 (N.Y.Super.Ct. 1883).
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about [this case], which appliedtwo characterizations.")This undeservedly
famous case has been grossly oversimplified by almost everyone who, to
my knowledge, has ever commented on it, including Ehrenzweig and me.5°
This is understandable: the case is hardly worth reading and well-nigh
unreadable. I doubt that Ehrenzweig or anyone else has read it in full in
this century; 5 even for this occasion I have been unable to force myself
to read it line by line. In the past I (for one) have relied on casebook
condensations.5 2 This negligence is understandable if not pardonable. The
decision is not only that of a trial court; the opinion is by a referee. It consumes 123 to 130 pages in the reports, depending on whether preliminary
matter is counted. The opinion is meticulous and learned to the point of
tedium and pedantry. This may not be surprising in view of the fact that
the referee, one Dwight, was a law professor: indeed, he was the famous
Theodore Dwight, founder of the Columbia Law School."8
We all think of the case as presenting the singular paradox that a contract made in Missouri and sued on in New York was held enforceable
despite noncompliance with the statute of either state, although the two
statutes were similar. The conventional explanation lies in the fact that the
excessively learned referee, as Ehrenzweig suggests, characterized the Missouri statute as procedural, and hence inapplicable to actions in New York,
and the New York statute as substantive, and hence inapplicable to contracts made in Missouri. This the referee did in fact do, primarily on
familiar literal grounds; 54 nonetheless, this explanation of the seeming
50 CURRIE at 153 n. 80.
51

When I said this in my oral presentation at Chicago, only one person came forward
to correct the statement. Professor Joseph Laufer, of the University of Buffalo, said that he had
once struggled through the whole opinion. Professor Arthur von Mehren, of Harvard, has
since told me that in preparing his recent casebook he read almost all of it.
52 E.g., CHEATHAMr, GRISWOLD, REESE, AND ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 423 (5th ed. 1964).

53 The referee is identified as Prof. Dwight in Hotel Woodward Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,
258 Fed. 322, 328 (2d Cir. 1919) (note 128, infra). The Centennial History of Columbia Law
School recounts Dwight's participation in the case and cites prior and subsequent events in
the litigation, including a reference to an invaluable (if one is interested) account of the case
by Tremain in SWIFr (ed.), A TRIBUTE To THEODORE WOOLSEY [sic] DWIGHT. ..PRESENTED ON
His RESIGNATION FROM THE WARDENSHIP OF THE COLUMBIA COLLEGE LAW SCHOOL 26-27 (1891).
See GOEBEL (ed.), A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 40-41 (1955).
54 In justice to the referee, it should be recorded that he thought Leroux v. Brown a harsh
decision, productive of commercial inconvenience, and had more pragmatic reasons for being
disinclined to hold the New York Statute applicable in the choice-of-law sense (as distinguished
from its applicability to a comparable domestic transaction). See 13 Abb.N.C. at 248-70, esp.
at 250, 258-59. Even more charitable to the referee is this more nearly contemporary comment:
"The judicial repose, pungent reasoning, and fearless conclusions exhibited by him in his treatment of the issues in this notable cause, and the relentless application through a web of legal
intricacies of the fundamental principles of law and equity, help to make up a severe standard
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paradox is considerably less than a half truth. If one is willing to suffer
the flagellating experience of reading the whole case, however, one finds at
least one alternative ground of decision, and that is usually enough to
prompt Ehrenzweig to distinguish a case that reads against his thesis;
perhaps it should also serve to distinguish a case that seems to lend him
support. To simplify the case, as one inevitably must, one Garrison, the
holder of a third mortgage securing dubious railroad bonds, wrote a group
of stockholders a letter to the effect that if they would desist from their
opposition to his foreclosure suit, and if he should become the purchaser
at the sale, he would convey "the railroad" to a new corporation in which
the promisees were to have the stock and he was to have the lion's share
of the bonds. This letter is treated as a contract made and to be performed
in Missouri. There was a subsequent oral agreement, made in New York
but to be performed in Missouri, treated as an attempted modification of
the original letter. The stockholders did their part but Garrison, having
bought the railroad at the foreclosure sale, decided to enjoy the fruits of
the deal while repudiating his promise under cover of the New York Statute
of Frauds.",
Putting aside for the moment the attempted oral modification, one may
wonder what the problem was so far as the Statute of Frauds was concerned. Remember that the original promise was contained in a letter
signed by the promisor himself. The catch was that, although this would
seem to be a memorandum sufficient to satisfy the requirement of any
halfway reasonable statute, the New York law required that the writing
express the consideration. As any man of common sense would be, the
referee was inclined to think that the very detailed letter did express the
consideration; at least it was a close question; but in the end, for rather
technical reasons, he decided he was "not prepared to hold that the consideration of the letter is [sufficiently] expressed in it."5 6 However, he then
proceeded to hold that, purely as a matter of interpretation of the New
York statute in its domestic context, it did not apply to this promise because (in so far as it concerned land) it was (1) not a contract for a sale
of anything, and (2) that it was not a contract for a sale of land nor of
any interest therein.5 7 As to the Missouri statute, not only was it cast in
of judicial industry and of learning, that may fairly be contrasted rather than compared with
many of the lazy compilations currently reported in the books to-day as 'opinions."' Tremain,
in Swn's TRIBUTE, supra note 53, at 27.
5 Thus far, at least, the facts are more succinctly and intelligibly stated in Marie v.
Garrison, 83 N.Y. 14 (1880), the same case at an earlier stage.
56 13 Abb.N.C. at 276.
57
d. at 271, 272-74. These holdings are rather obscure, and I do not undertake to
defend them. I do note and emphasize the fact that the referee held, wholly apart from any
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"procedural" terms, but it did not contain the unusual New York requirement that the memorandum express the consideration.58 As for the subsequent oral agreement, the referee was firm in his conclusion that it was an
attempted modification of the original letter. This raised the question
whether a contract, if within the Statute of Frauds, may be orally modified;
but the referee decided that, even if the parol modification was voided by
the New York statute, the result was merely to leave the original written
promise in effect, and the plaintiffs were content to recover on either basis."
Finally, the referee held that, even if one statute or the other should be
construed as barring an action at law, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover in equity, the defendant having retained the fruits of the plaintiffs'
performance.60
In summary, (1) while the referee did hold that neither statute was
applicable because that of Missouri, where the contract was made and was
to be performed, was procedural only, and that of New York, where the
action was brought, was substantive only, he also held that (2) there was
no conflict, because there was a written memorandum satisfying any requirement under the Missouri statute (if it were applicable on any theory),
and neither statute was applicable in the domestic sense because under
neither was this a contract for the sale of an interest in land; and he also
held that (3) if the oral modification was voided by New York law the
original memorandum remained in effect, giving the plaintiffs all they
needed in order to recover; and he also held that (4) in any event, if either
statute barred recovery at law on the express promise, plaintiffs were entitled to relief in equity on the theory of unjust enrichment.
This ought to be enough, but a word more must be added. If there
was ever a case justifying a rule of alternative reference such as Lorenzen
advocated, 6 this is surely it. There was a detailed memorandum in writing
signed by the party sought to be charged-by himself, not by his agent.
It came very close even to spelling out the consideration as required by the
New York statute. The only defect, if the New York statute had been apchoice-of-law problem, that the New York statute would not have invalidated this contract
even if it had been a transaction wholly domestic to New York.
58 Id. at 279.
19 Id. at 298-99. Also in connection with the alleged oral modification the referee, treat-

ing the agreement as governed by Missouri law as the place of performance, held that under the
Missouri statute the agreement was likewise not a contract for the sale of an interest in land.
Id. at 304-09. In so far as the agreement related to rolling stock and other personalty, the
referee had no difficulty in holding that neither statute applied to invalidate the contract.
60
Id. at 309.
61 Supra notes 21-23 and related text.
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plicable, would have been the failure to express the consideration with
sufficient specificity. On any reasonable view the protective policies of
both statutes were satisfied. The statutes, if applicable, varied only in
minor detail. It must be evident, also, that the policy underlying the requirement that the writing express the consideration differs somewhat from
the protective policy of the typical Statute of Frauds. To be sure, the legislature may feel that one man may defraud another as readily by falsely
swearing that the other promised to sell him Blackacre for a pittance as by
falsely swearing that he promised to sell him Blackacre at all; but when the
promise itself is not only in writing but admitted, and when the consideration as deducible from the writing and from parol evidence is clearly
adequate and fair-as it certainly was to Garrison, of all people-how
could any court in its senses refuse enforcement, whether the case is inter62
state or domestic?
2. "[A]ssumption of renvoi which, if anywhere, is certainly inadmissible in the law of contracts... ." For this point Ehrenzweig cites no cases;
thus, according to my plan, there is nothing for me to discuss. Besides,
this is no time to talk about renvoi.
3. "[R]esort to the dangerous cure-allof public policy...." Rubin v.
Irving Trust Co.1 3 My organization of this paper, which is designed to

track Ehrenzweig's exact route, becomes confusing at times; but try to
remember that Ehrenzweig is saying that, pending express recognition
of the "Rule of Validation," courts, while paying lip service to official
doctrine that would require invalidation, have been compelled to seek just
results by "precarious devices"-in this case by resort to the dangerous
cure-all of public policy. That seems to mean that in the Rubin case the
court applied the notion of local public policy to validate an agreement that
would have been invalid according to "official doctrine." Since the court
did nothing of the sort, Ehrenzweig must have been thinking of something
else; indeed, I feel sure he was thinking of something else, for otherwise his
subsequent reference to Rubin as a deviation from the "Rule of Validation," explainable on the ground that the parties contracted outside the
621 am constrained to add that, even on the conventional, or casebook, interpretation

of the decision, the paradox of a valid contract that does not comply with the Statute of Frauds
of either state is not altogether irrational, nor even necessarily the product of a devious design to
evade the statute. Conceivably the statute of State X might be construed as expressing only a
judicial-administration policy, while the statute of State F might be construed as expressing
only a party-protective policy. Then, if the action is brought in State F, and if that state has no
interest in protecting the defendant, and no obligation under the Constitution to do so, noncompliance with either statute should not result in invalidation.
68 305 N.Y. 288,113 N.E.2d 424 (1953).
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state for the very purpose of evading a strong policy of the forum,

4

would

be flatly inconsistent with this citation.
This was an action in New York to enforce specific performance of a
contract not to modify a will, the plaintiff having performed his part and
the decedent having died domiciled in New York. The alleged agreement
had been made in Florida, by whose law it was valid. The New York Personal Property Law, however, required a writing for a contract to bequeath
property or to make a testamentary disposition of any kind. Not unreasonably, the New York court held this statute broad enough to encompass
agreements not to change an existing will; it therefore affirmed a summary
judgment for the defendant. The court found it unnecessary to decide
whether the New York statute was substantive or procedural: it simply
expressed a deeply rooted policy of New York for the protection of decedents' estates-at least those of New York domiciliaries. Citing Emery v.
Burbank, 5 the court intimated that the statute might be construed as both
substantive and procedural-that is, as invalidating any contract reachable by New York law at its inception, and preventing all suits in New York
courts on oral promises to make or not make a will, wherever made. I find
in the decision strong support for governmental-interest analysis. New
York's policy and its interest in applying it are discussed in detail: The
difficulty of refuting such claims after the death of the alleged promisor is
enormous; such claims tend to hamper expeditious and orderly administration of estates; the state is deeply concerned to protect the decedent's
testamentary privilege and with the welfare of his dependents and creditors. "Strike" suits based on such alleged promises are often brought to
force settlement as the price of avoidance of delay in distribution of the
assets to the true beneficiaries. The court even discusses the problem in
terms of the governmental-interest analysis employed in the cases dealing
with the problem of due process in the choice of law.66 There was, in fact,
no real conflict: Florida's only connection with the matter was that the
alleged promise was made there (the residence of the plaintiff, brother of
the decedent, does not appear; but presumably it was not Florida). At all
events, the court did not resort to "precarious devices" in order to validate
a contract: it vehemently and (I think) properly invalidated the contract.
4. "[A]rbitrary adjustments of the general rules of localization...."
Specialties Development Corp. v. C-O Two Fire Equip. Co.07 This case
64 EHamxzwsG at 474 n. 32.
65 163 Mass. 326, 39 N.E. 1026 (1895), discussed infra in text at note 277.
66 305 N.Y. at 304, 113 N.E.2d at 428.
67 207 F.2d 753 (3d Cir. 1953).
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does not involve the Statute of Frauds at all, nor does it even deal with any
question of the validity of contracts. It therefore seems irrelevant to a discussion of the "Rule of Validation." This was an action by the licensor of a
patent to recover the royalties unpaid by the licensee. Defense, that the
licensor had failed to prosecute infringers in a certain market area as he
had bound himself to do. Held, this was a material breach, giving the
licensee the option to terminate the contract and sue for damages or to
treat the contract as still in force. If he elects, as this defendant did, to
continue to operate under the license he must pay royalties. Since this was
a diversity case arising in New Jersey the court was required to follow
New Jersey choice-of-law rules; New Jersey would apply the law of New
York as the place of contracting. It is at this point that Ehrenzweig quotes
from the opinion: "The fact that.., copies were taken later to California,
for the signature of an attesting witness and the affixing of the corporation
seal, does not change the conclusion that the contract was a New York
transaction." ' It does not appear that the result would have been different
if the contract had been treated as made in California. The court's conclusion as to the effect of the breach under New York law is based mainly
on Williston. Why drag in an irrelevant case, involving no problem of
validity and no apparent conflict of any kind, to accuse the courts of using
"precarious devices" to reach "just results" because we are not blessed
with a recognized "Rule of Validation"? And wherein, for that matter, did
the "arbitrary adjustment of the general rules of localization" consist?
5. ".... [A]nd even assumption of a 'waiver' of invalidatinglaws...
(French law)." Mandelbaum v. Silbereld.69 Pass the fact that this was a
decision by an inferior court. One reads the case in vain to discover any
remarkable "waiver" doctrine resorted to in order to validate a contract
invalid according to official doctrine. This was an action on a contract of
employment between two parties residing in France when and where the
alleged agreement was made. New York law did not require a writing;
French law did, though it also permitted oral testimony upon "commencement of written proof"--upon the production of any writing tending to
make the alleged fact probable. Expert testimony was to the effect that
the French law was procedural only. Hence, though the New York court
considered that the law of France, as the place of contracting and performance, was applicable, it did not apply the French procedural statute.
Quite incidentally the concept of "waiver" enters the case when the court
points out that under French law the defendant may lose the benefit of
08 See EmHREzwEI at 472 n. 14.
69 77 N.Y.S.2d 465 (City Ct. 1944).
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the statute by failing to raise the point or by taking steps in the litigation
inconsistent with an intention to rely on the defense. Is this any more
remarkable than the familiar doctrine that the defense of the Statute of
Frauds must ordinarily be pleaded? The case presents no real conflict if
we believe the expert testimony and interpret it as meaning that the French
policy is one of regulating the administration of justice in French courts,
nor if we believe, as seems possible, that the defendant had in the New
York court satisfied the requirements of the French statute by "commencement of written proof," or by failing properly to invoke the French statute,
or by taking steps in the litigation inconsistent with an intention to rely on
the statute as a defense. Finally, and significantly, the court said that in
view of its decision there was no occasion to determine whether the contract was valid under the French Code of Commerce, broadly permitting
oral proof.
A stronger case from Ehrenzweig's point of view would have been
the French decision cited by the court"° enforcing an oral contract made in
England, where it was valid, though it did not comply with the French
requirement of a writing. This may indicate that the French do not consider their statute requiring the formality of a writing an inflexible rule of
judicial administration, and so might tend to support a statement that
French courts exert themselves to bend their laws in an effort to achieve
validation and thus accomplish "just" results. One hopes that the results
are just in fact.
6. ". . . [A]nd even assumption of a ... 'moral impossibility' of ...
invocation [of invalidating laws]."
a. Lenn v. Riche.7' Again I must come to the aid of my confusing
scheme of organization. Ehrenzweig is unquestionably saying here that,
deprived of the boon of a "Rule of Validation," courts go into contortions
to reach just results by valdiating contracts invalid according to the official
doctrine-this time by resort to the notion that invocation of the invalidating laws is a "moral impossibility." The case does not even remotely support any such suggestion. The plaintiff's uncle had treated her almost as a
daughter, her father having died. Among other things he had given her
valuable objects of art. In 1935 (he then living in France, she in Italy) he
suggested that she turn these over to him for safekeeping, promising to
return them; this she did. In 1940, both parties then residing in Paris, he
told her he wanted to store her property along with his in the vault of a
Paris bank. This also was done. He was sent to a concentration camp and
70 77 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
71331 Mass. 104,117 N.E.2d 129 (1954).
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she never saw him again. His widow remarried and, with her husband (the
defendant administrator in Massachusetts), removed the property from
the vault, failing to account for the plaintiff's. The court held that French
law was controlling. Although some difficulty was encountered on account
of the lack of expert testimony, the court found that under French law
there had been a loan for use, or commandatum. For such a transaction
involving objects of such value French law required a writing, and the
court assumed this to be "substantive" rather than "procedural." Thus
the contract was apparently invalid under the law of the place of contracting and performance, though presumably valid under the law of the
forum. But the French Code contained an exception to the requirement
of a written instrument whenever "it has not been possible for the creditor
to procure written proof of the obligation."" Impossibility need not be
absolute in the physical sense but may be "moral impossibility":
"It would seem that a moral impossibility exists [according to French
authorities] whenever it would be inconsistent with established custom or
social convention or even good manners or when it would be seriously embarrassing to ask for an instrument in writing. The existence of a close and
intimate relationship ... has been taken into account in determining whether
it was morally possible to obtain an instrument in writing. In view of the
seeming great liberality of French law in discovering moral impossibility,
we think that the jury could find the existence of such an intimate relationship between [the uncle] and the plaintiff that she could not reasonably be
expected to insist upon receiving a legal document from him when he offered
to receive and care for her property, and that a practical or moral impossibility existed.

'73

In short, there was no conflict. The contract was valid under both French
and Massachusetts law. There is no reference whatever to the "moral impossibility" of invoking invalidating laws. I can think of nothing more to
say.

74

With his citation of Lenn v. Riche Ehrenzweig couples a reference to
In re Bulova's Estate,75 "applying New York law to a Swiss consular contract between New York residents 'for the simple reason that contemplation of Swiss law as applicable to the operation of a New York statute upon
72 331 Mass. at 110, 117 N.E.2d at 133.
73

Id.at 110-11.
This case is familiar to users of casebooks because of its holding that the plaintiff was
entitled to sue the uncle's widow's husband in Massachusetts as ancillary administrator with the
will annexed, and was not required to resort to the courts of France to sue the "universal
legatee."
75 216 N.Y.S.2d 26 (Surr.Ct.), aff'd 220 N.Y.S.2d 541 (App.Div. 1961).
74
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New York property would have been an absurdity.' ',71 The purpose of this
reference is hard to discern. Husband and wife, domiciled in New York,
executed a property settlement agreement in Switzerland; this they did
with great ceremony before a United States consul, thus complying with
the formalities required by New York law for a waiver or release by the
wife of her right to elect to take against her husband's will as in case of
intestacy. Before the surrogate, from whose opinion Ehrenzweig quotes,
there was no issue as to the adequacy of the formalities. Apropos of an
argument that the alleged abandonment of the wife by the husband constituted a breach and a failure of consideration (and a rather obscure argument likewise unrelated to formalities), the surrogate said: "The assertions that Swiss law is involved in either the interpretationor the operation
of this agreement are not deserving of serious consideration."" He then
continued, in the same context, to make the remark quoted by Ehrenzweig,
to the effect that in view of the domicile of the parties in New York and the
subject of the contract the suggestion that they contracted in contemplation
of Swiss law was an absurdity.
Thus far there appears to be no question of formal validity and no
conflict. On appeal, however, the wife asserted fraud in the inducement and
noncompliance with formalities required by Swiss law. As to fraud, summary judgment was ordered against the widow. But Swiss law required
that a post-nuptial agreement be signed by two witnesses, approved by a
public officer, and filed by him. This had not been done. Justice Breitel,
a knowledgeable man in matters of conflict of laws, rejected the generalization that formalities are governed by the law of the place of contracting.
According to established rules, he thought, it could be held that this Swiss
contract was governed by the law of New York as that of the domicile of the
parties except with respect to Swiss real estate; as to that, Swiss law governed, invalidatingthe agreement. As to all other property, including movables situated in Switzerland, New York law governed, giving validity.
In sum, Swiss law was applied to invalidate the contract as to Swiss land,
and New York law was applied to validate it as to all other property. The
decision is consistent with governmental-interest analysis if we can justify
a Bernkrantoperation deferring to the interest of Switzerland in regulating
title to land within its borders. Justice Brietel's opinion is notable in that
it discusses New York's "grouping of contacts" formula in terms of the
impact of the decision on state policy.
Ehrenzweig concludes this portion of his discussion by citing the
Rubin case again, this time for the proposition that "courts, by these and
76 EENzwEiG at 472 n. 16.
77 216 N.Y.S.2d at 28-29.
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other formulas have done 'little more than restate[d] the problem.' ... M
(Emphasis added.)
I conclude by noting that what the court said in Rubin was that "the
characterizationof the problem as substantive or proceduralwas [formerly]
recognized as being determinative of the problem. But the principle, concerned as it is with nebulous legal conclusions, does little more than restate
the problem. ' 7 (Emphasis added.)
III
THE INAPPOSITE CASES
Before embarking on his effort to demonstrate that "If the traditional
language is disregarded and the courts' actual holdings are analyzed in
terms of their results, judicial practice can be fairly said to have created a
new rule: the Rule of Validation [sic],"8 0 Ehrenzweig cites certain cases
to be eliminated from the analysis for the reasons to be enumerated below.
Since Ehrenzweig claims no support for his thesis in these cases, I am
strongly tempted to pass them over and get on with the argument; but for
several reasons I have resisted the temptation. For one thing, discussion of
the cases that Ehrenzweig expressly disclaims as support will give me the
opportunity to agree with him from time to time; for another, despite his
"elimination" of the cases from the analysis, he subsequently relies on some
of them; for another, his treatment of some of the eliminated cases throws
interesting light on his methods of case analysis.
A. "Cases that, althoughpurporting to apply, and often cited to support traditionalconflicts rules, do not involve a conflict between different
laws."
1. ContinentalCollieries,Inc. v. ShoberY1 I should like to agree,
and for present purposes do agree, that this case involves no true conflict,
though it is not possible to be certain of this without further research into
the laws of Pennsylvania and Ohio. Given an alleged oral contract to assign
a contract for the exclusive right to sell the product of coal mines, the federal court in Pennsylvania looks first to the law of Ohio (place of con78 Ena.NZWEiG at 472. The Rubin case is cited in note 63, supra.
79 305 N.Y. at 298, 113 N.E.2d at 427. Coupled with this citation of Rubin is a reference
to In re Rosenburger's Estate, 131 N.Y.S.2d (Surr. 1954) ("a candid application of the
intended validating law . . . (Netherlands)"), En~muZWarlO at 472 n. 17. Since this case is
cited as supporting the "Rule of Validation" its consideration will be deferred to a later section
of this paper.
80 EHmmZWElG at 472. The cases to be discussed in this part III are all cited in id., n. 18.
81 130 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1942).

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:243

tracting). Finding the Statute of Frauds of that state "procedural," the
court reverts to the Sales Act as in force in Pennsylvania and finds that
law also procedural, and hence controlling. The issues appear to be: (1)
whether this contract to assign an exclusive contract for a sales agency
is a contract for the sale of goods within the Pennsylvania statute (held:
it is, but no indication of the answer under Ohio law); and (2) whether
the memorandum signed by the purported agent of the party to be charged
(assignee) is sufficient, since the signer may also have been an assignor and
so incompetent to act as agent for the assignee. Result: No dismissal;
the plaintiff is given a chance to prove that the signer was not disqualified
to act as agent for the defendant. It is true that there is no indication of any
difference between the laws of the states concerned, yet Ehrenzweig might
have been well advised not to exclude the case. The end result is to hold
Pennsylvania law applicable as the procedural law of the forum, which
may or may not result in validity. Without further information it is not
possible to evaluate the case in terms of governmental interests, unless one
is prepared to take seriously the suggestion that the Pennsylvania statute
states a policy of judicial administration always binding on a Pennsylvania court (as well as a federal court in Pennsylvania). Quite possibly
this is a case for validation under an alternative reference rule, since there
was a memorandum signed by one purporting to act as agent for the party
sought to be charged, though there may possibly be minor differences between the two laws as to the authority or competency of the agent.
2. Hamiltonv. Glassell.2 I quite agree. Both Louisiana and Texas
regarded contracts for oil and gas leases as within the Statute of Frauds;
and though there was here a memorandum signed by the party sought to
be charged, it recited only his agreement to drill wells, not the alleged
consideration (the promise in suit) involving leases to him. On literal
grounds the federal court in Louisiana dismissed the Texas statute as procedural, but applied the Louisiana statute (strongly worded to affect both
substance and procedure) to defeat recovery. The result is reached the
more readily because it would be the same in the Texas court. The plaintiff
was a citizen of Texas and the defendant a citizen of Louisiana. The Louisiana statute was applied to invalidate the contract and protect the local
defendant, serving both asserted Louisiana interests (judicial-administrative and party-protective), without impairment of any interest of Texas.
3. Maciasv. Klein."3 I am inclined to agree, especially for the reaF.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1932).
106 F.Supp. 107 (W.D.Pa. 1952), rev'd "on other grounds," 203 F.2d 205 (3d Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 827, 74 Sup.ct. 47, 98 L.Ed. 352 (1953).
82 57
83
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son that no contrary law was called to the attention of the court. But there
is more to the case than this. We begin with an oral contract for the sale of
goods, validated by part payment; then comes an alleged interstate telephone conversation purporting to increase quantity and price. Not only
was no contrary law made to appear; the place of contracting itself did not
appear, since the acceptor may have been speaking from any one of three
states (and under the weird theory that the place of contracting is that
where the words of acceptance are spoken into the telephone, one must
know where the acceptor was). In the district court the Pennsylvania
Statute of Frauds was treated as procedural and controlling in any event;
but that statute was held inapplicable (as a matter of domestic interpretation) on the ground that a contract, once taken out of the statute by part
payment, needs no further formalities for modification. In the court of
appeals, says Ehrenzweig, this decision was reversed "on other grounds."
I would not put it in just that way. At that level it appeared that the plaintiff
seller, Macias, placed the modification call from Los Angeles and believed
that the buyer's agent, Klein, who spoke the words of acceptance, was in
Detroit or Pittsburgh; but the evidence did not establish the fact. Thus
we still do not know "where the contract was made" (though it should not
have been terribly difficult to find out, from the telephone company's records if necessary, where the call placed in Los Angeles was consummated).
Like the district court, the court of appeals treated the Pennsylvania
Statute of Frauds as procedural, but reversed on the ground that there
was no authority in any state for the lower court's domestic construction,
permitting informal modification after part payment. It is true that no
conflicting law was made to appear. At the same time, the court invalidated
the contract under the Pennsylvania Statute of Frauds, holding that statute
procedural. The case hardly supports a rule of validation; at least on the
assumption that the defendant was a Pennsylvania enterprise, it is consistent with governmental-interest analysis. But probably, as Ehrenzweig
says, it should be excluded on the ground that no conflict appears.
4. Mulroy v. Sessions. 4 I entirely agree. The court treated the
law of Texas (as the place of contracting), as controlling, but both Texas
and New York agreed that a contract to acquire and share an interest in
land is not a contract for the sale or lease of an interest in land within the
Statute of Frauds. It was generous of Ehrenzweig to exclude this case,
validating the oral agreement as it does.
B. "Also inconclusive are those cases involving alternative grounds
for the holding or for the choice of law...
84 38 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Sup.Ct. 1942).
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1. Joseph v. Krull Wholesale Drug Co."5 While I am dubious
about any general principle that alternative grounds for a decision may
be disregarded, here I agree that the ruling on the Statute of Frauds was
quite unnecessary to the decision and hence dictum. The defendant, a
Pennsylvania enterprise, made an offer of employment to the plaintiff, a
resident of New York. He accepted by telephone from New York and commenced work, only to be fired after about six months. Alleging that the
contract was for a fixed term ending more than a year after its date, he
was met by a plea of the Statute of Frauds. The district court in Pennsylvania, looking to Pennsylvania choice-of-law rules, decided that Pennsylvania would apply the law of the place of contracting 8 0-New York I-and,
treating the New York statute as substantive, invalidated the agreement.
Before doing so, however, it had submitted to the jury a special interrogatory in response to which the jury found that the contract was one terminable at will. If the ruling on the Statute of Frauds had come first it would
have been significant; coming as it did after the jury verdict it was quite
unnecessary. In addition, there is no suggestion that the Pennsylvania law
was different. I claim no support in this case for governmental-interest
analysis. New York had no interest in disappointing the expectations (unwarranted, in view of the special verdict) of its resident, unless it was compelled by the Constitution to give foreign promisors the same protection
it gave domestic ones. The opinion is highly conceptualistic, exalting the
place of contracting, applying Adams v. Lindsel87 mechanically to contracts by telephone, and disregarding almost entirely considerations of
policy.
2. Marvel v. Marvel."8 Here I must reject Ehrenzweig's suggestion that the case should be laid aside as explainable on the basis of alternative grounds for the decision. The plaintiff, while a resident of Illinois, conveyed Illinois land to his brother. After the plaintiff had moved to Nebraska
the brother sold the land, and the plaintiff here claims the proceeds, alleging
an oral trust or agency for sale. The defendant brother pleaded (1) the
Statute of Frauds and (2) that in any event the plaintiff was indebted to
him in such an amount that an accounting would show no balance due the
plaintiff. The court held the oral agreement not provable under the Nebraska Statute of Frauds, though conceding that the Illinois Statute might
permit its enforcement-and Illinois was both the place of contracting and
the situs (strangely enough, there was no reference to the possible sig85 147 F.Supp. 250 (E.D.Pa. 1956) aff'd per curiam, 245 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1957).
86 Cf. Joseph v. KruU Wholesale Drug Co., n. 85, supra.
87 1 Barn. &Ald. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818).
88 70 Neb. 498, 97 N.W. 640 (1903).
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nificance of situs). The reasoning was that the Nebraska statute was procedural-and this reasoning was based on the mischievous influence of
Leroux v. Brown. There were alternative grounds for the decision for the
defendant: set-off and laches. Any of the three grounds would have sufficed;
but who is to say which of the three is to be disregarded?
As to governmental interests, the decision may be said to have served
the dubious interest of Nebraska in protecting its courts from perjury; but
the interest of Illinois (as of the time of the transaction) in protecting the
expectations of its resident promisees is frustrated. Indeed, the most disturbing aspect of the case is that it may be one in which Nebraska, though
it may have had no interest whatever in the parties at the time of the transaction (the residence of the defendant brother does not appear; and certainly Nebraska has no interest in the Illinois land), has disrupted the
settled right of the parties as they originally existed under the law of the
only interested state, and this without any apparent justification in terms
of credible Nebraska policy and interest. This is the type of case to which
I have referred as raising problems similar to those attending retroactive
legislation: settled rights should not be unsettled without strong justification in terms of the urgency of the public interest to be served.89 If the
Statute of Frauds does indeed embrace a judicial-administration policy,
it is difficult for me to conceive that that policy is nearly important enough
to justify unsettling settled rights of this sort.
3. Third Nat'l Bank v. SteelP° ("involving writing requirements
not relatedto the contract....."). I agree. The statute here involved related
to actions for the tort of misrepresentation; and although the court considered decisions on the Statute of Frauds relevant, the decision is beyond
the scope of Ehrenzweig's (and my) subject.
4. Hooper v. First Exck. Nat'l Bank 1 ("competing law ... not
pleaded"). I agree with Ehrenzweig92 and he with me9" that unless a competing foreign law is appropriately brought to the attention of the court
the rule of decision is appropriately to be found in the law of the forum.
But that is not this case. The plaintiff sued in the district court for Idaho
alleging an oral agreement by the defendant to sell land in Washington.
He did not seek to enforce the agreement but treated it as void, and sought
only restitution of partial payments made. It was the defendant, by way of
counterclaim, who sought enforcement of the agreement, asking damages
89 See Currie, Full Faithand Credit, Chiefly to Judgments, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 89, 91-99.
90 129 Mich. 434, 88 N.W. 1050 (1902).

91 53 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1931).
92 EHRENZwEiG at 360, 367.
93

CuRRiE, ch. 1.
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for plaintiff's breach of his promise to buy, and it was the plaintiff who
pleaded the (Washington) Statute of Frauds. The court specifically holds
the Washington Statute of Frauds applicable,as that of the situs and place
of contracting, to void the contract. Hence we have here not a case to be
discarded because no competing foreign law was pleaded (though it might
possibly be discarded on other grounds if we knew that the Idaho statute
was identical with that of Washington); instead we have a case invalidating a contract by invoking a foreign Statute of Frauds, flawing the "Rule of
Validation."
As for governmental interests, I have only this to say, but it is a bit
of a new twist: Why was not the plaintiff's complaint, setting forth the
terms of the oral agreement, a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the statute
and bind him? Probably the answer is that in some states, while the memorandum may be executed subsequent to the agreement, it must precede
the filing of the action.94 But in all conscience this complaint should suffice
as a memordandum in any case, domestic or interstate; and for that reason,
though not for the sake of an indiscriminate "Rule of Validation," I think
the plaintiff's promise should have been enforced- even if Washington law
required a pre-action memorandum and Idaho did not-because as to such
detail a rule of alternativereference is greatly to be desired. The complaint
substantially serves any policy that can be credibly attributed to either
statute.95
5. A. S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co.9" ("the parties had agreed
on an applicablelaw"). I can say only that this is rather an over-simplification, though there may be another reason for excluding the case from the
discussion. Of six claims set forth only the fifth is relevant: The defendant,
an Oregon corporation doing business in New York, entered into a written
dealership contract with plaintiff terminable at will by either. The alleged
oral modification was an agreement not to terminate without notice and
just cause, and this claim was for damages for breach of that agreement.
At Special Term the defendant objected only that the allegations were too
indefinite, and on that ground the action was dismissed with leave to replead. 97 The Appellate Division modified the judgment by ordering [unconditional?] dismissal of this count. 8 So far there has been no mention of
94 1 shall not clutter this paper with citations on this collateral matter.

95 A possible additional reason for not treating the complaint as sufficient to permit the
counterclaim to succeed is that the defendant tried to improve on the terms of the agreement
as alleged; but that seems irrelevant to the main question, which is whether the agreement
alleged in the complaint could be enforced.
96 3 N.Y.2d 369, 144 N.E.2d 371,165 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1957).
97 1 Misc.2d 788, 148 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1955).
98 2 App.Div.2d 739, 153 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1956).

RULE OF VALIDATION

any requirement of formality. That comes only in the Court of Appeals, and
relates not to the Statute of Frauds but to section 33-c of the New York
Personal Property Law, requiring a writing for modification of a written
agreement so providing. 9 What the court said was that the objection based
on section 33-c was "not well taken upon this motion addressed to the face
of the complaint, since it is alleged therein that Oregon law was agreed to
govern the contract." 0 0
We do not know whether the allegation concerning the agreement on
Oregon law was supportable by the evidence; thus it seems hasty to toss
the case aside on the ground that the parties had agreed on the applicable
law. However, since the case does not deal with the Statute of Frauds, it
may well be put aside, but for one remark: According to some authorities,
such statutes as section 33-c raise problems analogous to those raised by
the Statute of Frauds.' If we treat the case accordingly, we may raise the
question: Should a party be allowed, by adopting the law of another state,
to waive the protection intended for him by such statutes? 0 2 Offhand, I
see no reason why not, especially since there are so many other ways in
which he may waive it. But not all the protections provided by law are or
should be thus waivable: e.g., the disability of infancy, or of coverture.
6. Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co. 10 3 ("the parties had agreed upon

an applicable law"). Not so. Ehrenzweig clearly implies that this is a
"party autonomy" case. Most of those who advocate autonomy for the
parties in determining what law shall govern-as everyone does, within
limits (though my limits would be tighter that Ehrenzweig's)- would
agree that in this particular case a specific agreement by the parties that
the law of a particular state should govern as to the particular matter should
be respected. But that was not this case. There was no specific agreement
between the parties that the law of Maine should govern. What happened
was simply that, at the trial, counsel for both parties assumed that the law
of Maine applied and treated the case accordingly.
Plaintiffs, cotton brokers doing business in New York, sued on a
contract by defendant, a Maine manufacturer, to buy 1,000 bales. There
99 The general law (and the law in Oregon) appears to be otherwise: oral modification of
written contracts is permissible, despite a contract prohibition, unless the contract as modified
is within the Statute of Frauds. See CoRBiN § 1295; 6 WIL.STON ON CONTRACTS § 1828 (1938);
RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS, § 407 (1932).

100 144 N.E.2d at 380.
101 See CORBIN at 212 (remembering Ehrenzweig's indebtedness to and reliance upon
Corbin).
102 1 assume that the Oregon corporation, since it was doing business in New York, was
clearly within the scope of New York's protective policy.
103 105 N.Y. 314, 44 N.E. 959 (1896).
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were preliminary negotiations that it would serve no useful purpose to
recite; by traditional standards, the agreement (if there was one) was
"made" in New York. The court discussed various approaches to choice
of the law governing formalities, rejecting the place of contracting as an
absolute. It considered the place of negotiation and the place of performance as also deserving of consideration. In the end, the clearest rationale
of the decision is the familiar one, so vulnerable and yet so popular in New
York (until recently) and still in some other jurisdictions: the law "intended by the parties" must govern. If you think that means the court
upheld this agreement you are mistaken. Oddly enough, the "law intended
by the parties" (if they made any contract at all, which would seem to be a
prerequisite to any intelligent talk about the intention of the parties to a
contract as to what law should govern their agreement) turns out to be the
law of Maine, of which the Statute of Frauds operated to invalidate the
contract. That is to say, the parties, assuming that they made a contract
at all (which is the very issue), intended it to be an invalid one.1" 4
IV
THE "RULE OF VALIDATION" IN FULL DRESS
"Contracts have been quite generallyupheld where they have satisfied
...the formality requirements of the law of the forum.

... M05

1. Hall v. Cordell.10 6 Ehrenzweig first cites this case 07 as the
American equivalent of the tendency of European courts "to give weight
to the true intention of the parties by giving validating effect to both the
law of the place of contracting and that of the place of performance." It is
difficult for me so to read it.'0 8 This was an action by plaintiffs, of Missouri,
against defendants, of Illinois, on an oral agreement to accept a bill of
0

Perhaps I overstate the paradox. It might reasonably be pointed out that one useful
purpose served by the Statute of Frauds is to allow parties, in the course of negotiations, to
make tentative statements that may sound like promises prior to the time when they may
finally decide to commit themselves. In such a state of mind, the hesitant quasi-promisor may
have this or that law in mind-possibly. But at that stage there is presumably no contract and
no "intention of the parties." In this respect the Statute of Frauds may perhaps be regarded
as modifying the "objective" theory of contracts.
105 EH EZWaiG at 472. Except as noted, all the cases to be discussed under this heading
are cited in support of the proposition stated in the caption in ibid., n. 19.
106 146 U.S. 116, 12 Sup.Ct. 154, 35 L.Ed. 959 (1891).
1 4

107 EmzENzwEiG

at 471 n. 4.

108 In passing, it may be worth noting that as a pre-Brie diversity decision announcing

a federal common-law rule for choice of law the case has, strictly speaking, lost its authority,
whatever it stands for; but let that pass.
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exchange. Missouri law, if applicable (as the law of the state of contracting,
perhaps), would invalidate; the law of Illinois would not. Held: The law of
the place of performance governs. It happens that the promise (if there
was in fact a promise) was performable in Illinois. Ergo, the promise is
valid and enforceable. There is some talk of the "intention of the parties,"
but only as supporting the rule that the law of the place of performance
governs. To me, this seems only another of those rather odd cases, deviant
from "official doctrine" as that is embodied in the original Restatement,
perhaps to be written off by conformists on the ground that it was decided
before the "true rules" had quite crystalized. A full analysis of the case
in terms of governmental interests would be difficult in the space here
available, but let me make this brief attempt: Prima facie the law of the
forum (Illinois, at least in post-Erie terms) is controlling. The Missouri
law requiring a writing is primarily for the protection of Missouri defendants, not Illinois defendants.' 09 Thus no reason appears for displacing
the law of the Illinois forum by Missouri law unless the Constitution requires Illinois to give Missouri plaintiffs the same protection (in the form
of vindication of their reliance on oral promises) that it provides for its
own residents. But Illinois might reasonably classify foreign plaintiffs into
two categories: those whose home states give them the same protection
Illinois gives its residents and those whose home states do not provide such
protection. On this basis (I emphasize that there is nothing in the decision
to suggest such a rationale) the case is consistent with governmentalinterest analysis. But I don't count on it."10
109 Conceivably, but not likely, for the protection of Missouri courts, which are not here
involved.
110 In this case the Court refers to Coghlan v. South Carolina R.R., 142 U.S. 101, 12
Sup.Ct. 150, 35 L.Ed. 951 (1891), a case earlier cited by Ehrenzweig as belonging to "an unbroken line of authority according to which the lex contractus will yield to any law in view
of which the parties have entered into the contract.... ." EmENzwEiG at 461, n. 4 and related
text. Coghlan, in my analysis, is not a choice-of-law case in the sense that it involves choice
of the rule of decision. It is one of those peculiar cases in which, the rule of decision being
clear, some law must be chosen for the purpose of finding a relevant datum. See CuRur, ch. 1,
esp. at 66-72. Bonds issued by the railroad were payable in London with interest at a stated
rate until maturity, and after maturity simply "with interest"; the contract was made in South
Carolina. Did "interest" mean the English legal rate of 5 percent or the South Carolina legal
rate of 7 percent? Apparently no question of usury was involved; if there was any such issue,
remember that Ehrenzweig excludes such contracts from the "Rule of Validation." EMHENzwFzi at 482. The Court held simply that, as a matter of interpretation of this undisputed,
written contract, the parties intended the London rate to apply, especially since the prematurity interest had been stated in terms of the London rate. Is it this type of case that gives
rise to the talk of "intention of the parties" in cases in which the question is not one of resolving
an ambiguity in an undoubted contract, but of selecting the law regulating the mode of proving
that a contract exists at all? If so (and it seems likely), the legal engine is off the rails. Cf.
Hancock, The Fallacy of the Transplanted Category, 37 Can. Bar Rev. 535 (1959).
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2. Scudder v. Union Nat'l Bank.'1 1 If it has not already become
clear, this case makes it clear that we cannot proceed further without pausing to discuss the question of how to read cases-or, indeed, the question
of whether to read cases. Ehrenzweig is an adherent of the movement in
legal thought known as "American Legal Realism." A similar leaning might
with some justice be attributed to me, though I believe I incline more to
the earlier sociological jurisprudence. At all events, Ehrenzweig and I
would agree that a judicial opinion need not be taken at face value; it is
permissible to look behind the reasons given in the opinion for the "real"
reasons leading to the result." 2 The question is, what occasions justify
assertion that a decision was motivated by considerations other than those
stated by the court? To me it seems that Ehrenzweig takes realism to an
extreme hardly intended by the founders of the movement when he (apparently) takes the position that what the court says as to its reasons is
to be treated as of no importance whatever (except to the extent that the
court may say something tending to support choice of the validating law).
On this basis, any interstate case involving the Statute of Frauds and resulting in the application of the validating law, for whatever stated reason,
can be cited in support of the rule-of-validation hypothesis. Any such case
applying the invalidating law can be explained away on some pretext or
other. Is this sound? Let us approach the question in the following way:
If a student in a class in conflict of laws were asked to state the
Scudder case, which we are now discussing, and if he were to state it in
the following way, I think it would be universally agreed that he would
have to be given a passing grade:
This was an action in the United States Circuit Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, 11 3 based on diversity of citizenship, in assumpsit for
breach of an alleged oral agreement to accept a bill of exchange. It seems
that a firm of Chicago brokers, having bought pork from a producer for sale
to the defendants, a Missouri firm, was in financial difficulty; in fact, it
seems that its bank account had insufficient funds to cover the check it had
sent, or must soon send, to its supplier. In this predicament the brokers
called on their customer, the Missouri buyer, to help. A member of the
Missouri firm went to Chicago to discuss the matter. As a result of this
conference the Chicago broker drew a draft on the Missouri buyer for the
contract price and sent it to a Chicago bank to be discounted; but the bank
refused to discount the draft without security. When the messenger returned

M91 U.S. 406, 23 L.Ed. 245 (1875).
112 There is perhaps a hierarchy of "real" reasons. If my memory is not playing tricks,
I recall Karl Llewellyn's speaking of "real reasons of the first water," and "real reasons of the
second water," and so on; but there is not time to document this.
113 Pre-Erie again; but let it pass.
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with this report, the broker instructed him to return to the bank with the
information that the Missouri firm promised to accept the draft. Allegedly
this instruction was given in the presence of the representative of the Missouri firm, and he assented by not raising any objection. The bank, on being
informed of this "promise," discounted the draft, credited the proceeds to
the account of the broker, and used them, in part, to cover the broker's
check to the producer. But when the draft was presented to the Missouri firm
it was dishonored; the shipment of pork had for some reason been rejected.
The bank, being thus out of pocket, and presumably unable to recover its
outlay from the broker because of insolvency, sued the Missouri firm on its
oral, or tacit, promise to accept the draft. There was a rather frivolous plea
invoking the Illinois Statute of Frauds that it seems unnecessary to discuss.
Illinois law required no writing for a promise to accept a bill of exchange;
Missouri did.1 14 The Supreme Court held the oral promise valid and binding
because Illinois law governed, and Illinois law governed, said the Court,
because that was the state in which the contract was made, and the law of
the place of contracting governs questions of validity-particularly of formal
validity. More broadly, the Court set forth the general formula we have
seen in other cases: questions of execution, interpretation, and validity are
governed by the law of the place of contracting; questions of performance
by the law of the place of performance; and questions of procedure by the
law of the forum. Rather clearly the Court did not consider this a question of
procedure, but one of substantive validity.
Having given the student a check mark indicating satisfactory performance, the instructor may now ask the student whether he thinks the
reasons stated by the Court actually give the true explanation of the decision. Forsaking the role of student and resuming my own character, I
would reply that there are several possibilities:
(1) That the Court actually believed in the rules it was reciting and
applying. In 1875 a general belief in such rules was prevalent, though the
rules were not uniformly formulated. This seems the most likely explanation.
(2) That at least the lower court (which decided the case the same
way), was simply being provincial and protecting the local bank at the
expense of the foreign promisor. This I am not cynical enough to credit for
a moment; nor does it explain the affirmance by the Supreme Court.
(3) That the Court was hostile to statutes requiring formalities such
as written instruments for oral promises, and, being convinced that the
tacit promise had actually been made as alleged and relied on by the bank
114 It may be worth noting that the Missouri statute began, "No person within this State
shall be charged... ," (91 U.S. at 406, 23 L.Ed. at 245) (emphasis added) but for present purposes, at least, I (Currie) seek to make no capital of this.
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to its detriment, felt that justice required that the promisor be held to its
promise; and so the Court manipulated the rules for choice of law to get
the just result. This has a certain plausibility, but the manipulation is not
easy to detect. Very few cases have held that the law of the place of performance governs formal validity (yet recall that in Hall v. Cordell, the
case last discussed, this very Court, 16 years after the Scudder case now
under discussion, held just that, mellowing the rule only a bit by referring
incongruously to the "intention of the parties").
(4) The Court, while paying lip-service to conventional doctrine, was
in fact applying the validating law, and would have done the same had the
laws of Illinois and Missouri been reversed (i.e., would have validated
the contract under the hypothetical Missouri law by some such holding as
that the law of the place of performance, or preferably the law intended by
the parties, was controlling). This I do not believe for one moment.
(5) That the Court regarded the law of the forum (Illinois) as prima
facie applicable, not to be displaced by the law of Missouri without good
reason. The plain policy of the Illinois law (not requiring a writing) was
to vindicate the expectations of those who acted in reliance on informal
promises of this sort, and Illinois certainly had an interest in applying that
policy for the protection of a local bank. This interest was in direct conflict with that of Missouri in protecting its merchants from the hazards of
oral testimony that such a promise was made; but, unless a Bernkrant
operation can be performed, the interest of the forum must prevail.
I do not believe this either-as an explanation of the decision made
by the Court in 1875 (unless, perchance, the Court was subconsciously
influenced by some latent racial memory of some ancient time when such
problems were perhaps handled more rationally). I do believe that the
Court may have been inarticulate about a felt need to implement the legitimate interest of the forum state in competition with the interest of another.
But all I really maintain is that, for lawyers of yesterday, today, and tomorrow, this hypothesis as to how such problems are or ought to be resolved is a better predictive-and persuasive-device than any of the foregoing suppositions.
3. Global Commerce Corp. v. Clark-Babbitt Indus.1 5 Ehrenzweig has already cited this case as an example of how the courts, not
blessed with an authoritative "Rule of Validation," have resorted to the
"precarious device" of "arbitrary (primary or secondary) characterization" in search of the just result. I have already commented on it.110
115 239 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1956).
116 See text at notes 44-47, supra.
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4. Woolley v. Bishop." 7 This case involves not the typical Statute
of Frauds but a special statute requiring land brokerage contracts to be
in writing; but I concede that similar considerations apply, so that the case
is relevant to the discussion. I do not concede that the decision furnishes
significant support for a "Rule of Validation." The broker, a citizen of
Oklahoma, sued in a New Mexico court to recover a commission from the
owner, a citizen of California, for finding a purchaser for oil and gas leases
on land in New Mexico. The purchaser was found and committed in Texas.
The case is really simple in the extreme. The defendant owner did not deny
having engaged the broker to find a purchaser at the rate of commission
claimed; he only denied having agreed to sell at the price and on the
terms agreed to by the purchaser. Furthermore, it seems clear to me, as it
seemed to the court, that the defendant welshed on the deal not because
of uncertainty or dissatisfaction as to the price terms, but because of his
belated understanding of the tax consequences. Now I should think an
admission of the formation of an oral brokerage contract is as good as a
memorandum thereof; and in this case the defendant not only admitted
the oral contract but signed and sent to the broker a telegram treated by
the court, reasonably enough, as a sufficient memorandum. Then what is
the problem? Neither the special statutes on brokerage contracts involved
here nor the typical Statute of Frauds requires that the memorandum state
the consideration (as we have seen, a New York statute does, or did).
Hence, regardless of the fact that one or more of the states that have been
named might have had a statute requiring a writing for brokerage contracts, there seems no possibility whatever of any conflict in the true sense.
Of the states that have been named, California and Texas had such
statutes; New Mexico did not; whether Oklahoma had one or not does not
appear, and is immaterial. The California statute was dismissed on the
ground that this was not a California contract (it might better have been
dismissed on the ground that it was satisfied by the admission and the
telegram). Correctly, I believe (from the standpoint of the law of contracts), the court construed the agreement as one for a unilateral contract,
completed when the offeree (broker) performed by finding a ready and
able buyer in Texas. The Texas statute, however, was dismissed on the
ground that the controversy was between the Oklahoma broker and the
California owner, and Texas, as the home state of the purchaser (who had
no direct interest, at least, in the outcome of the litigation over the commission), had nothing to do with the case. Thus in traditional terms the
court held that the law of the state of contracting governed, but not the
117 180 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1950).
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procedural law of that state; hence, I suppose, the law of the forum applied, since no law with a better claim to recognition had been established.
I would say that this is consistent with governmental-interest analysis but
for the fact that there was no conflict in the first place, all statutes having
been satisfied by the admission and the telegram." 8
5. Rothenburg v. H. Rothstein & Sons."' Reasonable men may
disagree as to the "real" reasons for a court's decision; but I suggest that
no scholar should cite, in support of any hypothesis, a case that plainly
holds nothing whatever. This was an appeal to the district court (in Pennsylvania) from a decision of the Judicial Officer (Department of Agriculture) imposing damages on the buyer of a carload of peas for wrongful rejection under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act.' In that court
a jury again ruled against the buyer, who appealed to the court of appeals,
invoking the (Pennsylvania) Statute of Frauds. We may pass the details
for the moment, for as to that defense the court said: ".

.

. [W]e deem it in-

advisable to dispose of this problem at this time.' 12 1 This was because the
case, although involving more than one state, was not a pure interstate
choice-of-law case, for the state laws and policies involved were intermingled with, and perhaps must be subordinated to, any relevant policies
expressed by Congress in the act. Thus the Erie-Klaxon doctrine did not
apply. The resulting problems were carefully stated by the court as four
separate questions.
The court then said:
"Since the parties have not addressed themselves to the questions
stated, we think it desirable, in the interests of fairness and as an aid to the
Court, that the litigants have the opportunity to review them, and to submit their views in briefs and oral argument. To this end, we shall, sua sponte,
order this case to be reargued before the full Court .... ,,2
That is all.
There was a rehearing and a decision on the merits; but Ehrenzweig
does not cite it. Shall we give Ehrenzweig the benefit of the doubt and assume that he had in mind the later decision on the merits, and only
118 Had there been a conflict (between, say, Oklahoma and California) this would have
been a case of the disinterested third state, since no interest was asserted on behalf of New
Mexico, the forum and situs. Indeed, the court expressly held that the governing law was that
of the place of contracting as opposed to that of the situs. 180 F.2d at 192.
119 181 F.2d 345 (3d Cir. 1950).
120 Cf. "The Case of the Spoiled Cantaloupes," in HART & SACxS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 10
(1958).
121 181 F.2d at 347.
122

181 F.2d at 347-48.
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inadvertently cited the nondecision? By all means. According to his own
standards Ehrenzweig would have been justified in citing the decision on
rehearing in support of his pet thesis, for the full bench unanimously upheld the contract, for purposes of the act, in an opinion by Judge Maris.2
But observe the reasoning of the court: (1) The Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act does not supersede state laws as to the validity of contracts to sell such commodities; questions of validity are determined by
the law of the state whose law is controlling under the rules for choice of
law; (2) the Pennsylvania statute requiring formalities for contracts for
the sale of goods is worded and construed by the Pennsylvania courts as
procedural--4.e., as not invalidating the contract but precluding its enforcement in Pennsylvania courts; (3) since Pennsylvania law did not
render the contract void, and since (as the court had said in its earlier
opinion) the Erie doctrine did not apply to enforce conformity with the
result that would obtain in a common-law action in the state court, the
statute had no application to an enforcement proceeding before the Secretary of Agriculture under the act; indeed, the act clearly provides a remedy
in addition to any remedies available under state law, so that there is
nothing to bar this federally created right to reparation; and finally,
(4) the formalities required by the Pennsylvania statute, as modified by
the federal act, were satisfied: for Pennsylvania treated acceptance of the
goods as a substitute for the written memorandum, and under the express
terms of the act (though perhaps not according to the Pennsylvania courts'
interpretation of the formalities requirement of the local sales act), the
actions of the defendant buyer amounted to acceptance-and as to this
matter the federal act superseded state law.
Hence, in the end, supervening federal law wiped out any possible
conflict between state laws. I can make nothing of this in support of governmental-interest analysis in ordinary conflicts cases, and Ehrenzweig
can make nothing of it in support of his "Rule of Validation"-which from
now on I propose to write in lower-case type.' 24
Rothenberg v. H. Rothstein & Sons, 183 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1950).
Although the foregoing discussion would seem to make reference to the detailed facts
unnecessary, for good measure I add: "It is undisputed that... the defendants, in Philadelphia,
.. accepted the offer of the plaintiff, in Buffalo, . . . to sell them a specific carload of fresh
peas." 181 F.2d at 346 (emphasis supplied). [Then how can the defendant successfully rely on
any Statute of Frauds?] Moreover, there was an exchange of telegrams that, in all common
sense, should yield the required memorandum signed by the party sought to be charged, and the
district court so held-though he mistakenly attributed to the defendant one telegram sent by
the plaintiff. [If there was a sufficient memorandum, how can the defense of the Statute of
Frauds prevail?] The car was rejected on the ground that the peas were not of the quality
called for by the contract, but a jury found the contrary. [What has the Statute of Frauds to
do with whether peas conform to the quality standard specified in an admitted contract?]
123
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6. Richmond-Carcia Oil Co. v. Coates.'25 This is one of the
strongest authorities in support of Ehrenzweig's thesis; but that very statement is perhaps the most damning indictment of the thesis that I can phrase.
To me the decision makes no sense. The land was in Texas. The residence
of the parties does not clearly appear, but one may infer (or guess) that
the plaintiff broker was of Texas and that the defendant owner was of
California. As we know from cases considered elsewhere, 12 6 both Texas and
California have statutes requiring a writing for land brokerage contracts.
No other states being involved, it would seem to require nothing short of a
tour de force a la Professor-Referee Theodore Dwight to escape the invalidating effect of both statutes. This court escapes that effect (1) by holding,
regularly enough, that the contract was not made in California, since it
was completed when the broker found a purchaser in Texas, although the
purchaser went to San Francisco to close the deal, and (2) by ignoring the
Texas statute. We have seen that the Texas statute is worded and construed as procedural; but what, in the pre-Erie year of 1927, was the significance of that fact in an action in the federal court in Texas? Maybe the
Texas statute was ignored because only the California statute was pleaded.
Any attempt to apply governmental-interest analysis seems futile. I would
say that each statute expresses a policy for the protection of its residentsin each case, for the protection of defendants who are alleged to have made
expensive promises. That being so, there was no conflict of interests, and
the California statute should have prevailed-vindicating the interest of
California without impairment of any interest of Texas. Yet all this is
skewed by the known Texas attitude that its statute expresses a procedural
policy only. If one can believe that, there was a conflict of interests between
Texas and California (i.e., the residual Texas law expressed a policy protective of the expectations of promisees !), and barring a Bernkrant operation (clearly indicated on these premises), the court should apply Texas
law to vindicate the submerged Texas policy. At any rate, the court protected the Texas broker.
7. Straesser-Arnold Co. v. Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. 2 7 This is
simply a case in which, though the Pennsylvania Statute of Frauds was
pleaded in an Illinois federal court, there was ample satisfaction of both
statutory requirements. The parties dealt through a broker, who signed the
Finally, nothing is said as to the formality requirements of New York law. [Then where is the
conflict of laws? ]
125 17 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1927).
126 E.g., Woolley v. Bishop, supra note 117.
127 8 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 642, 46 Sup.Ct. 207, 70 L.Ed. 776
(1926).
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order blank. According to the Supreme Court, the (pre-Erie) law was well
settled to the effect that a broker may sign for both parties. In addition,
there was an exchange of letters and telegrams amounting in all common
sense to a sufficient memorandum, signed by the party to be charged; that
party, the buyer, simply welshed because the market fell. The case does
not support a "rule of validation" and, there being no conflict and no
problem of an invalidating Statute of Frauds, further comment on my
part would be absurd.
8. Hotel Woodward Co. v. Ford Motor Co. 28 This case is significant for me chiefly because it identified Referee Dwight, of Marie v.
Garrison,as "Prof. Dwight."'2 9 Beyond that, it deals with a written memorandum, clearly sufficient to satisfy either statute, and the only question
is whether the authority of the agent who signed on behalf of the party
to be charged must be in writing or may be proved by parol. Ford, a Michigan corporation, planned an office and warehouse building in New York,
but on account of the high cost of the land contemplated a high-rise structure with a view to leasing the upper floors to the adjoining hotel. Negotiations resulted in a draft lease sent from New York to Michigan; an officer
of Ford replied that the draft was "entirely acceptable" subject to details
to be settled later. In addition, the Ford directors, meeting in Michigan,
adopted a resolution ratifying the agreement to make the lease. When construction costs were found to be greatly in excess of estimates Ford abandoned the project although the hotel was willing to abide by the draft
provision calling for escalated rentals proportional to added construction
costs. In answer to the hotel's suit for breach of the agreement to make a
lease Ford pleaded the Statutes of Frauds of both New York and Michigan-and lost. The only difference, for present purposes, between the two
statutes was that Michigan required the authority of the agent to be in
writing while New York did not. There was no proof that the Ford officer's
authority was written, and none was to be anticipated on the New York
trial. But the holding is that his authority, express or implied, could be
established by other proof. The court reviewed the general law, finding
support for various theories: formalities in such cases are governed by the
law of the place of contracting, or of the situs, or of the forum, almost
ad libltum. In the decisions of New York's highest court, however, Judge
Hough could find no support for the only theory on which the law of Michigan could be regarded as controlling-that referring to the place of contracting. New York would hold its statute applicable as the law of the
128 258 Fed. 322 (2d Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 256 U.S. 698, 41 Sup.Ct. 537, 65 L.Ed. 1177

(1921), 259 U.S. 588, 42 Sup. Ct. 590, 66 L.Ed 1077 (1922).
129 258 Fed. at 328.
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forum and/or situs. Hence on retrial the plaintiff had an opportunity to
prove the authority of the agent.
So what? When practically all the details of the contract have been
spelled out in a very formal draft lease, and an officer of the lessor has
signed a letter approving the draft as "entirely acceptable," is not every
reasonable purpose of the Statute of Frauds of any state satisfied? When
the Michigan legislature required written authority for an agent did it
have in mind corporate officers? Would not a rule of alternative reference
be admirable here? At all events, even if some pedant should object that
this decision subverts Michigan's interest in protecting its corporations
against written promises made by corporate officers not having ad hoc
authority in writing, my answer is that the (federal) court in New York
properly subordinated that Michigan policy to New York's policy of protecting the expectations of its corporations who rely on such promises,
written authority or not.
9. Young v. Pearson.1 0 Sometimes Ehrenzweig brushes aside decisions as aged; sometimes, as here, he reaches as far back as possible to
find support for his thesis. But though the nugget here panned is almost as
old as the California Gold Rush, it does not support the "rule of validation." The plaintiff sued for an accounting on the theory that in New
Orleans he and the defendants agreed to join in a hegira to California as
partners to trade in land. The Louisiana law does not appear; whatever
it may be, the California Statute of Frauds does not apply to partnership
or joint-venture agreements, even though the object of the enterprise is
to deal in land. No problem, no conflict.
10. Fimian v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.' Plaintiff, a citizen of Georgia, sued for breach of an oral contract of employment to last three to five
years. The contract was made in Georgia, to be performed in the state of
Washington. The two states had similar statutes of frauds, but Georgia,
unlike Washington, excepted from the requirement of a written memorandum contracts partly performed. Here the plaintiff, relying on the promise
made by defendant's agent, resigned his job in Georgia and moved his
family to Washington, only to be discharged without cause after working
for six or seven months. (The answer admitted all this except that it denied
that the contract of employment was for a fixed period of time.) 1' 2 The
130 1 Cal. 448 (1851).
131 209 Ga. 113, 70 S.E.2d 762 (1952).

132 See same case below, 85 Ga.App. 200 (1951). Actually there were two cases, decided
together on appeal. The two corporate defendants, acting through a common agent, had (if the
plaintiff's allegations as to the agreed term of employment were true) victimized two Georgia

families.
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Georgia Supreme Court, reversing the Court of Appeals, first restated [sic]
the stock rules as to the law governing formalities, interpretation, performance, and procedure, and then held:
"Where, as in this case, a suit upon a contract executed in Georgia and to be
performed in another State is brought in a court of this State, the question of
whether or not the plaintiff's right of action is barred by the statute of
limitations or the statute of frauds, both relating exclusively to the remedy,
must be determined with reference to the laws of Georgia .... The Court
of Appeals erred, therefore, in holding that a Georgia forum is controlled
by any foreign statute of frauds, relating exclusively to the remedy, and
particularly so where such foreign statute is in conflict with the statute of
this State."' 3 3

At least four "real" reasons for the decision are thinkable-not all,
perhaps, mutually exclusive: (1) The Georgia court believed what it was
saying about the procedural character of the statutes of frauds of both
states, or at least felt bound to that characterization by precedent; (2) it
was simply being provincial, favoring the local resident as against the (presumably) foreign corporation; (3) it was validating contracts at all costs
by reference to the validating law; or (4) it was furthering the governmental interest of Georgia by applying the policy embodied in Georgia
law for the protection of local residents, where the protective policy and
interest of Washington was (or may have been) in conflict with Georgia's
policy and interest. Take your choice: Ehrenzweig has his and I have mine.
Lest there be any doubt, my own belief is that the Georgia court really
believed in the stock rules it was restating, but was inclined to resolve ambiguities in those rules (e.g., it would have been possible, under the rules as
stated, to hold that the law of the place of acting, or of performance,'1 34
was controlling) in such a way as to further Georgia's interest in applying
its domestic policy for the benefit of local people. Again let me emphasize
that I do not pretend that the influence of this policy-oriented thinking
was explicit in the opinion, or even consciously in the minds of the court.
11. Kellum v. Robinson.3 5 Although Ehrenzweig assumes the
prerogative of choosing among alternative grounds for a decision,"3 6 in this
instance he does not scruple to cite in support of his thesis the merest dictum. Even the dictum lends no significant support to the thesis, since it
stands for the proposition (rather clearly "correct") that the agreement
was not within the Statute of Frauds; hence there was no conflict.
133 209 Ga. at 114,70 S.E.2d at 763.
134 The court of appeals so held, denying recovery, 85 Ga.App. at 203-04.
135 193 Iowa 1277, 188 N.W. 821 (1922).
136 See note 112, supra.
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The plaintiff and the defendant (the latter a resident of Missouri)
entered into an oral partnership agreement calling for the purchase of a
farm in Missouri. Title was taken in the name of the defendant, who
operated the farm for a year and then sold it, rather arbitrarily sending the
plaintiff a check for less than the one-third interest claimed by the plaintiff,
and refusing to account further. To plaintiff's petition for an accounting,
defendant interposed two grounds of demurrer (if we disregard the
rather odd ground that the "cause of action did not arise within the state
of Iowa"). The first was the statute of limitations; the second was the
Statute of Frauds. With respect to the statute of limitations the court held,
interestingly enough, without mentioning the distinction between "substance" and "procedure," (1) that although the contract was allegedly
made in Iowa, it was to be performed in Missouri; the intention of the
parties governs, and that intention identified Missouri, the place of performance, as the source of the governing law; and (2) that, in the absence
of proof of the applicable limitation period prescribed by Missouri, the
Missouri statute would be presumed to be the same as that of Iowa.8 7 That
was five years, and the action was barred.
This was enough, was it not, to dispose of the plaintiff's action? Yet
the court went on to discuss "for a moment" the ground of demurrer raising
the Statute of Frauds. Thus everything said on that subject is pure dictum.
Even so, all the court said (without clearly indicating whether it was talking
about the Missouri statute or the Iowa statute) was that a partnership
agreement, an incident of which is the purchase of land, is not within the
Statute of Frauds. All the cases I have seen on the point are to the same
effect. I almost forbear to add that the defendant had himself acknowledged
the existence of the partnership agreement by making his own arbitrary
accounting; that an exchange of correspondence included documents signed
by the defendant fully adequate, it would seem, to satisfy the requirement
of a written memorandum of the oral agreement; and that the court said
(again by way of dictum, of course) that, even if the plaintiff could not succeed (because of the Statute of Frauds) in establishing a legal interest in
the land, he could recover on the theory of a resulting trust.
12. Meylink v. Rhea.13 To say the least, this furnishes inconclusive support for the "rule of validation." The suit, brought in Iowa
(presumably by a resident of Iowa) was for specific performance of an
oral agreement to sell land in Iowa. The defendants, husband and wife,
were residents of South Dakota, where the contract was made. The hus137 It is unusual for a court to presume that the statutory law of another state is the
same as the statutory law of the forum. See CuRIE at 19-23.
138 123 Iowa 310,98 N.W. 779 (1904).
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band admitted the contract; so did the wife, except that she denied authorizing the husband to sell at the agreed price, which was lower than she had
hoped to receive. At this point I begin to wonder whether the requirements
of the Statute of Frauds were not in fact satisfied; but there is more. The
purchaser had made a small down payment, which avoided the requirement of a writing under the Iowa, though not the South Dakota, statute.
(The idea of a rule of alternative reference again suggests itself.) Held:
The Iowa statute is procedural and controlling although the South Dakota
statute "strikes at the contract itself"; 1 3 thus the law of Iowa as the procedural law of the forum governs. The most explicit ground of decision,
however, is that Iowa law governs as the law of the situs. Let us leave it
that considerable literary license is required to list this as a decision
favoring validation at all costs. Note in passing that (at least if we assume
that the plaintiff was a resident of Iowa) the forum applied domestic policy
to effectuate its interest in vindicating the expectations of local residents
who had paid something in earnest to bind the oral bargain.
13. Ellis v. Eagle-PitcherLead Co.140 The oral contract for the
sale of zinc ore (treated as a contract for the sale of goods) was made in
Kansas (the forum state), where it was valid. The ore was located in Oklahoma, according to whose law it was conceded (for unstated reasons) that
the contract was invalid. Held: The law of the forum (Kansas), as the
place of contracting, governs, and gives validity. Situs and place of performance, even if assumed to be in Oklahoma, are immaterial. Since the
court applies the hornbook rule that the law of the place of contracting
governs formalities, something like temerity is required to cite this case as
upholding a "rule of validation." Compatibility with governmental-interest
analysis is difficult to assess since the connections between the parties and
the respective states are not given (though Moody's Industrial Manual
(1964) lists the losing defendant as an Ohio corporation). This last circumstance suggests that full analysis would have to deal with problems
of possible unconstitutional discrimination.
14. In re De Gheest's Estate.'4 ' . . . ("loan agreement made in
France between French residents"). This has nothing to do with the Statute of Frauds, nor with formality requirements of any kind. By a very
formal agreement an American citizen residing in France during the German occupation promised to repay her French money-lender in dollars she
had on deposit in a Missouri bank. The action was against her estate. The
question at issue was the validity of the agreement under the "French"
139 123 Iowa at 311,98 N.W. at 780.

140 116 Kan. 144, 225 Pac. 1072 (1924).
141362 Mo. 634, 243 S.W.2d 83 (1951).
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currency control laws. The holding, expressed in a sophisticated opinion,
was that Missouri law governed and gave validity because it was the law
of the place of performance and the law intended by the parties.
If it is my turn to guess at the unarticulated "real" reason for the
decision, I suggest that antipathy to Nazi currency control laws, the effect
of which on private contract rights was not made clearly to appear, may
have had something to do with the result. I prefer, however, to this brand
of psychoanalysis the suggestion that Missouri had no relevant policy
whatever except that honest debts be paid, and applied that policy despite
potential conflict with the (possibly) contrary policy of a foreign government, repugnant or not. This is a satisfactory adjustment even if the decedent died domiciled in Missouri; I will not suggest that it is so a fortiori
because one is tempted to guess that the Missouri administration was
ancillary.
15. Reilly v. Steinhart"4'... "(option agreementmade in Cuba)."
Here we have an agreement in writing, executed in Cuba between two
American citizens domiciled and doing business there, whereby the plaintiff gave the defendant the option to buy a concession to build a railroad in
Cuba, together with the necessary lands. The option itself was to cost the
defendant $50,000, of which $15,000 was paid on execution, the remainder
to be paid when the option matured. It is for this remainder, $35,000, that
the plaintiff sues. The defense is that under Cuban law it is not enough for
such a contract to be in writing; it must be "protocolized," which is to
say, it must be "authenticated before a notary or by a competent public
official with the formalities required by law." Cardozo (who, I regret to say,
was as conceptualistic as that other great judge, Holmes, when it came to
conflict of laws), announced that the action must fail if the Cuban law
was substantive, since "the existence of a contract must be determined
by the Cuban law" (as the law of the place of contracting).148 But the
Cuban law was procedural rather than substantive, and this Cardozo, on
the basis of expert testimony, was able to demonstrate in an unusually
cogent way: In Cuba, if the defendant refused to protocolize a less formally
executed agreement, the plaintiff could sue to compel him to do so. Thus
the agreement was actually enforceable in Cuba, though, as Cardozo said,
Cuba "recognizes the contract as valid, but prescribes a double remedy.
The law of New York follows the law of Cuba in recognition of the contract,
44
but prescribes its own [single] remedy, and pursues its own procedure."
142 217 N.Y. 549, 112 N.E. 468 (1916).
143 For this proposition he actually cited Holmes's outrageous decision in Cuba R.R. v.
Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 32 Sup.Ct. 132, 56 L.Ed. 274 (1912), discussed in CURRIE, ch. 1.
144 112 N.E. at 469.
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Thus there was no conflict. I add only that it disturbs me when Ehrenzweig, while rightly adhering to Lorenzen's condemnation of the substanceprocedure dichotomy, blandly cites a faithful and not especially perceptive
application of that dichotomy in support of his "rule of validation" thesis.
This is not, of course, to disagree with the result of the decision, which is
clearly sound as comporting with the laws of both states.
16. Bernstein v. Lipper Mfg. Co.14 5 The pattern of Ehrenzweig's
analysis is reiterated here. The decision upholds the contract, applying
the law of the forum; ergo, the "rule of validation" is demonstrated; never
mind the reasons given by the court. But I am interested in those reasons.
By an apparently admitted oral contract the defendant agreed to employ
plaintiff as salesman for a year, only to discharge him prematurely because
of alleged misconduct-a charge of which the jury absolved the plaintiff.
The contract was valid according to Pennsylvania law, and no good reason
appears for the displacement of that law by any other; the parties not
being identified, one may assume (though it is not necessary to assume)
that they may both have been identified with the forum state, Pennsylvania. Then why the talk of conflicting laws? The defendant invoked the
New York statute, which would have invalidated the oral agreement (or so
it was said)-because, forsooth, the plaintiff's employment-the performance by him of his part of the contract-was to take place partly in New
York as well as in the South and Middle West. So the invalidating New
York statute was dragged in on the theory that the law of the place of performance governs formalities. Nonsense, said the court. Precisely because,
as here, performance of a contract may be split among many states, that
rule for choice of law should be rejected in favor of one pointing to the
place of contracting. While I am of course not overjoyed by this short-cut
approach to the sound result, I find satisfaction in the fact that the court
applied the law of the only state having any basis for an interest in the
matter, so far as the record reveals.
17. Perry v. Mount Hope Iron Co. 46 The plantiff seller, residing
and doing business in Rhode Island (the forum state), sent his agent to
call on the defendant, a Massachusetts corporation doing business in Boston, to solicit an order. Allegedly the defendant's officer made an oral offer
which plaintiff's agent asked him to hold open until the next day, which the
defendant agreed to do. On the next day the plaintiff accepted the offer by
telegram dispatched from Providence to Boston. The defendant rejected
the scrap, denying that it had made an offer, and alleging that if there was
145 307 Pa. 36, 160 Ati. 770 (1932). My statement of facts is based in part on the opinion
below, 161 App.Div. 242, 146 N.Y.S. 534 (1914).
140 15 R.I. 380, 9 At. 632 (1886).
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any offer it was only for No. 1 quality, which the shipment rather clearly
was not. It also invoked the Massachusetts Statute of Frauds, on the theory
that if there was an offer it was accepted only upon receipt of the acceptance
by the offeror in Massachusetts. The Supreme Court assumed that the law
of the place of contracting was controlling, but, affirming the trial court
as to this point, rejected the heresy (in terms of the law of offer and acceptance) urged upon it by the defendant, and held the contract made when
and where the acceptance was dispatched-Rhode Island, whose law gave
validity. This is a slender reed on which to base a "rule of validation." On
its face the ruling simply accords with the simplistic though beguiling
maxim that the law of the place of contracting governs formalities, and with
the worse than simplistic notion that the place of contracting is determined
in the same way as the time of contracting-an issue with quite different
implications. 147 Significant to me is the fact that the court implemented the
interest of the forum state in vindicating the expectations of its entrepreneurs despite the fact that this impaired the contrary interest of Massachusetts in protecting its entrepreneurs against the hazards of parol proof.
This is consistent with governmental-interest analysis, though I would
regard this as a good case for a Bernkrant operation since the plaintiff
solicited the business by sending his agent to the defendant's office in
Boston. 48
18. Hunt v. Jones.'49 If Ehrenzweig would let it, this case could
furnish him with some support for a "rule of validation," though not with
respect to the Statute of Frauds and otherwise narrower than Ehrenzweig's
broad rule; but Ehrenzweig will not allow this. Although he here cites the
case as supporting the "rule of validation," elsewhere he declares that that
rule does not apply to the cases mentioned in this opinion in the only passage speaking favorably of a validating rule.' We have an oral contract
made in Rhode Island for the sale of lime (in process of manufacture in
Connecticut) to be delivered in New York. The parties are not identified
with the states named, but a reasonable guess is that, since the plaintiff
chose to sue in Rhode Island, he probably resided there, and, since the lime
was to be delivered to New York, the defendant buyer was probably at least
doing business there. The contract was plainly valid according to Rhode
147 See CuP.Rm at 87, following the line laid down by Cook and Cavers.
148 Although the judgment of the trial court was reversed on other grounds, that does
not, in my judgment, make this ruling dictum, since it will constitute the law of the case on
remand for new trial.
149 12 R.I. 265 (1879).
150 EBRENzwEiG at 482, quoted and discussed in Currie, Book Review, 1964 DUxE L. J.
424,431-32.
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Island law and invalid under the New York Statute of Frauds. The holding
is simply that the law of the place of contracting, rather than the proffered
law of the place of performance, governs formalities. Permitted my assumptions as to the connections of the parties with the respective states are
correct, I would say that the decision is consistent with the interest of
Rhode Island in vindicating the expectations of its residents who have
relied on oral promises. But Ehrenzweig could, if he would, find comfort
in the following gratuity:
"There are cases which go farther and hold that a contract made in
good faith to be performed in another, will be upheld if it conforms to the
law of either State ....

This rule has been applied especially to stipulations

for interest on contracts for the payment of money, and is commended by
Professor Parsons as reasonable and just....

"The case at bar, however, involves the validity of the contract in
matter of form rather than of substance, and seems to fall more appropriately
under the former rule than the latter [i.e., under the rule that the law of the
place of contracting governs as distinguished from the rule of alternative
reference, or the validating rule]; but it is immaterial whether the former or
the latter is applied, for the contract in suit is valid under either of them."'151
Whereas Ehrenzweig states emphatically that the "rule of validation"
applies to formalities such as the Statute of Frauds but not to usury cases
(because he approves usury statutes as heartily as he disapproves the
Statute of Frauds?), this court says just the converse: a rule of validation
is all very well for usury cases, but the law of the place of contracting is
preferred when the issue concerns formal validity.
19. Cooper v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc."' . . . ("secondary

characterizationholding a foreign statute 'procedural'"). Just why Ehrenzweig decided to append the explanatory squib to this particular citation
is not clear; we have had abundant evidence that courts commonly decline
to apply a foreign Statute of Frauds on the ground that it is procedural,
especially if the foreign court so characterizes it. Here was a written contract made and to be performed in Georgia. The plaintiff was a citizen of
South Carolina, the forum state; the defendant was a Florida corporation
doing business in several states. After extensive discussion with some attention to Lorenzen, the court held that, since the Georgia courts themselves
held the Georgia Statute of Frauds remedial, it did not affect the action in
South Carolina. The contract was valid under South Carolina law, the only
issue being whether the authority of the defendant's agent to execute the
151 12 R .I. at 267.
152 206 S.C. 372, 34 S.E.2d 589 (1945).
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written contract must also be in writing. Again the possibility of a rule of
alternative reference where there is substantial compliance with the policy
of both statutes suggests itself. As for governmental interests, the decision
upholds the forum state's interest in vindicating the expectations of its
residents who rely on written promises.
20. Linn v. Employers Reins. Corp.153 . . . "which, while purportedly based on a peculiar localizationof telephone contracts, was probably motivated by the favor negotii." Indeed? Any localization of telephone contracts for purposes of choice of law is "peculiar," I think; but all
the cases I have read (and there are more to read than one might suppose)
hold, as does this court, that the contract is made when and where the
words of acceptance are spoken into the mouthpiece. That is no less and
no more defensible than would be a contrary rule to the effect that the contract is made where the words reach the ears of the offeror-unless one is
tempted to suggest that the prevailing rule has the advantage of economy
for law students: they have only to learn Adams v. Lindsell, not one rule
for written correspondence and another for telephonic communication.
The rather passive attitude of the Pennsylvania court was that, while there
is something to be said in criticism of the general current of authority favoring localization where the words of acceptance are spoken, the line of least
resistance is to drift with the current.
What happened was this: the plaintiff, a Pennsylvania insurance
broker, approached the defendant's agent in New York and offered to procure reinsurance contracts for defendant in return for a share of the
premiums. The agent said he would have to communicate with his home
office in Kansas City. On returning to Philadelphia plaintiff received a
telephone call from the New York agent accepting the offer. The Pennsylvania statute, said the court, had no application because, being substantive,
it had no application to contracts made elsewhere. The trial court had assumed that this contract was made in New York, and so held it invalid
under the New York statute. This was en rapport in theory with the Supreme Court's "peculiar" localization, but in application it suffered a
defect: there was nothing in the record to show that the New York agent, in
telephoning the acceptance, had placed the call from New York I Hence
there must be a remand and new trial. What do you suppose the plaintiff's
chances were, on remand, of proving that the telephone call from the New
York agent was placed not from New York but from some state with a
validating law? As I judge those chances, the probable tendency of the
decision was to doom the contract to invalidity under the law of New
153 392 Pa. 58, 139 A.2d 638 (1958).
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York-not to validate it, as Ehrenzweig suggests, under some validating
law. What, then, is the basis for the assertion that the decision was "probably motivated by the favor negotii"? The effect if the Pennsylvania statute
had been held applicable does not expressly appear. To speak with precision, the case reaches no result on the merits, but only lays down an abstract
rule to the effect that the law of the place of contracting governs, and the
place of contracting is that where the words of acceptance were spokenwhatever the law of that place, or its connection (or lack of connection)
with the matter may be. I derive no support, and want none, from an
opinion so reasoned. If my suppositions are right, and assuming that the
contract would have been valid under Pennsylvania law (if we do not
assume that, there was probably no conflict), the Pennsylvania court undermined Pennsylvania's policy and interest, unless one can justify a Bernkrant on the basis of the plaintiff's aggressive initiation of negotiations in
the defendant's territory.
In his footnote" 4 Ehrenzweig couples with his citation of the foregoing
case the following: "In this connection, see Linn v. Employers Reinsurance
Corp., 397 Pa. 153, 153 A.2d 483, 485 (1959), recognizing a presumption
for the lex fori." Although Ehrenzweig does not say so, this is the same case,
back in the Supreme Court after remand and retrial. Concerning what
would appear to have been the vital issue in the light of the remanding
opinion-the place where the telephone call of acceptance was placed-the
defendant's agent testified that he had made no telephone call at all, from
New York or any other place. He admitted that he had received authority
from the home office to accept the offer, and that the contract had been
performed on both sides for twenty-seven years. Such an admission and
such "part performance" should blow any defense under any Statute of
Frauds sky-high, without the aid of any "rule of validation." This was not
the method used by the court, however, to sustain the jury's verdict for
the plaintiff. Under the charge given by the trial judge the jury might have
found that there was a call of acceptance, placed from some state other
than New York (the verdict was not necessarily based on a finding that
the oral agreement had been concluded while the parties were together in
New York-a finding that would have led to invalidation). In fact, the
defendant at the trial (after remand) admitted that there was an oral contract, but contended it was made face to face in New York, and not by
telephone at all. What kind of defense is that under the Statute of Frauds?
May I admit in open court that I entered into an oral agreement in New
York with a Pennsylvania businessman, and still invoke the aid of a New
154 EEm zwEiG at 473, n. 19.
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York statute designed to protect me against fraudulent claims that such an
agreement was made? The Pennsylvania court preferred not to deal with
this question (thinking it, I suppose, an unfair and sophomoric attack on
the majesty and wisdom of the law). It maintained its precarious stand
that the place where the words of acceptance were spoken supplied the controlling law; it then placed the burden of proving where that place was
on the defendant; and, since the defendant had not sustained the burden of
proving that this contract was made in New York, it sustained the jury's
verdict for the plaintiff. "Since it was not established that the laws of New
York are applicable, the laws of the forum, Pennsylvania, are presumed
to apply."' 1 5 Observe that, although the court used the word "presumed,"
Ehrenzweig's reference to "a presumption for the lex fori" is misleading.
The court did not presume that the law of New York was the same as that
of Pennsylvania; the contrary had been proved. The court simply applied
the law of the forum as a matter of course, as it should do, when the party
seeking advantage in a foreign law fails to establish its claim to displace the
law of the forum as the source of the rule of decision.
In the end, then, the court did validate the contract by applying the
law of the forum: only incidentally because of its "peculiar localization of
telephone contracts"-primarily because the defendant failed to carry the
burden of showing that foreign law should displace local law. And the clear
interest of Pennsylvania in protecting the expectations of local businessmen, dealing in good faith for more than a quarter of a century on the
basis that a man's word is as good as his bond, was finally vindicated. If any
contrary interest of New York in protecting locally connected enterprises
against fraud was subordinated (and who will undertake to demonstrate
that this was so?), I couldn't care less. This was a decision by a Pennsylvania court.
21. Watson v. Lehigh Valley Wood Work Corp.15 This case is
cited, if one reads Ehrenzweig carefully, not as sustaining the "rule of validation" but in order to explain it away. In this case, he says, "the parties
had agreed on the lex fori." If by this he means to suggest that the case is to
be explained by reference to the theory of party autonomy (as he must be
understood to mean in the context of his espousal of that theory) '" I have
two remarks to make. (1) Is it not odd, as I have tried to suggest before,
that the theory that gives the parties freedom to choose the governing law
155 397 Pa. at 157, 153 A.2d at 485.
156 198 F.Supp. 273 (E.D.Pa. 1961).
157 See the entry, "Party Autonomy," in his Index, and pursue the sub-entries, especially
the reference to the theory as applied to contracts at p. 316, where Ehrenzweig speaks of "the
great principle of party autonomy."
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should lead to a decision that the parties entered deliberately and intentionally into an invalid contract? (2) So far as the report shows, there is no
evidence whatever that the parties at the time of the transaction had
"agreed on the lex fori." For the trial record the parties (presumably
through their counsel) had stipulated that the law of Pennsylvania (the
forum state) was controlling. They did this not because of a "meeting of
the minds" but for the simple reason that Pennsylvania precedents (as we
already know from our consideration of the Linn cases) established that,
so far as Pennsylavania was concerned, the law of the place of contracting
governs formalities, and according to the plaintiff's contention, the contract was made when the defendant in Pennsylvania accepted by telephone
(a proposition also established by the Linn cases).
Even though this should suffice to dispose of the citation, Ehrenzweig's "peculiar" techniques of case analysis force me to continue. This
case, which Ehrenzweig attempts to distinguish, or extirpate from his rose
garden as a noxious weed, does not even require distinction or extirpation,
because it does not hold the purported contract invalid under any Statute
of Frauds. It hardly matters, but the plaintiffs were of Nevada and the
defendants were of Pennsylvania. The action was on an alleged agreement
of guaranty. The court holds not that the oral agreement was invalid because not in writing; it holds, on the merits, that no such contractwas ever
made-for the convincing reason that the plaintiff himself, in letters, insisted on a letter of guaranty as being required by law and as a condition of
his incurring an obligation to pay a commission to the guarantor. Thus it
seemed clear to the court that any apparent promise to guarantee was
merely an incident of preliminary negotiations. As an alternative holding
the court holds that, in any event, the "guarantor" was discharged by
plaintiff's extension of time to the debtor.
V
THE SAME: WITH IMPORTED FABRICS, YET
"Contractshave been quite generally upheld where they have satisfied
58
the
... formality requirementsof... anotherproper law.'
1. Dow v. Shoe Corp. of America. 5 9 Ehrenzweig's scheme of citation appears to call for federal decisions first, followed by state decisions
in alphabetical order, with cases in each category arranged in inverse
chronological order. This is logical and convenient enough, and is suffi1 58
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at 473. All the cases discussed under this heading are cited in id., n. 20,

except as otherwise indicated.
159 276 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1960).
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ciently arbitrary that it would be unfair to attach much importance to the
happenstance that the very first case cited in support of the proposition
quoted above very clearly does not sustain that proposition. The fact remains that, whereas Ehrenzweig gives it first place in his impressively long
list of cases cited to sustain the proposition that contracts have been generally upheld when they have satisfied the formality requirements, not of
the forum state but of another "proper law," this case holds nothing of the
sort. So far as appears, there was not even a conflict-of-laws problem. The
case simply follows the familiar construction of the provision of the Statute
of Frauds relating to contracts not to be performed within a year: that provision does not embrace contracts for lifetime employment, since one or
both parties may die within a year. 60 A superficial basis for regarding this
as a case presenting a conflicts problem exists in the fact that, the action
having been brought in a federal district court in Illinois and the agreement
having been made in Wisconsin, the court stated that in matters of substance the agreement was governed by the law of Wisconsin. There is no
semblance of a suggestion, however, of any conflict between the statutes of
Illinois and Wisconsin. The contract would be valid under the typical
Statute of Frauds of any state; it would be invalid only in a state such as
New York, which has sought by special amendment of the statute to cure
the "anomaly" of validating lifetime contracts while invalidating shortterm contracts not to be performed within one year.
2. Minella v. Phillips.'6' This, the second case cited by Ehrenzweig in support of this branch of his "rule of validation," is even more
inapposite, if that is possible, than the first. No conflict appears, and there
is not even a definitive ruling as to the validity under the Statute of Frauds
of the alleged oral trust of land that is under discussion.
This is a bankruptcy case in which the bankrupt, doing business in
Houston, Texas, applied for a discharge which was refused by the referee
because he had failed to account adequately for his assets. There was a
little matter concerning some claimed gambling losses, and it appeared to
the accountants that the bankrupt had substantial assets not otherwise
accounted for by him; but the missing asset with which I presume Ehrenzweig is concerned was a piece of land in Massachusetts that the bankrupt
had acquired from his mother and stepfather and had sold for $7,500.
None of the proceeds of the sale were listed by the bankrupt as available
to be applied to the claims of his creditors. His excuse was that his mother
had told him, on conveying the land to him, that if he should sell the land
160See FuLLER, BASIc CONTRACT LAW 954-55 (1947), citing WILUSTON § 495 and RESTATEMENT, CONTACTS § 198.
161 245 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1957).
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she wanted the proceeds to go to the bankrupt's children and his son-inlaw. His claim was that he had in fact given his daughters and his son-inlaw $5,000. This, of course, did not account for the remainder of $2,500;
but the question was whether it was a sufficient excuse for his failure to
pay over even the $5,000 to the trustee for the benefit of his creditors.
Since the bankrupt's position was that he had been trustee of a valid
trust of land in Massachusetts, the court, assuming the applicability of
Massachusetts law, gave some attention to the validity of the trust under
the Massachusetts Statute of Frauds. Its conclusion on that point was that
an oral trust of land is unenforceable, but becomes enforceable when the
land is sold and "converted" into money. (Observe that since [in all probability] the beneficiaries were not parties to the bankruptcy proceeding, a
ruling that the trust was invalid could not bind them, and so would be
somewhat less than authoritative; and even this favorable ruling would not
be pleadable by them, under the rule of mutuality of estoppel, in a good
many states).162 But the court did not stop with this. It found no trust, but
only an expression by one of the grantors of her hope or desire; and any
old trust hand knows that "precatory words" do not give rise to a trust.
Even this did not dispose of the question before the court. Trust or no
trust, the question was whether the bankrupt had an excuse for not disgorging the price realized on the sale. Comes now the ratio decidendi of the
case: Under the bankruptcy act, the bankrupt might be excused for having
given two-thirds of the proceeds to his daughters and his son-in-law, and
thus (as to this portion of his unreported assets) entitled to discharge, even
if the trust were invalid under the applicable law, if he in good faith, though
erroneously, believed he was under a legal obligation to pay over the
money. Even this the court did not definitively decide, because the lack of
accounting for other assets was sufficient, apart from the matter of the
trust, to sustain the refusal of the discharge. "The admitted lack of any
explanation of what became of $30,000, exclusive of the claimed gambling
losses, forms a sufficient justification for the denial of a discharge."1'63 Thus
there was no definitive ruling on the validity of the trust even under Massachusetts law; no conflict with the law of any other state appears; and this
was a federal bankruptcy case in which the rule of decision was supplied
by an act of Congress, not by the law of any state.'64
162 See Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9
STAN. L. Rav. 281 (1957); id., Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CAr=F. L. REv. 25

(1965).
163 245 F.2d at 689.

164 Challenging questions for governmental-interest analysis are presented when federal
law build upon state law or relies on it to fal gaps in the federal regulatory scheme. Cf. Richards
v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 82 Sup.Ct. 585, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962). Doubtless the draftsmen who
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3. A.M. Webb & Co. v. Robert P. Miller Co.""5 Again, I am sorry
to say, I cannot explain why Ehrenzweig thought it appropriate to cite
this decision as supporting his thesis. I have read (though Ehrenzweig does
not cite it) the same case on a prior appeal,' 0 and the following discussion
draws upon the prior opinion; but even it does not justify the citation.
We deal with a written agreement between a New York dealer and a
Pennsylvania manufacturer, made in New York, whereby the defendant
manufacturer was for five years to sell his entire output through plaintiff.
On this appeal the court decides (1) that the jury verdict finding oral rescission after three months was supported by the evidence, written contracts
being rescindable by parol (citing only section 222 of the Restatement of
Contracts); and (2) that, as to alleged breaches prior to rescission, the
New York Statute of Frauds does not require the price to be stated in an
otherwise sufficient memorandum where the parties intend only to contract for a reasonable price. So far there is no problem of conflict of laws
as to oral promises. On the prior appeal the court was concerned with the
issue of vagueness or uncertainty. It held that under New York law an
agreement silent as to price will be construed as referring to market or
current rates. "We find no merit in the defendant's contention that the
agreement fails for want of a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the New
York Statute of Frauds, N. Y. Personal Property Law, Sections 31 and
85 .... ,17 Neither of these statutes requires that the consideration be
stated in the memorandum. No suggestion appears that the Pennsylvania
law was in conflict. The Pennsylvania manufacturer was held to his contract, but not contrary to any Pennsylvania policy. The point as to the
Statute of Frauds, in fact, seems merely a restatement of the vagueness
point.
4. FranklinSugarRef. Co. v. William D. Mullen Co." 8 Curiouser
and curiouser. The decision does sustain the validity of a contract as not
in contravention of a Statute of Frauds other than that of the forum, but
have relied on such devices in the past have assumed that any conflicts between state laws will
be readily solved by black-letter rules of thumb. We who believe that such problems must be
approached in terms of governmental policies and interests are confronted with the serious
question: What is the interest of the states on whose law the Federal Government relies in,
say, a Federal Employers' Liability Act case raising a conflicts question as to the validity of
a marriage between the injured employee and his dependent helpmeet? I can only say (1) that I
hope to study some of these puzzling problems in the future, and (2) that the Federal Employers' Liability Act, at least, might be regarded as a statement by Congress of what is now
the policy of each state for employees of interstate railroads. But this hardly goes far enough.
165 176 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1949).

166 157 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1946).
167 157 F.2d at 867.
168 12 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1926).
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I am at a loss to know what the conflict was; and, to make matters worse,
a little later on Ehrenzweig cites this case following the statement that
"Even fewer are the cases which, under a foreign law, have held invalid a
contract valid under the law of the forum," with the following qualifications: "... did not actually invalidate the contract."' 69 How does Ehrenzweig understand the case? Did it validate a contract, invalid under the
law of the forum, by reference to foreign law? Or was it one of the "few"
cases invalidating under foreign law a contract valid under the law of the
forum? If the latter, did it actually or inactually invalidate the contract?
These are difficult questions. Let us return to the case itself.
The plaintiff, a Pennsylvania enterprise, sued for breach of a contract
by the defendant, a Delaware enterprise, to buy sugar. The action was
brought in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.
There was a written memorandum: that is, a printed form, entitled "Acceptance of Offer," on stationery of the plaintiff seller; it bore the typewritten signature of one apparently acting as broker. Almost without discussion this (pre-Erie) decision holds that the Pennsylvania Statute of
Frauds applies because the contract was made and to be performed there.
The memorandum was held sufficient; cryptic though it was, it was complete and certain when read in the light of trade terms and customs fully
pleaded and admitted by demurrer. As to the signature, any difficulty is
obviated, first, by the demurrer's admission of the contract as alleged in
the complaint, and second by the fact that, after receiving a carbon copy of
the "acceptance form," the defendant wrote not one but three letters confirming the transaction, the last of which requested a price adjustment that
was refused by the seller. The plaintiff seller won. This may have gone contrary to the interest of the local (Delaware) defendant, but not contrary,
so far as appears, to any Delaware policy for his protection. There is no
suggestion whatever that the law of Delaware would have invalidated the
contract. Indeed, what was involved was the formalities provision of the
Uniform Sales Act, and without looking it up I assume that Delaware's
statute was the same as Pennsylvania's. There was simply no conflictonly a valid memorandum signed by the party to be charged, or by his agent
on his behalf.
5. Mullaly v. Carlisle Chemical Works."7 ° There is no conflict
here. True the court holds-almost by way of dictum-that the contract is
not within the New York (foreign to the New Jersey forum) Statute of
Frauds; but the plaintiff does not necessarily win.
169 EHmENZWmE

at 474-75, n. 33.
170 184 F.Supp. 701 (D.N.J. 1960).
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Plaintiff was an officer and prime stockholder of a New Jersey corporation that was acquired by defendant, an Ohio corporation, whose parent
was another defendant Ohio corporation. As part of the merger plaintiff
was employed by written contract by the first defendant for a term of three
years. This contract was terminable at will by the employer, but only on
condition that payments of salary be continued during the term. Upon
merger the old retirement plan of plaintiff's original corporation was liquidated and its benefits were commuted so far as the plaintiff was concerned;
he was covered into an existing plan of the parent corporation permitting
retirement after 25 years of service (including his service to his original
corporation), or, in case of hardship, after 15 years of service. When his
three-year term expired his total period of service was exactly 24 years and
ten months-just short of the period that would have entitled him to retire
on full benefits as a matter of right. He was not so retired, and he sued
for the full benefits on the theory that the employer orally promised to
certify him for hardship retirement if he was involuntarily retired prior to
25 years of service. Held, applying New York law as that of the place of
contracting and performance, that the alleged oral agreement was not
within the provision relating to contracts not to be performed within
one year, since the employer could at any time terminate the three-year
employment contract and certify the plaintiff for hardship retirement
(since he had served well over 15 years when the employment contract
was made). However, the court could find no consideration for the promise
to certify. For this reason the court was tempted to order summary judgment for the defendant, but refrained and allowed plaintiff to go to trial
because of the possibility that he might be able to establish consideration.
Thus the ruling on the Statute of Frauds amounts to something like dictum, since we are not sure the plaintiff won; but let that pass. The point is
that there was no conflict because no suggestion that the New Jersey law
on the Statute of Frauds was different. Without looking it up, I assume that
it was the same, this being in line with the usual interpretation of the oneyear provision of the typical statute.
6. Eckhart v. Plastic Film Corp. 7 ' The first thing to be noted
about this case is that it has been overruled. It was overruled by a case
cited a little later by Ehrenzweig, but Ehrenzweig does not note the overruling. 2 The second thing to be noted is that (on the theory adopted by
the court) no conflict appears. The plaintiff sued for breach of an alleged
oral contract for lifetime employment. Under the law of Connecticut, appli171 129 F.Supp. 277 (D.Conn. 1955).
172 Rubenstein v. Kleven, 261 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1958), cited in EHRENZWEIO at 474 n. 31,
and discussed infra, text at n. 261.
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cable by reason of the Erie-Klaxon doctrine, the contract was governed by
the law of New York as the place of performance (plaintiff was to work out
of a New York office serving as his base of operations). The reader may
recall that, although the standard interpretation of the provision concerning contracts"not to be performed within a year does not apply to contracts
for lifetime employment, New York in 1933 amended its statute, to rectify
this anomaly, by extending the requirement of a writing to contracts "performance of which is not to be completed before the end of a lifetime."
Quite wrongly, even perversely, the federal district court in Connecticut
held that the amendment did not mean what it said, and held the contract
valid under New York law. That is why the decision was later overruled
by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. But in the meantime note that
presumably the contract was valid under the law of Connecticut, since few
states have followed New York's example in amending the statute to rectify
the anomaly. Thus, in a peculiar sense, we may say that there was no conflict between the laws of Connecticut and New York. But the main point is
that this decision is plainly wrong, and has now been authoritatively declared wrong-not as a matter of conflict-of-laws theory but because of its
perverse misinterpretation of the New York statute.
7. Smith v. Onyx Oil & Chem. Co." 3 Quite simply, this case involves no conflict. In the interest of brevity I omit the details. Referring
to the New York Statute of Frauds (chiefly concerning sales of goods,
though the one-year provision is also mentioned) because New York was
the place of contracting, and so supplied the rule of decision under the
conflicts law of the forum (Delaware), the court holds (1) there was an
ample memorandum to satisfy the statute, and (2) the statute did not
((even encompass" a contract for the sale of goods made to order for a particular buyer. There is no indication that the law of Delaware (or the law
of New Jersey, also mentioned), was to any other effect.
8. Canister Co. v. National Can Corp." 4 Again no conflict appears. Omitting details, the law of Delaware points to the law of New York
as that of the place of contracting. The one-year provision and the sale-ofgoods provision are invoked. Neither is applicable because (1) the agreement was to terminate with the lifting of wartime production controls,
which might happen within a year, and (2) the goods were manufactured
to order for the particular buyer. These are standard constructions of the
typical statute.
9. Wolfe v. Burke."5 I should say, rather, that the contract here
173 120 F.Supp. 674, 681 (D.Del. 1954).

174 63 F. Supp. 361 (D-Del. 1945).
175 18 Colo. 264, 32 Pac. 427 (1893).
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was upheld under the common law of the forum state, no conflict with the
law of any other state appearing. The action was in Colorado for breach of
a fairly formal contract, made in Idaho, for the purchase of land in Idaho
(there was an escrow arrangement, part payments were made, time extensions were granted, etc.). While there was no plea of any specific Statute
of Frauds, it must be remembered that at common law the defense could
(at least sometimes) be asserted under a plea of the general issue. The
court said that if the contract was to be held invalid by reason of the
Statute of Frauds it must be the statute of Idaho, because the contract was
made and to be performed there and the land was located there. But no evidence was introduced as to any Idaho Statute of Frauds. The statutory
law of another state will not be presumed to be the same as the statutory
law of the forum; the presumption as to common law does not apply to
statutes (a standard holding) .1' This contract was valid at common law
and hence enforceable unless stricken by the Colorado statute; but that
does not apply because it is substantive and has no application to contracts
for the sale of land in another state, made and to be performed in the other
state. The parties are not localized. Perhaps this holding may be said to
frustrate Colorado's policy of protecting domestic people asserted to have
promised to buy land (if we assume that the defendant was a resident of
Colorado); but Colorado has not construed its statute as announcing any
such policy. Besides, it is hard to see why the trial court thought the note
signed by one of the defendants was not a sufficient memorandum under
any statute.
10. Lams v. F. H. Smith Co.17 7 I cannot say ex cathedra that
Ehrenzweig is not entitled to cite this case in support of his proposition,
since the decision does uphold a contract by applying foreign law when it
would be invalid by the law of the forum; moreover, as I read it, the case
frustrates the interest of Delaware, the forum state, in protecting its own.
But if one reads the case one must, I submit, take it as signifying something
quite different from an indiscriminate "rule of validation." This is the
familiar casebook case on which I relied (among others) when I predicted
that analysis of Ehrenzweig's authorities would repudiate rather than substantiate his thesis.171 I had discussed the case in considerable detail in an
essay published in 1960-two years before Ehrenzweig's treatise appeared. 7 9 To me it seems very clear that the Delaware court was motivated
by the kind of reasoning that goes into governmental-interest analysis: it
See CuaRai, ch. 1, at 19-23.
177 36 Del. (6 Harr.) 477, 178 Ad. 651 (Super.Ct. 1935).
178 Currie, Book Review, 1964 DuxE L. J. 424,429-30.
179 See Cunm, ch. 19, at 450-55, originally published in 69 YALE L. J. 1323 (1960).
176
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determined the policy of the Delaware Statute of Frauds (primarily to protect local people and enterprises) and recognized Delaware's interest in
applying its policy to the fullest reasonable extent. It felt bound, however,
to accomplish this through the alternatives made available by the traditional rules for choice of law, even though by such means it could only
approximate the goal of the legislature, and that by indirection as distinguished from forthright declaration of policy and interest. The effective
choice was between characterizing the statute as substantive or characterizing it as procedural. Then the court calculated the odds. It reasoned,
rightly or wrongly, that most alleged promises by residents of Delaware
would be made in Delaware. Hence the greater protection would be afforded
local people-both at home and when they were sued in other states-if the
statute were characterized as substantive. This is what I call governmentalinterest analysis and policy effectuation by indirection and approximation.
It is not a technique that I applaud, since it leads to some absurd results,
including arbitrary discrimination against its own people that, in some
instances, will some day be held unconstitutional. It is, however, a groping
toward policy and interest analysis within the manipulable framework
of the traditional system. It is most definitely not an indiscriminate "rule of
validation," even though in the case in which the decision was announced
a Delaware corporation was arguably deprived of the protection of Delaware's policy.
There is another way of looking at the case. The defendant corporation had contracted in writing to repurchase bonds sold by it to the plaintiff.
The contract was allegedly made in New York, which had the one-year
provision but did not require the agent's authority to be in writing, as the
Delaware statute did. Rejecting the literalism of Leroux v. Brown, which
would easily have led to a holding that the local statute was procedural,
precluding enforcement, the court, as I have said, deliberately calculated
the odds and held the statute substantive for the protection of Delaware
people in the long run. Is this not also an appropriate case for a rule of
alternative reference? There was a writing, signed by an agent of the defendant. Must there really be, under any statute, ad hoc written authorization for a corporate agent to make written promises not to be performed
within a year, relied on in good faith by the buyer of bonds?'
11. Green v. East Tenn. & Ga. R.R.'8 The case does not deal
with the Statute of Frauds; it does not even deal with the formal validity
180 In criticism of Erhenzweig I do not seek to make capital of the fact that the decision
was by an inferior court. I myself value the decision as a pragmatic, though constricted, approach to a sound method of solving conflicts problems.
18137 Ga. 456 (1867).

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:243

of contracts in any guise. The question is whether an arbitration award
made pursuant to a (probably written) contract may be oral, not reduced
to writing. The relevant considerations seem remote from the Statute of
Frauds. It does not appear from the report that Georgia required an award
to be in writing; the court said that the law of Tennessee, as the state of
contracting, governed, and there was ample evidence that Tennessee law
validated such an award. Independent investigation of the Georgia legislation of the approximate time discloses that a submission to arbitration
could be by parol, and the award might be "verbal," when no more than
$500 was involved.' 82 Whether this legislation was applicable cannot be
determined without research unjustified by the occasion: the 1861 Code
was Georgia's first; the contract was made in 1850; this action was tried
in 1867. Whether or not the original code provision was based on a law in
force when the contract, or the award, was made, and whether or not more
than $500 was involved, I do not know, and I shall not attempt to find out
because the whole thing has nothing to do with the formal validity of contracts.
12. Oakes v. Chicago Fire Brick Co.' I concede Ehrenzweig
such comfort as he can derive from this decision. It does strain to hold a
contract valid under the law of another state when presumably it would
be invalid under the law of the forum (though it is not clear why it would
be thus invalid). Moreover, the result can be squared with governmentalinterest analysis only on the basis of an assumed Bernkrant operation.
The plaintiff, apparently then a resident of Pennsylvania, there (allegedly) contracted with the defendant corporation to work as salesman for a
period of one year, to begin at a future date. In reliance on the informal
promise he moved to Chicago and worked about a month before his discharge. Admittedly the argeement was valid according to Pennsylvania law
(possibly because of part performance?). It was assumed to be invalid
under Illinois law, though one wonders again whether part performance
should not aid the plaintiff. The court says nothing about a preference for
the validating law. On the surface, at least, it merely lays down a rule for
choice, and one that, if followed, will certainly lead to invalidation under
local law in cases to come: Ordinarily the law of the place of contracting
applies to formalities; but where the contract is made in one state to be
performed in another, the parties will be presumed to have intended the
law of the place of performance. So far this points to invalidity. Here, however, performance was to take place not only in Illinois but in several states.
182 GEORGIA CODE § 2826 (1861); id. § 2834 (1868); id. § 7-104 (1933).
183 388 11.474,58 N.E.2d 460 (1944).

1965]

RULE OF VALIDATION

301

Defendant having failed to sustain the burden of showing that performance
was to be wholly in Illinois, we are remitted to the law of the place of contracting. If I were an adherent of the "rule of validation" I would not be
especially happy with this pronouncement that, in the next case, where the
work is to be done entirely in Illinois, the agreement will be stricken down.
13. Miller v. Wilson.' A slender reed indeed. The action is on
an agreement made in Kansas to purchase land in Kansas, where, of course,
performance was to take place. The parties are not localized except as one
may draw risky inferences. There was a receipt signed by the plaintiff (and
accepted by the defendant), a note signed by the defendant, a letter of
inquiry, and a chit signed by the defendant forfeiting his deposit-all of
which the court said, it seems to me unreasonably, did not add up to a
sufficient memorandum to satisfy the hungry Illinois statute, if it were
applicable. But it had no application to such a contract as this. And no
Kansas Statute of Frauds was pleaded. So whether by presuming the
Kansas law to be the same as the common law of Illinois, or simply by
default, the court held the defense of the Statute of Frauds must fail. "Rule
of validation?" The case clearly says to me that the defendant has only to
bring to the attention of the court in proper fashion the applicable Statute
of Frauds of Kansas, and the Illinois court, a cathedral for harsh application of formal requirements (if the discussion of the sufficiency of the
memorandum is a reliable guide), will instantly put the contract to death.
14. Henning v. Hill.'85 If Ehrenzweig can squeeze any comfort
out of this case he is welcome to it. Perhaps he was captivated by an incidental remark to the effect that the Indiana Statute of Frauds (relating to
brokers' contracts) did not declare a policy of the state. But what happened was this: The contract was made in Illinois at a time when both
parties were residents of Illinois, and was fully consummated there. Only
after the whole transaction (except payment of the commission) had been
completed did the defendant move to Indiana. To me this is a clear case of a
single interested state at the time of the transaction; to have applied
Indiana law would have required a strong justification not to be found in
a Statute of Frauds. No Illinois statute was pleaded. The court held the
Indiana statute substantive and hence inapplicable; it was in this connection that the court remarked that the statute did not declare a (judicialadministration?) policy for Indiana. In the absence of proof of an invalidating Illinois statute, the court presumed the common law to be in force
in all the former Northwest Territory, and upheld the contract. God helping it, it could do no other.
184 146 MI].523, 34 N.E. 1111 (1893).
185 80 Ind.App. 363, 141 N.E. 66 (1923).
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. . "(applying French law)." Now I am

simply-or rather compoundly-confused. Ehrenzweig cited this case
earlier"8 7 to support his statement that, for lack of an express "rule of validation," courts resort to "precarious devices" to validate contracts-here
the "moral impossibility" of invoking the invalidating law. We disposed
of that, I think. Now he cites it to sustain the proposition that courts uphold contracts under foreign law although they would be invalid under the
law of the forum. Whence he derives the notion that this commandatum,
or bailment, would be invalid under the law of Massachusetts I have not
the faintest idea.
16. Dudley A. Tyng & Co. v. Converse. 8s So far as I can judge,

there was no conflict-and so no support for Ehrenzweig-if the Michigan
statute was at all reasonably drafted and interpreted. At best, the case simply holds that the law of the place of contracting governs-determining
place of contracting by the usual weird rule relating to acceptance by telephone. The defendant, apparently a resident of Michigan, wrote to the
plaintiff broker in Illinois offering to buy certain shares of stock at a stated
price. The plaintiff acknowledged and said he would treat the order as a
standing one until cancellation. About a week later there was a telephone
conversation in which the defendant did or did not cancel, depending on
whose testimony one believes. A couple of weeks later plaintiff telegraphed
that the order had been filled. Defendant replied that he would not "accept," then wrote a letter saying, "I am very sorry I did not cancel my order
with you," and went on to make excuses about having bought all the stock
he could finance. On the same day all this happened there was a telephone
conversation to the same effect. I find it hard to understand why the letter
signed by the defendant was not a sufficient memorandum. The court, however, concentrated its attention on the defendant's argument that the contract was made in Michigan, holding that it was clearly made in Illinois and
citing cases to the effect that acceptance by telephone takes place when and
where the words of acceptance are spoken. 9
17. Matson v. Bauman.9 ' I concede nothing here. At a time
186 331 Mass. 104, 117 N.E.2d 129 (1954).
187 See text at note 71, supra.
188 180 Mich. 195, 146 N.W. 629 (1914).

189 Concededly Illinois had no applicable Statute of Frauds. Assuming that the typical
Statute of Frauds as it relates to the sale of "goods, wares, or merchandise" embraces corporate
stock (a not unusual holding), the Michigan statute presumably in force at the time, though
covering such a transaction, required only "some note or memorandum in writing" signed, etc.,
and would seem to be completely satisfied by the letter regretting failure to cancel the written
order. 4 How. MIcE. STAT. (2d ed.) § 11400.
190

139 Minn. 296, 166 N.W. 343 (1918).
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when both parties resided in Iowa the defendant, to induce plaintiff to
buy stock in a corporation, executed and signed a formal, written offer to
repurchase at the original price some five and one-half years later. On
demand defendant refused to repurchase and plaintiff sued. Defendant
pleaded the Minnesota (forum) Statute of Frauds. Can you guess why?
Because, forsooth, it required that the consideration be stated in the
memorandum, and that was not done. The court held simply that according
to settled law the state where the contract was made and to be performed,
and where the parties resided at the time, was controlling. The Iowa Statute
of Frauds was not pleaded. The court refused to assume that, if pleaded,
it would be found to contain the unusual requirement that the consideration be expressed in the memorandum. There was no conflict. Only a single
state was interested in the parties and the transaction-Iowa. Iowa law
was not shown to invalidate, and probably did not invalidate (I have not
bothered to look up the Iowa law at this time, and do not intend to do so).
Had there been a conflict a rule of alternative reference would have been
indicated. No court in its senses would have invalidated the contract in
these circumstances, and the holding does not remotely support a "rule
of validation."
18. Halloranv. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co. 9 ' This was an action
to recover on the defendant's written promise to guarantee the rent of
premises in Iowa to be used as a saloon. The lessor and lessee appear
to have been residents of Iowa; the lease and the contract of guaranty
were executed and to be performed in Iowa. The defendant was presumably, a Minnesota enterprise. The contract of guaranty conformed with
the pleaded Iowa Statute of Frauds. The answer admitted the execution
of the guaranty contract-though I must be careful not to make too much
of this because of the strange ruling, occasionally uttered, that even a
written admission, to take the case out of the statute, must precede suit.
The only complaint was that the writing did not express the consideration,
as required by the Minnesota statute. The court did not say, as I do, that
it does not require much imagination to guess why a brewing company
would undertake to guarantee payment of the rent of a saloon. Instead it
gave long shrift to the argument that the memorandum did not satisfy the
forum's statute, in the end holding the statute substantive for cases such
as this, at least. Moreover, the requirement that the consideration be expressed was "at most an insignificant variance from [the typical Statute
of Frauds], since it is generally held that a recital of 'value received' is a
sufficient expression of consideration-an expression that leaves the actual
191 137 Minn. 141,162 N.W. 1082 (1917).
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consideration wholly at sea so far as perjury is concerned." The fundamental policy of the statute, that such promises as this be proved by written
evidence, was satisfied. Hence this was simply a case of holding applicable
the law of the place of contracting and performance (and perhaps situs), a
well-reasoned policy construction of the domestic statute, and in effect a
declaration of a rule of alternative reference where differences are demonstrably and incontrovertibly nonessential to the basic policy of the statute.
19. McKibbin v. Ellingson1 ' 2 ... "(applying a foreign recording
statute) ." This does not concern the Statute of Frauds, and does not even
(according to my comprehension of the expression) involve a question of
the formal validity of a contract (at least in the sense of an executory
promise). It concerns the validity of an assignment for the benefit of creditors-executed and performed-and the requirement that such an assignment be filed or recorded. It was duly filed in the foreign state. The policy
of such a statute is so obviously different from the policy of the Statute
of Frauds that further discussion would be as inexcusable as the citation
itself; but, under provocation, I add the following quotation from the
opinion:
"Though we were to deem [the assignment] executed in this state,
still it would not come within our statute regulating assignments. That
statute does not assume to regulate assignments executed in this state by
nonresidents, who have no property and no place for carrying on business
in this state, and the trusts created by which are to be carried out in another
state.'

1 93

20. Hooker v. McRae.'9 4 The defendant's son went to the plaintiff's place of business in Tennessee and asked plaintiff to buy cross-ties
for the account of his father's company, giving the plaintiff a list, signed
by him for his father's company, that specified kinds and prices. Plaintiff
delivered the ties to the railroad right-of-way (presumably in Tennessee)
as called for by the order, but defendant refused to take them up. Upon
being shown the order signed by his son he said, "Well, you have me, and
I will take the ties up as soon as I can get the cars placed." So how can any
Statute of Frauds bar recovery? The court held simply that this was a
Tennessee contract, and the Tennessee Statute of Frauds did not apply
except where the price of the goods was $500 or more-and the cross-ties
were not worth that much. That is all. Independent investigation reveals,
58 Minn. 205, 59 N.W. 1003 (1894).
193 58 Minn. at 210,59 N.W. at 1003.
194 131 Miss. 899, 95 So. 744 (1923), explained on appeal from judgment on remand (not
reversed on other grounds as Ehrenzweig says), 138 Miss. 439, 103 So. 197 (1925).
192
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as expected, that the Mississippi statute used the more common figure of

$50.195 But was there not a sufficient memorandum in any event? No ques-

tion was raised as to the authority of the son as agent. Did not the buyer
"accept" the goods, or part of them, and "actually receive the same" when,
on being notified that they had been delivered to the right-of-way, he said
he would take them up?
21. Houghtaling v. Ball & Chapin.'9 6 My notes read: "Absolutely inapposite." The plaintiff alleged that he had sold 2,000 bushels of
wheat to the defendant at $1.05 per bushel and delivered it to defendant's
agent in Illinois, who was to ship it on to St. Louis, where payment was to
be made on arrival. The defendants refused to accept delivery in St. Louis,
or to pay. The answer was a general denial. The trial court instructed the
jury that there was no evidence to warrant a verdict for the plaintiff. This
court says it was error to take the case from the jury since the evidence
tended to support the allegations of the complaint, above stated. If there
was a question of law the court should have preserved it by putting a
hypothetical question to the jury.
"... It is obvious that, as the case comes from the court below, there is no
question of law for this court to decide. None was made, and, so far as the
record is concerned, we are utterly at a loss to ascertain the point on which
the cause was determined in the court below.
"It is not perceived how the statute of frauds could affect the contract,
as stated in the petition. It is alleged that the wheat was sold and delivered.
If so, the statute had nothing to do with the case. There being a delivery of
the article sold, the contract was taken out of the operation of the statute.
The allegation that payment was to be made upon the arrival of the wheat
at St. Louis, serves only to designate the time of payment, and, by no
means, subjects the contract to the laws of Missouri. The laws of Illinois
alone operated on the agreement." 9 7
Observe that the court first spoke of the Missouri statute; suddenly the
Illinois statute becomes material, but it was not proved; and we have reason
to know that Illinois did not have a statute requiring a writing for sales of
19 5

Also that the authority of the agent was not required to be in writing. Miss. CODE
Ai-x. § 268 (1942); HEIGWAY'S Am. Miss. CODE § 3329 (1927). The later decision on appeal
from the judgment on remand only makes it clear that the writing was not the integrated
contract; parol evidence was admissible to prove that the defendant wanted softwood ties only,
and was not obliged to take hardwood. If anyone is prepared to argue (against odds) that the
Mississippi court should have protected its resident notwithstanding the memorandum and
acceptance, I would suggest that the decision is justified on the basis of a Bernkrant operation,
since the defendant sent his son into the plaintiff's home territory to instigate the deal.
190 19 Mo. 84, 59 Am. Dec. 331 (1853).
197 19 Mo. at 86, 59 Am. Dec. at 332-33.
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The court refused to take judicial notice of Illinois law, holding
that the burden was on the defendant to prove it. Otherwise the court would
assume the Illinois law to be the same as the common law of Missouri. In
short, the court seems to hold: (1) If there was delivery as alleged, and
the jury could so find, the case was taken out of the Missouri statute, if that
was applicable; and (2) Illinois law, not Missouri law, governs, and is
presumed to be the common law, with no Statute of Frauds requiring a
writing.
22. Howell v. North.'9 9 This case perhaps furnishes the strongest
support thus far for Ehrenzweig's statement, yet it is slender support. The
action is by an assignee of the right to a brokerage commission for the
sale of land. Since, in my view, an assignment ordinarily should not change
settled rights, I shall treat the case as if the original parties were the litigants. Both were apparently residents of Nebraska (the forum state),
though, since they lived in different cities, they did business by correspondence. Defendant wrote to plaintiff offering a "fair commission" if he
could find a buyer for Colorado land at a stated price. Plaintiff alleged
performance and nonpayment; the trial court sustained a demurrer to the
complaint. Reversed. The defendant had invoked the Nebraska statute,
which required brokerage contracts for the sale of land to be in writing,
subscribed by both the landowner and the broker (a rather unusual requirement), and stating the compensation of the broker. The defendant's
letter had been very precise except as to the commission: it even enclosed
a plat. The broker's acceptance was endorsed on the defendant's letter
(signed by the brokerage company with the initials of the broker), all as
shown by the defendant's brief. In addition, the broker wrote defendant a
letter saying he had found a buyer but had heard that defendant had sold
to another, and asking clarification so that he could proceed. Defendant
replied by letter denouncing the rumor and impliedly authorizing the
broker to proceed. Plaintiff proceeded to sell the land in Colorado, and
from that state wired defendant that he had done so. The law of Colorado
was that the broker was entitled to his commission upon procuring a ready
buyer though his contract was not in writing and no specific commission
had been agreed upon.
It would seem that even the Nebraska statute was satisfied, if "fair
commission" can be taken, as it should be taken, as a sufficiently precise
statement. The court treated the letter denouncing the rumor as clear
authorization to proceed. Thus defendant had twice committed himself in
198 See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. XLIV, § 1 (1845).
199 93 Neb. 505, 140 N.W. 779 (1913).
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writing. Acceptance of the offer occurred when plaintiff performed in Colorado (a standard holding where the contract is unilateral). "This contract would appear to be binding in any event whenever the plaintiff's
assignor discovered a buyer and sold the land to him."2 0 ° Some language
of the court is worth quoting in order to make the point that imprecise
reading of precise language can be misleading. The court said:
"The purpose of the [Nebraska] statute was to protect landowners from
the fictitious claims of real estate dealers who never actually sold the land
they claimed to sell and never earned the commission for which they were
claimants, but it was never the intention of the legislature to protect the
real estate owner against legitimate claims for services which he authorized
in writing and which were honestly rendered." 20 1
This does not mean that the purpose of the statute is only to protect against
dishonest dealers; if there is not substantial compliance with the (applicable) statute the dealer cannot recover, no matter how honest his claim.
The court simply means that the substance, the spirit, and even the letter
of the statute were complied with in this case. There is no discussion of the
sufficiency of the provision for a fair commission. Thus the court actually
holds the contract valid under the law of the forum. Almost as an afterthought it says that the contract related to land in Colorado and was to be
performed there, and was valid under Colorado law.
23. Anderson v. May 22 No conflict; this is rather clearly not a
case in which a contract, in the sense of an executory promise, invalid by the
law of the forum, is validated by foreign law. The action is on a written
promise, constituting a perfect memorandum, and supported by sufficient
consideration, to guarantee the rent on a one-year lease (to commence at a
future date) of land in Arkansas. There is no question whatever as to the
formal validity of the contract of guaranty. The question is whether the
informal lease was valid, for presumably if there was no valid underlying
obligation to pay rent there would be nothing for the guarantor to guarantee. Rather naturally, it seems, the Tennessee court looked to Arkansas
law to determine the validity of the lease. Arkansas was the only state
related to the primary transaction: the land was there, and, so far as appears, so were the lessor, the lessee, the making of the agreement, and the
transfer of possession. The Arkansas statute, "similar" to the Tennessee
statute, required a lease of land for more than one year to be in writing.
Since this lease was for exactly one year and no more, it was not within the
200 93 Neb. at 509, 140 N.W. at 780.
201 Ibid.
202 57 Tenn. 84 (1872).
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terms of either the Arkansas or the Tennessee statute. The statutes did
not speak of leases, as they did of contracts generally, "not to be performed
within the space of one year"; and the standard construction of the lease
clause is that it does not encompass a lease for one year, though the
term is to begin at a future date. So the court held here, although the question was one of first impression in both Arkansas and Tennessee. But the
decision is buttressed by a further provision of the Arkansas statute, to the
effect that an unwritten lease shall be treated as one terminable at willwith no greater effect than a lease for one year.The effect is that any oral
lease, with or without entry, operates as a lease for one year from the
date of the contract to make it. Judgment for defendant reversed.
This I regard not as a choice-of-law case in the sense that the forum
refers to foreign law for the rule of decision but as a case in which, given the
rule of decision (whether supplied by domestic or foreign law) the court
looks to foreign law to find a datum made relevant by the rule of decision.
There is no discussion of what law governs the contract of guaranty. The
defendant mailed his letter from Memphis to Arkansas, but whether it was
offer or acceptance does not appear. Presumably both states agreed that
the guarantor was bound only if there was an enforceable obligation of the
lessee to pay the rent. To find that datum, the court looked to Arkansas law
and concluded that there was such an obligation.
24. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jenkins."3 To quote
again my notes: "Inapposite (polite way of saying case not remotely in
point)." Action by holder of security interest to repossess automobile from
allegedly innocent purchaser for value; question, whether the security
instrument (conditional sale or chattel mortgage) must be recorded. This
has nothing to do with the Statute of Frauds. In some remote sense it may
be thought to concern "formal validity" of contracts; but the policy considerations involved are quite different. Interesting question; let's discuss
it on some other occasion.
25. Beach v. Gehl2 °4 This was an action for breach by the lessees
of an agreement to lease premises in Illinois for five years, defendant
lessees having abandoned the premises after about a year and a half of
occupancy. There was nothing wrong with the lease; the controversy was
over the defendants' contention that there was an oral rescission. The plaintiff denied this, maintaining that he re-entered after abandonment simply
to mitigate damages. On this issue the jury found, in defendants' favor,
that there was an oral rescission (but this is vitiated by prejudicial instruc203 234 S.C. 394, 108 S.E.2d 578 (1959).
204 204 Wis. 367, 235 N.W. 778 (1931).
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tions as to what would amount to an agreement of rescission). Hence there
must be a new trial, but it was necessary to determine the validity of an
oral agreement to rescind. For this purpose the court referred to Illinois
law because "the premises as well as the transactions" were localized there.
Under that law an oral agreement to rescind a written lease for a term of
years was valid. Although this does not appear from the report, the law
of Wisconsin appears to be otherwise, because rescission is a return to the
lessor of an interest in land and is therefore within the Statute of Frauds. 20 5
Hence it is true that the court here upheld under foreign law a contract
invalid under the Statute of Frauds of the forum. Its motive, however, does
not appear to be that of validating every contract if that can possibly be
done by reference to any proper validating law. The holding is conventional. If it be suggested that Wisconsin failed to effectuate its interest in
protecting the expectations of the lessees in reliance on the oral agreement
(on the rather dubious assumption that the lessees, being sued in Wisconsin,
resided there), to the advantage of the lessor (on the assumption that, as
owner of the Illinois premises, he resided there), I would reply that this
seems an excellent situation for a Bernkrant operation. °6
26. D. Canale & Co. v. Pauly & Pauly Cheese Co. 20 7 . . . "(dissenting opinion)." Since Ehrenzweig cites this case only for the dissenting
opinion, which of course is not authority, perhaps we should pass on without further comment. In fairness to Ehrenzweig, however, I think we should
take into account the majority opinion, because (1) the dissenting opinion
would invalidate the contract by applying the law of the forum (contrary
to the statement in Ehrenzweig's text), and (2) the majority opinion
furnishes perhaps the strongest support yet for Ehrenzweig's thesis, though
he does not rely on it.
Taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts were that
the parties orally contracted in Tennessee for the sale of cheese by defendant to plaintiff, F.O.B. Wisconsin. (One may guess that the defendant was
of Wisconsin and the plaintiff of Tennessee.) Rather clearly, under conventional doctrine, the contract (if any) was made in Tennessee and to
be performed in Wisconsin (by delivery to the carrier). The contract did
not comply with the sale-of-goods provision of the Wisconsin statute, but
205 See

RESTATEMENT,

CONTRACTS, § 222 (1932), and WxscoNsnf

ANNOTATIONS

(1933).

I do not seek to make capital of the fact that we do not know the ultimate result since
on the new trial the jury, properly instructed, may find there was no agreement to rescind.
The decision rules clearly enough-and this will be the law of the case on remand-that by the
applicable Illinois law an oral rescission is valid.
207 155 Wis. 541, 547, 145 N.W. 372,373 (1914).
206
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was concededly valid under the law of Tennessee.20 8 The trial court dismissed the action, holding that the law of Wisconsin, as the place of performance, was controlling. This court reversed, holding that the intention
of the parties determines what law governs; and that, while in the absence
of other indications the place of performance is presumed to be the place
whose law was contemplated by the parties, other considerations may rebut
the presumption. The only counter-consideration mentioned is the intention
of honest men that their agreements shall be valid and binding. This
familiar argument for validation, quite reminiscent of Ehrenzweig's own
argument, is set out at length at pages 545-46 of the official report. The
mandate called for judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The dissent would
apply the law of Wisconsin, invalidating the contract, because there were
no circumstances in evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption that the
parties intended the law of the place of performance to govern: "To say
that the presumed intention of the parties to make a valid contract is potent
to overcome the inferences of intention arising from the fixing of the place
of performance elsewhere is to eliminate the latter as a factor in all cases,
because everyone who seriously attempts to contract intends to make a
20 9
valid contract.1
In terms of the result as distinguished from the reasons given, I greatly
prefer the majority opinion, though it would have lent Ehrenzweig support
if he had cited it. I welcome the result in spite of the reasoning, which indeed leads to an absurdity: to repeat, while the law intended by the parties
may very well be relevant to the interpretation of an admitted contract, it is
begging the question to speak of the intention of the parties to a contract as
to the law governing validity, where the question is, as it most often is in
cases concerning the Statute of Frauds, whether there was any contract
at all. The law and policy of the Statute of Frauds, when it is applicable, is
that the existence of a contract cannot be proved except by a written memorandum. If there is no such memorandum the court cannot know whether
there was a contract or not, and must assume there was none. So what price
the "intention of the parties to the contract"?
On its face the result reached by the majority impaired the interest of
Wisconsin in protecting its own residents and enterprises against the hazards of informal proof of promises to sell cheese. I would not find it hard,
Apparently the Tennessee Statute of Frauds of the period did not contain a sale-ofSee TENN. ANN. CODE § 3142 (1917). But cf. the Hooker case, supra note 194.
provision.
goods
209 155 Wis. at 549, 145 N.W. at 374 (dissenting opinion). The dissent might have added
that the assumed intention to make a valid contract eliminates not only the law of the place of
performance but any invalidating law-which is about what Ehrenzweig advocates; yet remember that the dissent, which Erhenzweig cites, was not urging such a rule but was employing
the reductio ad absurdum argument against the majority's validating opinion.
208
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however, to justify a Bernkrant operation supporting the result in view of

the fact that the defendant's salesman presumably sought out the plaintiff
buyer in his home territory of Tennessee, where merchants were not accustomed to the requirement of a writing when contracting for the sale

of goods.
VI
THE CRUCIAL NEW YORK CASES
"Even if the partieshave established the required contact for the purpose of evading a stricter law, the Rule of Validation [sic][210] should
probably be applied since "the parties do not need protection.'[211] These
conclusionsE21 23 based upon actual holdings rather than judicial language,
have been exemplified elsewhere by an analysis of the case law of New
218

York, one of our outstandingjurisdictions.')

1. Rubin v. Irving Trust Co.21 4 We have already discussed this

case, 215

and I shall repeat only that the decision invalidated the alleged

contract by reference to the law of the forum and domicile, and refused to
validate it by the law of another state having only a fortuitous relationship
to the matter-and did so, moreover, explicitly in terms of interpretation
of the law of the forum in the light of the strong protective policy it expressed.
2 16
2. Reilly v. Steinhart.
This too has been previously dis-

cussed, 217 and I repeat only that there was no conflict: the contract was upheld because it was in writing and valid by the laws of both Cuba and New
210 Ehrenzweig's emphasis.
211 For this remarkable pronouncement Ehrenzweig cites one Raape, who cannot be
identified without some effort (see first Emax'zwEiG at 473 n. 21, referring to Ehrenzweig's
earlier note 4, which refers to nothing; but the diligent researcher consulting the bibliography
(EmEzWEIG at XLV) may discover that, with his usual erudition, Ehrenzweig is referring
to the author of a "leading treatise" in a foreign language, in this case German, published in
1955 and not available in translation. I tend to believe, perhaps naively, that American legislatures rather than untranslated German scholars should determine whether American parties
need protection against oral proof of promises.
212 The reference is apparently to all three of the immediately preceding statements, the
first two of which have been examined in parts IV and V of this paper.
213 Here Ehrenzweig refers to his article in 59 CoLumi. L. REv. 874 (1959). As has been
indicated, this discussion must be limited to the cases cited in the treatise. The entire quotation
in the text is from EmHmNzwEI at 471, and the cases to be discussed below are all, except as
otherwise stated, cited in id. n. 22.
214 305 N.Y. 288,113 N.E.2d 424 (1953).
215 See text at notes 63-66, supra.
210 217 N.Y. 549,112 N.E. 468 (1916).
217 See text at notes 142-44, supra.
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York; the only difference was that Cuba required the plaintiff to pursue
two remedies while New York gave him satisfaction in a single action.
3. Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Lipowicz.218 Absolutely no conflict of laws was involved in this case. The question was whether a memorandum cryptic because of the use of trade jargon was sufficiently definite
to constitute an enforceable contract; and, as many another court has
done, this court held that it was, when read in the light of evidence as to
trade custom and usage. Substantially identical statutes of frauds were
satisfied by a memorandum in writing signed by the party sought to be
charged or by his agent.
2 10
4. Russell v. Societe Anonyme des 18tablissements Aeroxon.
A little farther on in his discussion Ehrenzweig cites this as an obstacle to
be distinguished: as one in which the contract was invalidatedunder forum
law "notwithstanding validating laws of the place of contracting or performance, or the intention of the parties.

. ."

20

because the foreign law was

not pleaded.1 Which is it: a case supporting the "rule of validation," as
clearly implied by the text and citation at page 473 note 22, or a deviant
case to be distinguished away as clearly stated at page 474 note 30?
One thing is clear: the contract was not validated under either law. It
was invalidated under the law of the forum, New York, on the ground that
the party seeking advantage under foreign law has the burden of properly
establishing that law to the satisfaction of the court. This is sound law,
which I understand Ehrenzweig to approve. 22 In this case the plaintiff not
only failed to plead and prove foreign law; he failed to lay a foundation for
demonstrating the relevance of foreign law. He did not even allege the
place where the contract was supposedly made. And how does one know
that the foreign (Belgian) law would validate? The decision does not say
it would. Ehrenzweig may know the answer; I do not. At all events, the
court, perhaps sharing my ignorance, wanted to be informed of the answer
before it upheld the contract as valid under foreign law.
Despite the absence of sufficient information, I am tempted to suggest
that the decision supports neither of the propositions for which it is cited.
The action was against a Belgian corporation and its vice president for
breach of an alleged oral contract to give the plaintiff an exclusive agency
for five years to sell the defendants' product. Only the individual defendant was served with process. It was clear that plaintiff had no written
memorandum binding the individual defendant personally, though it may
218 247 N.Y. 465, 160 N.E. 916 (1928).
219 268 N.Y. 173,197 N.E. 185 (1935).
220 EBRENZWEIG at 474 (text and n. 30).

221 See Cuwm, ch. 1, and text at notes 92-93, supra.
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have had one binding the corporation. The plaintiff argued that the vice
president contracted "individually and as Vice-President of the Socit6";
but what court is likely to place that interpretation on a contract signed by
a corporate official? I suppose I could incur personal liability by signing a
contract purporting to award an exclusive franchise to sell General Motors
products; but I imagine a court would require rather clear language on
which to base an interpretation that I intended to assume such a personal
obligation. If I were vice-president of General Motors, and signed such a
paper, I imagine the court would suppose that I was purporting to bind the
company rather than myself. The individual defendant pleaded the New
York Statute of Frauds both as to the sale of goods and contracts not to
be performed within one year. As to him the obligation, if any he had assumed, was voided. The defendant corporation was not served with process
and so was not affected, at least directly. How can there be any complaint
against the decision? And how can it support a "rule of validation"?
5. A. S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co 22 Again, we have previously
discussed the case. 223 We did so because Ehrenzweig cited it as a case to be
excluded from the analysis22 4 on the ground that the parties had agreed on
the applicable law. Now, one page later, he cites it in support of his "rule
of validation." We have seen that the case does not involve the Statute of
Frauds at all, but rather the question whether a written agreement may be
orally modified. All the court held was that the objection to the complaint,
grounded on a New York statute requiring a writing for modification, was
not well taken since the complaint on its face alleged that the parties had
agreed on the validating Oregon law.
6. Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co.22 5 This case, also, has been previously discussed. It, too, was excluded from the analysis, 226 only to be
served up one page later as a pillar of the "rule of validation" coming from
"one of our outstanding jurisdictions."22 7 The case is appropriately cited
for neither proposition. The parties had not contracted for a particular law
to govern their relationship; their counsel had simply stipulated what they
knew the court would rule as to the applicable law. And the case does not
support the "rule of validation," since the decision holds the contract
invalidunder the law of Maine-the governing law as stipulated by counsel
and dictated by precedent.
222 3 N.Y.2d 369, 144 N.E.2d 371, 165 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1957) ; 57 CoLum. L. REv. 1188

(1957).
223 See text at note 96, supra.
2 24

EHRENzwEiG at 472, n. 18.

225 150 N.Y. 314,44 N.E. 959 (1896).
22 0
EmENzwiG at 472, n. 18.

227 EHR NzwEiG at 473.
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If every case declining to apply

the invalidating law of the forum, for whatever reason, supports a "rule of
validation," then this case supports Ehrenzweig. But I believe in reading
cases, and all I read here is that the federal court, applying the Erie doctrine and attempting to determine what a New York court would do, held
that it would not apply New York's statute requiring a writing for contracts
for real estate brokerage commissions where the case was not shown to be
in any significant way related to New York: "Since none of the events of
the case occurred in New York, it would be unreasonable to hold that provision applicable." 29 The district court (136 F.Supp. at 157) erred in
directing a verdict for the defendant, since the jury might justifiably have
found for the plaintiff. The other states possibly involved, because "pivotal
events" occurred there, were Massachusetts and Rhode Island. Without
research into the statutes of these states at the relevant time, I take professorial notice that fewer states have statutes requiring brokerage contracts to be in writing than have the Statute of Frauds, modeled on the
English statute, which contains no such requirement. A hasty look at the
Massachusetts and Rhode Island statutes indicates superficially that
neither had a statute directed specifically to brokerage contracts. The
parties are not localized, except that their citizenship was diverse.
8. Farmerv. Arabian American Oil Co. 23 0 The case is very simple,

and simply does not support a "rule of validation." It supports only Ehrenzweig's dislike of the Statute of Frauds as an instrument of modern legal
policy, domestic or interstate. The plaintiff, a doctor of medicine apparently
residing in Texas, was unquestionably employed by the defendant to work
in Saudi Arabia. The defendant was a Delaware corporation having its
principal office in New York. The original agreement was made by telephone and confirmed by correspondence. The plaintiff went to Saudi Arabia
and actually worked about eight months before he was discharged. The
only problem relating to the Statute of Frauds arose from the fact that the
writings did not state the term of employment. According to the defendant,
the contract was terminable at will; according to the plaintiff, it was to
last for the duration of the defendant's operations in Saudi Arabia. The
issue was whether the contract was invalidated by the New York provision
relating to contracts not to be performed within a year. Though there was
some doubt arising from recent New York decisions, the court applied
the standard rule that contracts terminable on an event uncertain in time
228 229 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1956).
229 229 F.2d at 276.
230 277 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 824, 81 Sup.Ct. 60, 5 L.Ed.2d 53

(1960).
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(such as termination of the Saudi Arabian operations) were not within the
one-year provision. The New York statute was simply inapplicable as a
matter of domestic interpretation, independent of any question of conflict-of-laws theory. The parties had stipulated for purposes of the litigation (they had not agreed as a matter of mutual consent at the time of the
contract) that New York law governed. No other law was pleaded, though
the contract may well have been "made" in Texas and was certainly to be
performed in Saudi Arabia. I suppose Ehrenzweig's enthusiasm for the
decision is accounted for by the following dictum contributed by the late,
revered Judge Charles E. Clark: "The statute of frauds, as applied to such
a contract as this, where plaintiff has performed for many months, is an
anachronism in modern life and we are not disposed to extend its destructive force. 2 Corbin, Contracts § 444 (1950). "1231 (Emphasis added.) I
agree with this statement by Judge Clark and Professor Corbin, but not
with the enlarged meaning Ehrenzweig would attribute to it.
9. In re Bulova's Estate 3 2 Ehrenzweig has previously cited this
case under the general heading of cases straining to reach a just result in
spite of "official doctrine," parenthetically remarking that the court applied the law of the forum to validate a Swiss contract between New York
residents because to have applied Swiss law would have been "an absurdity."2 ' On our first visit to the case 34 we observed that in the lower
court, from whose opinion Ehrenzweig quotes, there was no issue as to
formal validity; and that on appeal the Swiss law was held applicable to
invalidate the agreement as to Swiss land, though as to other property the
law of the New York domicile was controlling.
VII
THE TROUBLESOME, "DISTINGUISHABLE" CASES
"Decisions of American courts which have appliedan invalidatinglaw
to a contract valid under a relevant foreign law, are rare and can usually
be explained on other grounds reconcilablewith the general Rule of Validation[sic],[235J

"Perhapsthe most important decisions in this category are those concerningforum land, includingdisputes over foreign commission agreements
231 277 F.2d at 51.

232 216 N.Y.S.2d 26 (Surr.Ct.), aff'd 220 N.Y.S.2d 541 (App.Div. 1961).
233

,HENzwEiG at 472, n. 16.

234 See text at note 75, supra.
235 Emm-mzw=o at 473.
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made by foreign brokers.... The courts have been ruled by a 'land taboo'
not justifiable under present economic conditions. 23 0
1. Arnold v. Wilson.237 This is an indefensible decision, but not
because of any land taboo. It does unjustifiably invalidate a contract by
application of the law of the forum; its faults are many. I agree that it is
wrong, but there is nothing in its wrongness to stampede us for refuge to an
indiscriminate "rule of validation."
The plaintiffs, residents of Arkansas, were engaged by the defendant,
also a resident of Arkansas at the time, by letter, to find a buyer for a ranch
defendant owned in Missouri, wishing to exchange the ranch for property
in Texas. The plaintiffs performed, the exchange took place, and then the
defendant moved to Texas. Plaintiffs sued him in the federal court there
for their unpaid commission. The trouble was that the written offer did not
state the terms of the commission. The Texas statute was construed to
require a written promise to pay a specific commission-no such promise
will be implied and none can be proved by parol. (A highly unreasonable
construction, I should say at once, or a highly unreasonable statute.) Admittedly, an oral or implied promise to pay a commission was valid under
the laws of Arkansas and Missouri. The court invalidated the written agreement on the familiar but highly questionable ground that the Texas statute
is procedural only, and applies to preclude enforcement of any contract
in the courts of Texas, regardless of its validity in other, really interested
states. There was, however, no land taboo; the decision is not grounded
on the fact that the land for which the Missouri ranch was exchanged had
its situs in Texas; it was for sale of the Missouri ranch-the price being
paid in Texas land-that the commission was claimed. The quarrel was
over an alleged oral agreement to base the commission on a percentage of
an agreed valuation of the Missouri ranch.
The worst aspect of the case is that Texas destroyed rights settled
under the laws of the only conceivably interested states at the time of the
transaction-Arkansas, the residence of both parties, and Missouri, the
situs of the land to be sold or exchanged. A problem analogous to that of
retroactive application of laws is introduced by the removal of the defendant from Arkansas to Texas after the transaction. That proved a profitable
move, indeed; it saved him from paying a $10,000 commission, justly
earned by the broker. The Texas statute, held "procedural" by the court,
was enacted in 1939 and was expressly made inapplicable to actions pending on its effective date-thus indicating that the legislature did not wish
2 36

EHmNZWEIG at 473-74 (Ehrenzweig's emphasis).

237

107 F.Supp. 961 (S.D.Tex. 1952).
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to disturb settled rights under informal domestic contracts antedating the
statute. Then where can any justification be found for disturbing rights
settled in other states, though after the enactment of the statute? A justification for such action is possible in some situations,23 8 but none is apparent
here.
The real vices of the decision have nothing to do with land taboo but
consist in sterile literalism, disregard of the party-protective purpose of
the statute, and callous disregard of settled rights. I would not hesitate to
argue that the decision is unconstitutional as a denial of due process of
law and of full faith and credit to the laws of Arkansas and Missouri.
Ehrenzweig would not agree.
2. Murdock v. Calgary Colonization Co.M30 By an oral contract
made and to be performed in Alberta, Canada, the defendant (presumably
of Illinois) engaged the plaintiff, an Alberta corporation, to find a buyer
for land in Alberta. If the law of Alberta is applicable as a matter of conflict-of-laws law it clearly invalidates the agreement, though Illinois appears to have had no similar statute. The court holds the Alberta statute
applicable as that of the place of contracting. (Note that Alberta was also
the place of perfomance, presumably, and was certainly the situs.) No
emphasis was placed on the situs in Alberta except as that bore on the
place of performance.
I do not deny that conflict-of-laws doctrine in general is plagued with
a "land taboo." Yet I do not detect the influence of that taboo in this decision, as Ehrenzweig does. I find a court obsessed with the substanceprocedure dichotomy, and one that, moreover, thinks itself pretty sophisticated because it rejects the literalism of Leroux v. Brown and holds the
Alberta statute substantive although it uses the "procedural" language,
"no action shall be brought." This is a court unjustly proud of its strong
defense of territorially vested no-rights.
The court is rather clearly wrong when it says that "It is evident that
the [Alberta] statute in question was designed to reach and bar exactly the
kind of claim for which the plaintiffs seek recovery in this action. ' 240 What
is evident to me is that the statute was designed primarily to protect local
defendants, and this defendant was (or so I have assumed) a resident of
Illinois. This does not mean that Alberta wished to favor its own people at
238 See Currie, Full Faithand Credit, Chiefly to Judgments, 1964 Sup. CT.REv. 89, 91-99.
230 193 Ill.App. 295 (1915). I pass over Richland Development Co. v. Staples, 295 F.2d
122 (5th Cir. 1961), cited in EmHENZWEIG at 474, n. 24, since, as Ehrenzweig indicates and I
have confirmed, it concerns not formal validity but the problem of the unlicensed broker,
which involves quite different considerations.
240 193 Il.App. at 300.
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the expense of foreigners; it only means that, the basic purpose of Alberta
being to protect local people-and perhaps, in addition, owners of local
land, though that is quite doubtful-the next question to consider is how
far it should extend that protection to foreigners. That it should stop short
of the point of officiously meddling in the interests of other states is clear;
the question is where the stopping point lies between the two extremes. Let
us approach the question from the standpoint of Illinois, where, after all,
the action was brought. Prima facie Illinois law controls. That law protects
the expectations of local people who rely on oral promises to pay commissions. Should the same policy be applied to Alberta brokers who rely
on oral promises made by Illinois residents? I should think, in common
sense and humanity, it should, since so doing will interfere with no interest
of Alberta in protecting its people against promises unreliably proved.
If it were inclined to be as selfish as reasonably possible, Illinois might give
the benefit of its policy of compensating those who rely on oral promises
only to those foreigners who are similarly protected by the laws of their
home state. That would justify this decision, but it would be a rather mean
policy, costing more to apply than the gain in windfalls to local promisors
(or protection to alleged promisors) would be worth.
3. Brown & Brammer v. Wm. Pearson Co.2 41 I, too, find this a
questionable decision, but hardly because of the land taboo. By an (alleged) oral agreement made and performed in Nebraska, defendant, a
Canadian corporation having its principal office in Winnipeg, Manitoba,
promised plaintiff brokers (of Iowa) a commission for finding a purchaser
for Canadian land. Note that, while the land was unquestionably in Canada,
it does not even appear in what province it was located. This helps to explain
the lack of reference to the law of the situs. The defendant pleaded the
Nebraska statute, which clearly required contracts for real estate brokerage commissions to be in writing. Apparently Iowa had no such statute. The
plaintiffs argued that the Nebraska statute was "procedural" (though it
used the term "void"), but the court was not impressed. Speaking with a
pronounced territorialist accent, the court held the statute of Iowa, as the
place of contracting and performance, applicable. It also emphasized the
policy of the statute to protect alleged promisors from trumped-up claims
that brokers had been commissioned to arrange land sales. (One gets the
impression that, in Nebraska, every time there was a land transfer some
deed-chasing broker showed up to claim that he had been hired to find the
buyer and had been promised a commission.) The exact reasoning of the
court was: the general rule is that the law of the place of contracting
241

169 Iowa 50, 150 N.W. 1057 (1915).
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governs; an exception exists for the law of the situs where land is involved,
but that is irrelevant here (because the exact situs did not appear?); there
is also an exception for the law of the place of performance where that represents the intention of the parties, but that only leads back to the law of
Nebraska (invalidating the contract).
The decision is conceptual and territorialist, but it does not reveal the
influence of a land taboo. I regret that the court did not consider the Iowa
policy of protecting the expectations of local people who rely and act on
oral promises to pay commissions. Possibly the failure to do this was
justified by considerations of the Bernkrant type, but this seems not a
strong case for finding that Iowa should refrain from asserting an interest
in conflict with that of Nebraska in protecting its people against parol
proof (including this foreign corporation, doing business in Nebraska).
The court is just strongly sympathetic with the Nebraska policy of protecting people-any people-against dishonest brokers, although not
especially sympathetic with this particular defendant, which, said the
court, was in the business of trying to "unload" Canadian lands "upon
2

credulous Americans.)) 2
4. Schoettle v. Sarkes Tarzian Inc. 243 There were two grounds for

this decision. One, that the contract was illegal under the law of the (Pennsylvania) forum because the broker was not licensed, is not relevant to this
discussion. Allegedly, plaintiff (a resident of New Jersey) 244 had been
engaged by the defendant, an Indiana corporation doing business in Pennsylvania, 245 to find a purchaser of the stock or assets of the corporation.
Service of process on the individual defendants, including the majority
stockholder and president of the corporation, had been quashed. The other
holding was that this gentleman had no authority, written or otherwise, to
engage anyone to sell the corporate stock or assets. The corporation could
not, in fact, have authorized this gentleman to sell the stock, a good deal
of which was owned by other people. That would seem to be enough to
dispose of the case, except, perhaps, as to some residual question relating
to the sale of assets. The court went on, however, to hold that the action
was barred because of an Indiana statute requiring land brokerage contracts to be in writing-not, apparently, because the corporate assets included land in Indiana, but because that was the place of contracting.
I hesitate to keep reiterating that these cases are not explainable on the
ground of land taboo, because that does not seem a fundamental issue be242 169 Iowa at 52, 150 N.W. at 1059.
243 191 F.Supp. 768 (E.D.Pa. 1961).
2 44
See same case 167 F.Supp. at 172 (E.D.Pa. 1958).
24
5 Id. at 173.
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tween Ehrenzweig and me. But he insists on explaining away these cases as
medieval, and thus as not impairing his "rule of validation," while they
seem to me only rather routine cases employing conventional rules referring
to the law of the place of contracting and the like-paying little or no
attention to situs.
5. Stricker v. J. P. Morgan2 46 Again I fail to find the land taboo,
and this time I even fail to find any decisive role played by a statute requiring formalities. The plaintiff simply failed by any competent evidence to
establish his claim that he and the defendant were partners in exploiting
land in Louisiana purchased by defendant, or that there was a joint venture,
or that he had an interest in the land by way of resulting trust or otherwise.
Almost incidentally, the court holds that the law of Louisiana, as the law
of the situs, governs, and requires a writing for any partnership or joint
venture if any of the assets are to consist of real estate; the writing must
even be recorded as if it were a conveyance.,47
Before I risk the assumption that the plaintiff was of Mississippi, the
forum state, and that that state's interest in vindicating his expectations
was subverted (on the unsupported assumption that Mississippi law did
not require a writing), let me pause to reflect that, since this was an action
to establish an interest in foreign land, many a court would simply have
dismissed the action out of hand as a "local" one, of which the Mississippi
federal court had no jurisdiction. I regret the persistence of this medieval
"land taboo," but there it is, in most states. Even if the court in Mississippi
had given judgment for the plaintiff, there is substantial doubt (to my
regret) that the judgment would have been respected or given full faith and
credit in the only state in which it could have been enforced-Louisiana.2 48
Let me, therefore, not waste time deploring the fact that Mississippi's
hypothetical governmental interests were neglected. The plaintiff was
lucky that a Mississippi court was willing to hear his case at all. And he
lost, in the end, not because of the Louisiana Statute of Frauds, but because
he failed to make out a case under either Mississippi or Louisiana law.
Since the appellate court did not even reach the question of the Statute of
Frauds, I take it this means that he failed to prove his case on the merits,
independently of any statutory requirement of a writing. He was aided
246 158 F.Supp. 830 (S.D.Miss. 1958).
247 My discussion rests in part upon the affirmance of the decision on appeal, 268 F.2d
882 (1959), which is not cited by Ehrenzweig. Perhaps it is not quite fair to take into account
what he has not cited-or Shepardized.
248 See the remarks of Mr. Justice Stewart for the Court in Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S.
106, 115, 84 Sup.Ct. 242, 246, 11 L.Ed. 189, 192 (1963), quoted and discussed in Currie, Full
Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments, 1964 Sup. CT. RFv. 89, 108.
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in thus losing his case by the court's application of the Mississippi Dead
Man Statute, barring his testimony as to transactions with the defendantbecause, interestingly enough, the defendant had become insane while the
249
case was pending.
At this point Ehrenzweig digresses a bit to refer to two cases already
discussed 5 0 in which brokerage contracts had been upheld despite the
possibility of application of an invalidating law. The reader is referred to
my prior discussion of these cases.2 5' In the same vein (unfortunately for
my plan of organization, which devotes this part of the paper to a discussion of the troublesome, "distinguishable" cases), he cites also a new case
for the proposition that "Contrary to the land taboo... and in conformity
with the rule of validation, courts have applied the lex fori to allow local
brokers to recover commissions for sales of foreign land even though the
employment contract was made under a law that would deny such a
claim. ' 2512 For this proposition he cites Callaway v. Prettyman,5 3 and it
seems best to discuss the case here, though it does not fit comfortably into
the context of this portion of the discussion.
There are some minor inaccuracies in Ehrenzweig's statement of the
case that need not be emphasized, since the main point to be made is that,
although the agreement was upheld under the law of the forum, that fact
furnishes little support for a rule of validation, since the court applied a
rule of thumb that could easily result in invalidity in countless cases to
arise in the future. The action was in Pennsylvania by a New Jersey broker
on an alleged promise, made in Pennsylvania, to pay a commission for
finding a buyer for New Jersey real estate. After disposing of the defense
of illegality the court, assuming the contract to have been made in Pennsylvania where the words were spoken (compare the usual ruling that such
a unilateral contract is completed when and where the broker finds his
buyer), the court ruled that evidence of the New Jersey statute requiring
brokerage contracts to be in writing was inadmissible under a plea of the
24 9

He was adjudicated insane, and a guardian ("curatrix") was appointed for him, by
a court of Louisiana, presumably his domicile. Interesting questions: How does the plaintiff
continue the action against the curatrix? And must Mississippi give full faith and credit to the
adjudication of insanity? This latter question was not reached because plaintiff's counsel, after
asking time to make their own investigation, satisfied themselves that the defendant was in
fact non compos mentis.
250
Woolley v. Bishop, 180 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1950), and Richmond Carcia Oil Co. v.
Coates, 17 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1927). I pass over Polson v. Stewart, 167 Mass. 211, 214, 45 N.E.
737, 738 (1897), since Ehrenzweig indicates that it concerns the problem not of formalities but
of the unlicensed broker. See EmtENzwEiG at 474 n. 26.
251 See text at notes 117-18 and 125-26, supra.

252 EHRENzwio at 474.
253 218 Pa. 293, 67 At1. 418 (1907).
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general issue. Only then did it hold that the contract was valid under the
law of Pennsylvania, because the law of the place of contracting governs
formalities.2 54
6. Russell v. Socit6 Anonyme des EtablissementsA eroxon.255 Resuming his effort to dispose of the troublesome cases, Ehrenzweig revisits
this case as one that, though invalidating under forum law notwithstanding
validating laws of the place of contracting or performance, or the intention
of the parties, does not support traditional conflicts rules as against a
"rule of validation."2'56 At this late hour I simply refer the reader to my
2 57
previous discussion of the case.
7. Bond v. Oak Mfg. Co 58 Of this "troublesome" case Ehrenzweig says: "though giving credence to both Restatements with reference
to their conflicts rules relating to contracts, [the decision] records the plaintiff's 'dropping the claim on the contract.' 25 Just what capital can be
made of this off-beat decision, whether by Ehrenzweig or by me, is unclear.
The action was in a federal court in New Jersey; the plaintiff, a Pennsylvania corporation, claims that defendant, an Illinois corporation, orally
authorized it to proceed with efforts suggested by plaintiff designed to enlarge defendant's market. The district court found there was no contract,
for want of definiteness and mutuality, but allowed recovery quantum
meruit for benefits conferred. The court of appeals affirmed: "Whatever
the contract was, it was unenforceable under the Illinois Statute of Frauds
and the plaintiff dropped its claim for breach of contract at the beginning
of the trial of the case. The parties have assumed that Illinois law governs.
We think this is correct. Whatever agreement was made was entered into
in Illinois and that state is the place where at least a large part of the undertaking was to be carried out. '2 0 But the court goes on to hold that under
Illinois law, and according to eminent authorities on the law of contracts,
there can be no restitution of benefits conferred under a contract invalid
under the Statute of Frauds. Judge Kalodner dissented.
Presumably, though the decision does not make it clear, it was the
254 There is neither time nor space to discuss the interesting implications of the court's
remark (218 Pa. 294, 67 AtI. at 419) that the verdict of the jury, presumably based on parol
evidence, established the fact that the defendant employed the plaintiff to sell or exchange
the hotel.
255 268 N.Y. 173, 197 N.E. 185 (1935).
256 EHmNZWEIG at 474.
257 See text at notes 219-21, supra.
258 293 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1961).

2.59 EBHRENZWEIG at

474 n. 30.

260 293 F.2d at 753, citing both the Restatement, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement
(Second), as Ehrenzweig says.
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not-to-be-performed-within-a-year provision that was involved; nor does
the precise conflict of laws appear. The (federal) New Jersey forum appears to be in the position of the disinterested third state, where Illinois
would protect the Illinois defendant (though it does not clearly appear
that Pennsylvania has a policy of protection for the expectations of Pennsylvania promisees). Probably Ehrenzweig means only that this case does
not sustain official doctrine, although the court cites both Restatements
with approval, because the parties dropped the claim on the contract.
They did this, however, did they not, because they were convinced by
precedent that the court would hold Illinois law applicable to invalidate
the contract? Or at least that the contract was invalidated by some Statute
of Frauds?
8. Reubenstein v. Kleven.2 61 This is a real beauty. According to
Ehrenzweig, this apparently troublesome case (from the standpoint of his
2 62
advocacy of the "rule of validation") is "explainable on special grounds"
-specifically, "concubinage with a married man. 2 63
The plaintiff, a resident of New York, alleged that in New York the
defendant, a resident of Massachusetts, entered into an agreement to pay
her $1,000 a month in consideration of her promise to furnish him companionship, the payments to continue "during the remainder of the plaintiff's natural life." This is a much abbreviated statement of the agreement
as alleged, and I cannot resist quoting the complaint a bit more extensively:
"....

in consideration of the plaintiff's agreement to devote all or substan-

tially all of her time and attention to the defendant; to account to the
defendant for all of her waking moments; be at the defendant's beck, call
and direction at such times as the defendant should desire; and in furtherance of said relationship to obey the defendant's wishes, in regard to plaintiff's deportment, conduct, habits, associations, friends, time, entertainment,
and education; to act as companion to the defendant at all times requested
by the defendant; to accompany the defendant to restaurants, dinner, on
264
travel, and elsewhere."
The agreement as alleged said nothing about sleeping moments; yet one
need not accuse Ehrenzweig of prurience for his suggestion of concubinage.
Any of us, however pure-minded, might be tempted to read such evil
thoughts between the lines-if this were all the available information. However, more information is available in the very decision of the district court
that Ehrenzweig cites.
261 261 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1958).
2 62

26 3

E

zw'

at 474.

Id., n. 31, citing same

264 261 F.2d at 922.

case below at 150 F.Supp. 47 (D.Mass. 1957).
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At the trial level the case was heard by one Bailey Aldrich, now a
judge of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, whose dry wit I have
had the privilege of appreciating at first hand for the past five years or so.
The defendant had pleaded both the New York Statute of Frauds (with
its one-year provision, amended to extend to lifetime contracts) and the
defense that the contract was contrary to public policy. The plaintiff had
taken the defendant's deposition, and had asked certain questions to which
affirmative answers might indicate adultery. The defendant refused to
answer on the ground that his answers might tend to incriminate him.
Comes now Judge Aldrich, with his New England astringency:
"Since it would be to plaintiff's disadvantage for defendant to testify
to an illicit relationship, I inquired of her counsel why he was pressing for
an answer. He replied that he was of opinion that the answers would, in
fact, be in the negative, and that defendant, being unable to testify truthfully to anything of a criminal nature, was seeking to create the impression
of such, to plaintiff's disfavor, by the inference which would attach to his
refusal. The suggestion that the defendant is a sheep in wolf's clothing
presents a novel reverse-English to the Fifth Amendment. [At this point
Judge Aldrich, in a footnote, compared the question posed by an earlier case
in the First Circuit: Whether it may be defamatory to call someone in a
community of thieves an honest man.] I do not, however, find it necessary
to pursue it. Defendant cannot work both sides of the street. Illegality is an
affirmative defense. If he is going to assert it predicated upon criminal acts
involving himself, to be established through the testimony of any witness,
or even simply by inference, he cannot remain aloof, asking the jury to find
that such acts occurred, and at the same time claim a privilege against selfincrimination on cross-examination. Since he refuses on deposition to incriminate himself, I will assume, as the rule of the case, that equally he does
not intend to prove criminality, through his own testimony or otherwise, at
the trial. Unless within twenty days he notifies plaintiff that he proposes
to answer the questions, plaintiff's motion will be denied and the issue of
criminality foreclosed.)

265

It seems clear that the defendant persisted in his refusal to answer the
questions. In consequence, the issue of illegality disappeared from the
case, and the court of appeals had to rule simply on the issue as to the
Statute of Frauds. It was thus that the court, without Ehrenzweig's notice,
overruled the Eckhart case, 2 0 and held that (New York law governing as
the place of contracting) the amendment to the New York Statute, extending the one-year provision to lifetime contracts, meant exactly what it
said. Invalidity followed.
265

150 F.Supp. at 48.
at note 171, supra.
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Thus we have a case of invalidation by the forum not under local but
under foreign law; presumably the contract would have been valid as to
form so far as Massachusetts was concerned. In his attempt to distinguish
the case on the ground that the contract was immoral Ehrenzweig seems to
be carrying American Legal Realism-the search for the really motivating
reasons for decisions-to an extreme bordering on contempt of court: for
Judge Aldrich had specifically ruled out the defense of illegality because
of defendant's invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination, and
the court of appeals had accordingly confined itself to the issue concerning
the New York Statute of Frauds.
9. Appolonio v. Baxter.20 7 "Cases in which a strong forum policy
is given effect to invalidate a contract valid under a pertinent foreign law,
are becoming increasingly rare and may now be virtually limited to contracts concluded outside the forum for the very purpose of evading the
forum's laws.1 218 This statement is made with reference not only to the
Appolonio case but also with reference to the two cases to follow, Emery v.
Burbank and Rubin v. Irving Trust Co.2" 9 As applied to all three cases, or
any one of them, the statement is preposterous.
Appolonio involved a claim against a decedent's estate for breach of
an oral contract to make a will. The decedent, who had died domiciled in
Tennessee, had been president and principal stockholder of a corpoation
having industrial plants in Louisiana. The plaintiffs were five employees
claiming that the deceased orally agreed, in consideration of their working
for abnormally low salaries, to leave them all his stock in the corporationeach to share the stock in proportion to his salary. The decedent's will left
all his property to his wife, who predeceased him. This rendered his will
inoperative, so that he died intestate, his sole heir being his sister, the
defendant-administratrix.
In the first place, this is not a Statute of Frauds case at all.270 By an
improbable tour de force one might conceivably persuade the court that
this was a contract "to sell or for the sale of ... goods or choses in ac-

tion";271 but it should suffice to observe that the court does not so much
as mention this possibility. The report (except for one remark by counsel
that may have been inadvertent) does not treat the case as one involving
the Statute of Frauds, but proceeds on the premise--which seems neither
207 217 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1954).
2

68 EHR~xzwEiG at 474.

at 474 n. 32; see text at notes 277 and 282, infra.
CODE AwN. § 7831 (Williams 1934)) contained no requirement that a promise to make a will be in writing. Cf. the statute of wills, TmN.
CODE ANN., §§ 8098.1-8098.6 (Williams 1934, 1952 Supp.)
271
TFNN.CODE ANN. § 7197 (Williams 1934).
200 EHRENZWEiG
270

The Tennessee Statute of Frauds (T=NN.
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unsound nor unusual-that oral contracts to make a will must be definite,
may not be proved by evidence of loose or casual conversation, must be
fair, and must leave no doubt that the promise was actually made as alleged
and that the plaintiff has performed his part of the bargain.
This standard of proof the plaintiffs conspicuously failed to meet.
On the issue as to whether the decedent had ever made any such promise
the testimony was only that he had represented that the company would
some day "belong to the boys."'2 72 Far from having worked for substandard
salaries, they had in due course received salary increases and bonuses.
Inconsistent with their claim was the fact that they had helped the administratrix sell the stock as her own without intimating any adverse interest.
As to choice of law, the parties conceded that the law of Tennessee278
was controlling because, while the contract was allegedly made in Louisiana,
the decedent died domiciled in Tennessee, and a Tennessee statute provided that the transfer of personal property is governed either by the law
of the domicile or that of the place of transfer. 4
As to a purpose to evade the law of the forum (what law of the forum?)
there was no evidence whatever. What can Ehrenzweig possibly have in
mind? That the decedent built his plants in Louisiana to evade the law of
Tennessee? (A rather questionable exercise of business judgment by a
man who, as we shall see, amassed a considerable fortune.) That the decedent made the promise in Louisiana to evade the law of Tennessee? (The
court paid no attention to the law of the place of contracting; and anyhow,
was not Louisiana a logical place for such a promise to be made (if it was
made at all), since the plants were there, the employees worked there, and
the deceased, even if he did not live there at the time of the alleged promise,
presumably spent some time there supervising the business?) That the
company was incorporated in Louisiana to evade the law of Tennessee? (In
the first place, we are not told the state of incorporation. In the second
place, what could be more natural and less devious than incorporation in
the state in which the company's plants were located? In the third place,
what could the state of incorporation, or its law, have to do with this case?)
Moreover, the relevant law of Louisiana, if any, is not made to appear.
Finally, the plaintiffs' case was decisively lost because they were incompetent, under the Tennessee Dead Man Statute, to testify to transactions with the deceased.
272 217 F.2d at 270.
273 They said the Statute of Frauds of Tennessee, but this is the remark I have ventured
to characterize as probably inadvertent since there seems to have been no relevant provision

in that statute.
274 217 F.2d at 271.
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A word about governmental-interest analysis-and for the sake of
constructing a realistic (though hypothetical) problem, let us assume that
the remark about the Tennessee Statute of Frauds was not inadvertent.
Let us assume (contrary to the apparent truth) (a) that Tennessee had a
statute requiring a written memorandum of an oral promise to make a will,
and (b) that under Louisiana law such a promise was valid and could be
proved by oral testimony-even by the testimony of adverse parties concerning transactions with the defendant's decedent. Would any Tennessee
court in its right mind put aside the Tennessee statute and apply the validating law of Louisiana-as the place of contracting, or of performance,
or of situs, or of incorporation, or of the "center of gravity," or as the state
having the "most significant relationship" with the matter-or on any
other conceivable theory for choice of law, including even the Bernkrant
technique-on a record such as this?
The stock was sold for $2,239,368.73. What court would take that sum
of money from the decedent's sister and give it to five grasping strangers
on such evidence? Any group of robed men who would do such a thing
would not constitute a court; it would constitute a menagerie.
The Tennessee (federal) court did only what any sane court would
have done. It applied Tennessee law and policy to effectuate Tennessee's
interest in protecting the estates of Tennessee residents against trumped-up
claims. This is true whether there was a relevant provision in the Tennessee
Statute of Frauds or not; it is true regardless of the provisions of Louisiana
law. If it be said that no jury would ever render a verdict for the plaintiffs
on such evidence, I reply that no jury should be given a chance to do so.
The mandate of the Statute of Frauds-if there is a relevant Statute of
Frauds-is that such evidence shall not be submitted to a jury, even controlled by the usual power of the court to set aside a verdict not supported
by the evidence.
For emphasis, let me say to Ehrenzweig, who delights to note alternative grounds on which a decision might be based, that there were the following defenses, not reached because of the dispositive ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to make out a credible case: equitable estoppel, laches, the
statute of limitations, and "the unconscionable character of the claims for
25
recovery.1 7
This ought to dispose of the Appolonio case, but I must add one word
more. Obviously, Statute of Frauds or not, a Tennessee court would not
allow recovery in favor of its own resident plaintiffs in such a case if it were
entirely domestic. Then why should it discriminate against its own resi275 217 F.2d at 273.
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dents, and in favor of nonresidents, because of some academic theory of
choice of law, whether it be the "rule of validation," the place of contracting, the place of performance, the situs, the place of incorporation, the
"center of gravity," the "grouping of contacts," the "most significant relationship," or what have you? I might hesitate to do so at this time-when
the demolition of choice-of-law theology is still not complete, because it is
a bit early for the courts to go back into the business of deciding choice-oflaw cases on constitutional grounds on the basis of insufficiently matured
theories-but, given a few years in which common sense can (hopefully)
be restored to the treatment of choice-of-law problems, I would not hesitate to argue that such preferential treatment for nonresident plaintiffs
would constitute, for resident plaintiffs similarly situated, a denial of the
equal protection of the laws. 6
10. Emery v. Burbank. 7 This is another of the cases on which
I relied in predicting that analysis of Ehrenzweig's "authorities" would
refute rather than sustain his thesis. 8 I have discussed the case at some
length,2 79 and it is still a standby as a leading precedent in most modern
casebooks. The opinion was written by Holmes in the period before his
native spirit of pragmatism and common sense was crushed out, so far
as conflict of laws was concerned. I regard it as an excellent example of
governmental-interest analysis, although, as in the Lams case, governmental interests must be furthered within the framework of the traditional
ideology, and hence by indirection and approximation.
The opinion is a forthright attack on the problem in terms of statutory
interpretation. The clear legislative policy was to protect decedents' estates
against dubious claims of promises to make wills. What decedents? Centrally, and as a minimum, those who died domiciled in Massachusetts. The
question, therefore, was how best to characterize the statute in order to
give the policy maximum effect. Although there was ample basis for giving
the statute a literal construction that would make it "substantive," Holmes
had little difficulty in holding it "procedural," with the result that the
local estate was protected. Going beyond the necessities of the case, he
did not hesitate to add that in a different sort of case, he would hold the
statute substantive as well if that should be necessary to effectuate the
purpose to protect the estates of local domiciliaries. He even went one step
farther and intimated that if this dual characterization should lead to
trouble in a rare but conceivable type of case in which Massachusetts would
ch. 11.
277 163 Mass. 326,39 N.E. 1026 (1895).
278 Currie, Book Review, 1964 DuxE L. J. 424,429-30.
279 CMUM, Ch. 10.
276 See Cuim,
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have no interest, he would be able to devise a way to avoid the statute's
application.
I had thought all this perfectly clear. Yet Ehrenzweig repudiates the
decision and "explains" it as one in which the contract was "concluded
28
outside the forum for the very purpose of evading the forum's laws.""
Presumably Ehrenzweig knows something about the facts that does not
appear in the report: if so, I think he should enlighten us by publishing
it. The report makes it very clear that at the time of the promise the
plaintiff resided in Maine, since the very promise in suit was made on the
condition that she "leave Maine and take care of the testatrix. 2 8' This
implies not only that the plaintiff then lived in Maine but also that the
testatrix lived elsewhere-probably in Massachusetts, since this case was
decided on appeal only five years or so after the promise was allegedly
made, and we know that the testatrix died domiciled in Massachusetts.
It is difficult to detect evasion here. Without, of course, knowing just what
happened, I have tended to imagine that the testatrix became acquainted
with the plaintiff while vacationing in Maine, and wanted her to accompany
her back to her home in Massachusetts. However this may be, I find it
difficult to imagine a dark conspiracy between the (presumably) elderly
lady from Massachusetts and the (presumably) mature lady from Maine
to form their contract in Maine for the deliberate purpose of evading the
Massachusetts requirement of a writing. If this was, indeed, their devious
(and cumbersome) design, they were, I think, ill advised as to the law;
for, notwithstanding Judge Holmes' assumption that the contract (as well
as the promise) was made in Maine, I imagine that any careful lawyer,
if consulted by the scheming ladies, would have advised them that the
promise was only an offer for a unilateral contract, and that the offer could
be accepted only by complete performance. This could take place only in
Massachusetts. Even today (I venture to suggest without cluttering this
paper with citations on a collateral matter), the plaintiff's commencement
of performance in Maine by packing her bags and boarding the train would
not be deemed an acceptance completing the contract but would only make
the offer irrevocable.
11. Rubin v. Irving Trust Co 28 1 This case, also, we have discussed before. 3 Ehrenzweig's current treatment of the case contradicts
his own earlier treament of it. Still I am not satisfied. Evasion? It seems
abundantly clear that the testator, though domiciled in New York, traveled
280 See text at note 63, supra.
281 163 Mass. at 327,39 N.E. at 1026.
282 305 N.Y. 288,113 N.E. 2d 424 (1953).
283 See text at notes 63-66, supra.
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and sojourned elsewhere on account of his health. The alleged promise was
fortuitously made in Florida, where New Yorkers in the situation of the
testator commonly sojourn for reasons other than a purpose to evade the
New York law requiring written evidence of a promise to make a will.
12. Brooks v. Yarbrough.2 Ehrenzweig's purpose in citing this
case is obscure. While it is in the same footnote that cites the three foregoing cases, and so is presumably cited as another case of invalidation
under forum law to be explained by the court's reaction against deliberate
evasion of that law by contracting elsewhere, the citation is preceded
(though not immediately) by the warning signal: "But see supra § 120 note
31; note 21; .. ." Note 31 appears in a portion of section 120 subtitled
"Avoidance of domestic law (fraus legis, fraude a la loi)" and is appended to this statement in the text: "Thus, contracts concluded abroad
between forum citizens may be upheld if they comply with the form requirements of the lex contractus even though the foreign place of contracting
was chosen for the purpose of avoiding the domestic statute of frauds. 285
This, then, I take it, is offered not as a case of invalidation under the law
of the forum because of a deliberate purpose to evade, but as a case of
validation under the law of the forum notwithstanding the choice of a
foreign place of contracting for the purpose of evasion.
In point of fact, it is neither the one nor the other. The plaintiff, a citizen of Missouri, sued the administrator c.t.a. of the testatrix in a federal
court in Oklahoma, alleging that in Kansas the testatrix promised him
that if he would live with her as her son for the rest of his life28" she would,
among other things, devise to him her grape and lemon orchards in Texas.
Joined as another defendant was the sole beneficiary under the actual
will-a citizen of Kansas.
Note that this is another pre-Erie diversity case, so that it is (to say
the least) not entirely clear what the source of the court's rules for choice of
law may be. But the court begins not with choice of law but with the law
itself. In a proper case, says the court, equity will enforce a contract to
make a will; but the proof must be "clear, satisfactory and convincing,
and must establish the contract beyond a reasonable doubt."
Let us digress here to consider the subject of evasion of the law of
the forum, which figures both in the text to which this citation is appended
284

37 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1930).
285 Note 21 in § 120 (if that is what is referred to) adds nothing except a notation that

foreign law may be ignored when it "outrages the public policy of the forum."
286 And that's not all. There is enough more to lead one as skeptical as Ehrenzweig to

suspect something comparable to concubinage (note 263, supra) ; but Ehrenzweig makes no
such suggestion here.
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and in that to which there is the "but see" cross reference. The promise
(if any) was made in Kansas-and the clues as to why it was made there
are too meager to support speculation. The law of Kansas does not appear.
Moreover, this was again an offer for a unilateral contract, and the place
of performance (thus the place of contracting?) is not specified. Finally,
the court attaches no significance whatever to the place of contracting.
Therefore, both references to the case as one in which the place of contracting was chosen for the very purpose of evasion are dead wrong.
Does Ehrenzweig mean instead that the parties chose land in Texas to
evade the law of the forum? That would be an elaborate and rather footless scheme. Texas happened to be the state where the grapes and lemons
were. But even if the testatrix bought the orchards in that state for the
occasion, or selected them for the occasion from among her (possibly)
widespread holdings, what kind of evasion would that be? Texas, it seems,
had a statute requiring written evidence of a promise to devise land. But
on top of all this the court held the Texas statute procedural and therefore
inapplicable.
If there was an Oklahoma statute requiring a writing for promises to
devise land (and this is not clear in view of the court's talk about proof
"beyond a reasonable doubt"), it was satisfied by the plaintiff's performance, since, under Oklahoma law, that was the result if performance consisted of personal services not readily valued in money. Hence, applying
the law of the forum, the judgment for the defendant was reversed and the
case remanded with instructions to overrule the motion to dismiss with
respect to the land.
This sounds complicated, but I find nothing especially remarkable or
even interesting about it. The forum upheld a contract under its own law.
No invalidating law with a better claim to applicability was brought forward except that of Texas, the situs, and that was held (familiarly enough)
to be inapplicable because procedural. The law of the place of contracting
plays no role whatever. And evidence of evasion is nonexistent-unless,
again, Ehrenzweig knows something that we do not know and that he has
not disclosed. 287
13. McCabe v. Bagby.28 8 This case, says Ehrenzweig, is "inconclusive (identical laws.)" The case is placed, though inconclusively,
287 Parenthetically, note that, under orthodox law, however regrettable, an Oklahoma
judgment ordering the devisee to convey Texas land would not be entitled to full faith and
credit in Texas. See Currie, Full Faithand Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 19 U. Cm. L. Rv.
620 (1954); but cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1958).
288 186 F.2d 546 (6th Cir. 1951).
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among those in which invalidation under forum law is explained by the
parties' choice of a validating foreign law for the very purpose of evasion.
The contract was invalidated, all right, but under foreign, not forum,
law. And evidence of evasion there is none. And the Statute of Frauds is
not involved in the first place.
The plaintiff, adopted by her grandparents, claims after the death of
the survivor of them (the grandmother and adoptive parent) that an incident of the adoption was an oral agreement made by them with her father
to execute mutual or reciprocal wills treating her as the equal of their own
two daughters, giving her a third of their joint estate. Grandmother's last
will disinherited plaintiff except for $1,000 (apparently because plaintiff
had, as a beneficiary under grandfather's will, shared in his estate and, on
her mother's death, had benefited by reason of gifts made by her grandparents to her mother). After all the operative facts had occurred (in Missouri) and after grandfather's death, grandmother went to Michigan to
visit one of her natural daughters, expecting to return, but never did; she
"resided" there until her death. The court simply held that the issues must
be determined "by the law of Missouri where all of the wills were executed
and where substantially all the commentary on their purpose or content
was made." 289 Almost a full page29 is devoted to a statement of Missouri
rules concerning the quantum of proof necessary to sustain an action for
breach of a contract to make a will: the contract must be "certain" and
must be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt," and so on. To an argument
that Missouri rules of evidence should not control in Michigan the court
replied: "It is conceded that if there was an oral contract between [the
grandparents and plaintiff's father] or between [the grandparents themselves] ... it must be determined by Missouri law."2 9 ' It went on to hold,
I think reasonably enough, that the question whether there was a contract
was inseparable from the question of the sufficiency of the proof that there
was a contract, so that Missouri law was applicable; then it added that in
any event the standard of proof in Michigan was substantially the same
as that in Missouri, and that plaintiff had satisfied neither. In other words,
the court held the contract invalid (or rather, unproved), though in terms
under foreign rather than forum law; it did so in part because the laws of
the two states were identical, as Ehrenzweig says; but what the case has
to do with evasion evades me. Who was trying to evade what law? Everything happened in Missouri until grandmother went to Michigan on a
186 F.2d at 548-49.
186 F.2d at 549. By contrast, there is but one passing mention, possibly a lapsus
linguae, of the Missouri Statute of Frauds. Id. at 551.
291 186 F.2d at 550.
289

290
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temporary visit from which she happened never to return. Any application of Michigan law to change the rights of the parties as settled under the
law of the only interested state at the relevant time would have required
strong justification to escape being an indefensible unsettling of settled
2 92

rights.

"Even fewer are the cases which, under a foreign law, have held in' 293
valid a contract valid under the law of the forum.
14. Jones v. National Cotton Oil Co. 294 Of the cases cited by

Corbin in his discussion of the Statute of Frauds in the conflict of laws
this, says Ehrenzweig, is the only one that "clearly applies an invalidating
lex contractus." I am happy to agree with Ehrenzweig that this case does,
just as he says, invalidate under foreign law a contract valid under the law
of the forum. Of course Ehrenzweig does not attach much importance to
the case for purposes of the discussion, nor do I. The decision is conventional. Texas applied the invalidating law of Arkansas as the place of
contracting and performance, and the place whose law was contemplated
by the parties-having first rejected an opportunity to treat the Arkansas
statute as inapplicable because procedural. Without more facts, analysis in
terms of governmental analysis is not feasible. I limit my comment to a
repetition of what I have said before concerning the incongruity of cases
such as this, emphasizing the intention of the parties to a contractas critical
in determining the governing law when the question at issue is whether
there was a contract at all.
15. Rohrer v. Rohrer,29 5 Coastwise Petroleum Co. v. Standard
Oil Co.,296 and Castorriv. Milbrand 9 7 In these cases, cited by Corbin as
invalidating the contract under foreign law, Ehrenzweig says that the law
of the forum was to the same effect.
The Rohrer case is one of those Illinois Appellate decisions in which
only an abstract is published, and the official abstract is almost totally devoid of information about the case. The West Publishing Company's version is fuller, and should indicate that the decision is inapposite, but is still
unsatisfying as to detail. The full, unpublished opinion 98 makes it abun292 Additional facts, not changing materially the picture as presented by the decision
under discussion, may be found in In re Kramer's Estate, 324 Mich. 626,37 N.W.2d 564 (1949),
relating
to the probate of grandmother's will in Michigan.
293
EmENzwEiG at 474. The cases to be discussed under this rubric are cited in id. n. 33.
294 31 Tex.Civ.App. 420, 72 S.W. 248 (1903).
295 29 Ill.App.2d 362, 173 N.E.2d 589 (1961).
296 179 Md. 337,19 A.2d 180 (1941).
2907 118 So.2d 563 (Fla.App. 1960).
298 Researchers confronted with a similar problem are advised that a certified (why
must it be certified?) copy of the unpublished opinion may be obtained by writing to the
clerk of the appropriate district court of appeals and paying the required fee (in this case $2.75).
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dantly clear that the case has nothing whatever to do with the Statute of
Frauds or any other issue as to formal validity, and nothing appears
affirmatively to show identity of the laws in question-although such identity is probable as a matter of professorial notice. At a time when the husband was domiciled in Mexico and the wife in Pennsylvania, they made in
Pennsylvania a written agreement whereby the husband agreed to treat
his wife for a time as joint owner of stock listed in their names as joint
owners but actually paid for by him. This was in consideration of the wife's
agreement not to contest the Mexican divorce the husband was contemplating. The court held that, where performance was to take place in several states, the law of the place of contracting would govern, and that under
Pennsylvania law the agreement, as a collusive one to facilitate divorce,
was void as against public policy.
As to the Coastwise case Ehrenzweig is entirely right: there was no
memorandum or anything else to take the case out of either the Maryland
or the New York statute, and the contract was invalidated-or rather, as
we ought to say in all such cases, not proved in accordance with law. While
the court discussed Maryland law as if it were applicable, it concluded
(interestingly) that "The negotiations were all in New York, and the law
of that state would apply."'' 9 9 (Emphasis added.) But the New York statute
and the cases construing it were to substantially the same effect as the law
of Maryland.
As to the Castorricase I am not so sure, but the importance of the
case to the discussion is too meager to justify the research necessary to resolve the problem. There was an alleged oral contract, made (if at all) in
Michigan, to employ plaintiff for five years, performance to take place in
Florida. The contract was clearly bad (or unprovable) under Michigan
law, and the Florida court treated the Michigan statute as substantive,
tending to assume that this means that the law of the place of contracting
controls. Little attention was paid to the law of Florida either as the law of
the forum or of the place of performance. While the defendants pleaded the
Michigan statute, the plaintiff argued for the applicability of Florida lawwhether as that of the forum or the place of performance is not clear. This
posture of the argument casts doubt on Ehrenzweig's assertion that the laws
of the two states were identical. Presumably Florida had the familiar provision concerning contracts not to be performed within one year, but perhaps the fact that plaintiff had worked for more than a year prior to his
discharge operated to eliminate the requirement of a writing under the
Florida statute. It should be possible to find the answer to this question,
299 19 A.2d at 183.
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but finding it would hardly be worth the necessary research. The decision
is a purely conceptual one in any event, giving comfort neither to Ehrenzweig nor to me. While Michigan's interest in protecting its enterprises
was sustained, Florida's interest in protecting its people was not-if the
plaintiff was one in whom Florida had an interest. That we do not know.
He had been in the Army and was in Rio when he met the defendants.
16. Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co300 This is another reprise,80 1 this
time the citation being to one of Corbin's cases, explainable on the ground
that "the choice of law followed the choice of the parties." This is simply
not so. There was no meeting of the minds of the parties as to what law
should govern their "contract," if there was a contract. Counsel at the
trial simply treated the contract as if it were governed by the law of Maine
as the place of negotiations and performance although the contract was
rather clearly "made" in New York. Again I am constrained to say that
it is incongruous to speak of the autonomy of the parties to a "contract"
when the issue is contract vel non-andespecially so where the law "agreed
on" by the parties invalidates the agreement.
17. Jackson v. Jackson.30 2 This, another of Corbin's cases invalidating under foreign law, Ehrenzweig dismisses as "explainable on its
peculiar facts." The "peculiar facts" elude me, unless what is meant is that
the decision is justified on a basis unrelated to the Statute of Frauds. The
plaintiff and her now deceased husband lived in Utah with their seven children and their marital disagreements. She went to California and procured
a divorce and property settlement which she claimed she agreed to only
because of the husband's prior oral promise to bequeath $3,500 to each
child. The husband remarried and died leaving each child only $1,000, and
the first wife, on behalf of the children, sued for the rest. She lost under a
plea of the California statute requiring a writing for a promise to make
a will, on the ground that the contract, if made at all, was made in California. There was no comparable Utah statute, yet the court said that
whether an oral promise to make a will was valid under Utah law was a
question not presented. Just possibly, Utah law might have required "clear
and convincing evidence," or proof "beyond a reasonable doubt," which
might amount to a requirement of written evidence.
The case hardly squares with governmental-interest analysis, since
California had no interest in the application of its policy for the protection
of estates and Utah had no discernible policy for the protection of estates.
A sound reason for the result, however, is suggested by the concurring
800 150 N.Y. 314, 44 NE. 959 (1896).
301 See text at note 103, supra.
302 122 Utah 507, 252 P.2d 214 (1953).
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opinion: the parol evidence rule. Rather obviously, the plaintiff was trying
to vary the terms of an "integrated" written agreement by evidence of prior
oral promises. That, I think Ehrenzweig must agree, is not generally encouraged.
18. Detroit & Cleveland Nay. Co. v. Hade.3°8 Belonging to the
same series, this case is disposed of as "based on unacceptable dogmatic
reasoning." I could hardly agree less. The opinion is to a degree conceptual, and unconventionally so; but it reaches a result entirely consistent
with governmental-interest analysis. In addition, it even holds that application of the invalidating law of Michigan is required by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. Of course, this latter circumstance alone is enough to rouse
Ehrenzweig to stigmatize the decision as based on "unacceptable dogmatic
reasoning"; 3 0 4 but I disagree. °5 Here the defendant, a Michigan corporation, engaged the plaintiff, a resident of Michigan, to find a buyer for land
in Ohio. The court treats this as a contract made and (in part) to be performed in Michigan although, as we have seen, such engagements are more
commonly treated as offers for a unilateral contract, accepted when and
where the broker finds a willing and able buyer. Rather fortuitously, this
happened in Ohio (though that is a likely state in which to find a buyer for
Ohio land). Michigan had a stern statute requiring a detailed writing for
brokerage agreements; Ohio had none. What impressed the Ohio court was
that the whole deal was between Michigan people, Ohio being involved
only as the situs of the land (irrelevant) and as the forum (also irrelevant,
since Ohio had no statute that could be construed as stating a judicialadministration policy). Having no interest whatever in the matter, Ohio
abstained from applying its law to interfere in the rights and duties of
Michigan parties to what was essentially (though not conceptually) a
Michigan transaction, and kept hands off. With its conclusion that this
abstention was required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause I am inclined
to agree, though I am troubled by one consideration: The defendant admitted the agreement, except that it maintained it had authorized sale to
any person whatever except the City of Toledo, which just happened to be
the purchaser found by the broker. It seems to me that any reasonable
Statute of Frauds should be satisfied by such an admission, and that the
trier of fact ought to be trusted to determine the truth of the asserted limitation. But then, I do not make, nor do I have authority to interpret, the
statutes of Michigan.
303 106 Ohio St. 464, 140 N.E. 180 (1922).
304 See EBaENzwEiG at 28-33, 138.
305 See Cu

m

ch. 5.

1965]

RULE OF VALIDATION

337
°

19. FranklinSugar Ref. Co. v. William D. Mullen Co." The argument here becomes rather confusing. Previously Ehrenzweig has cited
this case 0 7 as upholding the contract under foreign law; now he cites it,
as the last of Corbin's cases refusing enforcement because of noncompliance with the non-forum statute, only to dispose of it on the ground that
it did not "actually" invalidate the contract. The only way to end the confusion is to revert to the case itself. There can be no possible question about
the fact that the contract was upheld because there was a memorandum
sufficient to satisfy any Statute of Frauds. Thus it appears to be true, if
that is what Ehrenzweig means, that his mentor, Corbin, mis-cited the case;
but I do not apprehend that the case itself, or the treatment of it by either
Ehrenzweig or Corbin, tends to sustain in any way the supposed "rule of
validation. '80 8
VIII
EXCEPTIONS, PROSPECTS, AND HOPEFUL SIGNS
"To be sure, there will remain situationsin which validationunder the
lex fori of a foreign contractinvalid under the foreign law would be undesirable because it would promote forum shopping.... This considerationmay
have been the basis of Cochran v. Ward 3 09 ... (Illinois contract as to Illinois land held invalid as against Illinois defendant under Illinois law.) 3 0
Despite the fact that Ehrenzweig goes on to explain away the phenomenon
as the product of an "obsolescent law of transient jurisdiction," I find it
difficult to reconcile this concession with a "rule of validation" to the effect
that any forum should validate any contract under any "proper" (which I
understand to mean any arguably, however implausibly, applicable) law.
However this may be, I do not understand why this case should be singled
out as a specific example of the (admitted) problem of forum-shopping.
The action was on an alleged oral agreement by the defendant, a resident
of Illinois, to lease land in Illinois to the plaintiff for a term of one year to
commence in the future. In Illinois, though not in Indiana, such an agreement is within the Statute of Frauds. The residence of the plaintiff does not
appear, though it seems that he intended to farm the land; Lawrence
300 12 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1926).

at 473 n. 20; see text at note 168, supra.
The 1964 pocket Supplement to 2 CoRBN" § 293 n. 63 contains the following statement: "Of the cases cited in this note, Ehrenzweig ... says: 'Only Jones v. National Cotton
307 EHRE zwEiG
308

Oil Co. clearly applies an invalidating lex contractus. In other cases the lex fori... did not
actually invalidate the contract (Franklin Sugar).' Ehrenzweig's views are, in general, in
harmony with those expressed in this treatise." What goes on?
309 5 Ind.App. 89, 29 N.E. 795 (1892).
31o The italicized statement is taken from Ehrenzweig's text at p. 475 and n. 34.
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County, Illinois, where the land was situated, is just across the Wabash
River, which forms the boundary between the two states. The opinion is
rather conceptual, holding that Illinois law applies as that of the place
of contracting and situs. If the plaintiff was a resident of Illinois the decision seems clearly sound on the basis of the considerations suggested in
8 n If, as
connection with the case of Detroit & Cleveland Nay. Co. v. Hade.
seems plausible in the circumstances, he was a resident of Indiana, the
decision did not vindicate that state's interest in protecting his reasonable
expectations in reliance on the oral promise; but that may be explainable
on the basis of a Bernkrant operation. True, an Indiana plaintiff may have
been lucky to serve Indiana process on an Illinois defendant, near neighbors
though they may have been; but I am at a loss to understand why Ehrenzweig is content to accept this case as a justifiable departure from his "rule
of validation" on the ground that it is a commendable inhibition against
forum shopping. Whenever a state commits itself to his "rule of validation," will not plaintiffs tend to flock to its courts?
Ehrenzweig concludes his discussion with hopeful reliance on two
inapposite cases. The first is Kossick v. United Fruit Co.,"' and the only
justification for his citation of it is that it cites Ehrenzweig. It is not a conflict-of-laws case in the usual sense at all, but one involving the question
whether federal maritime law shall prevail over a state Statute of Frauds.
The essential question was whether the contract was within the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction; if so, the supreme federal law clearly applied
unless the problem was so strictly local that there was no necessity for
insistence on the usual uniformity and harmony of the federal maritime
law. The Court simply held that the contract was maritime and not local
in this sense, so that federal law must prevail. It is surprising that such a
case should be cited in support of a "rule of validation" in interstate conflicts cases by one who takes considerable pains to distinguish interstate
from inter-heirarchical conflicts l3
The other is the justly famous, though recent, decision of the Supreme
Court of California in Bernkrant v. Fowler,314 in which Mr. Justice (now
Chief Justice) Traynor, for a unanimous court, ruled that the California
statute requiring a writing for a promise to make a will was not intended
by the legislature to apply to a contract involving Arizona plaintiffs, land,
and negotiations, although the action was against the estate of a California
domiciliary. Almost every conflict-of-laws pundit can claim some support
Text at note 303, supra.
312 365 U.S. 731, 81 Sup.Ct. 886, 6 L.Ed. 56 (1961).
313 EHmENZwEIG at 309.
314 55 Cal.2d 588, 12 Cal.Rptr. 266,360 P.2d 906 (1961).
311
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from this catholic opinion; I have staked my own claim. 5 Whether I have
a better claim than anyone else is of course open to question;3 1 I insist,
however, on one point: to cite this sophisticated opinion as one supporting
a "rule of validation" regardless of the governmental interests involved
is not a high compliment to its distinguished author.
Ix
CONCLUSION
Any attempt to summarize the foregoing argument would be largely
a matter of arithmetic, which is not one of my fields of special competence.
The question is: how many of Ehrenzweig's citations would be allowed
by a responsible law-review editor to stand as appropriately invoking the
case in supporting the proposition for which it is cited? I suggest that a
tally would probably indicate that Ehrenzweig has totally failed to sustain
his purported "rule of validation." The reader is cordially invited to make
out his own score-card.
815 See Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CoNTma'. PRoB. 754, 757-58
(1964).
816 Some light on the question may be shed by Chief Justice Traynor's review of my

SELEaTm EssAys, to appear in a forthcoming issue of the DuxE LAW JonerAL.

